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ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to investigating the dynamic properties of Law of One Price (LOP) violations
around periods of market distress. It studies the extent to which these violations are state-dependent
and how they are related to different market conditions. The role of monetary policies and hedge
funds in contributing to LOP equilibrium are also analysed. First part focuses on the construction
of an LOP deviation proxy called Basisbond, derived from the foreign-currency sovereign bond
markets (in USD and Euro) of three main emerging economies (i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Turkey).
It is observed that Basisbond moves close to zero (supporting LOP condition) during good states of
economy (Pre-Crisis), whereas it becomes markedly large, persistent and volatile during bad states
of economy (Credit Crisis). Second part delves deeper into why Basisbond deviated so markedly from
zero during 2008-2009 Credit Crisis. We find strong evidence that rising funding costs, falling bond
supply, intensified risk aversion and deteriorated default risk coupled with macroeconomic shocks are
responsible in deterring arbitrageurs from exploiting the trading strategy, and inducing relative price
divergence. Depending on the geography of bond issuance, there exist cross-sectional idiosyncrasies
regarding the sign of deviation. While Turkey tends to pay smaller credit risk premium in Euro
compared to USD, the opposite is true for Brazil and Mexico. When investors face discordant
default risks across two equivalent securities, the underlying trading strategy is left unexploited.
Moreover, there is strong evidence that different sets of monetary policies have different implications
in resolving LOP disequilibrium. Third part investigates the impact of arbitrageurs (particularly
hedge funds) in supplying liquidity to markets, and thus contributing to correct relative valuation
of mispriced securities. It is confirmed that hedge fund withdrawal, due to severe capital reduction,
contributes adversely to the growth of LOP deviations in credit and swap markets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is good for a scientific enterprise, as well as for a society, to have well established laws. Physics
has excellent laws, such as the law of gravity. What does economics have? The first law of economics
is clearly the law of supply and demand, and a fine law it is. We would nominate as the second law
“the law of one price”.
Lamont and Thaler (2003a)
I. Law of One Price
The law of one price (LOP) requires that two assets generating equal cash-flows should trade at equal
prices. Otherwise, there exists an LOP violation (as called in the finance literature), and potentially
an arbitrage opportunity. This relationship plays a key role in financial economics, as quoted by
Lamont and Thaler (2003b): “Arbitrage is the basis of much of modern financial theory, including
the Modigliani-Miller capital structure propositions, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula, and
the arbitrage pricing theory.”
Violations of LOP are potentially easy for arbitrageurs to eliminate in “free-access” economies. If
two identical securities A and B are trading at two different prices, say $101 and $100, respectively,
then arbitrageurs could sell security A, and use the proceeds to simultaneously buy security B,
locking-in a profit of $1. If access to capital markets is such that sufficient amount of liquidity can
indeed be channeled into the trade (i.e. more arbitrageurs become aware of it, and implement the
same strategy), the price of security B would eventually increase and the price of security A would
eventually decrease, causing prices to converge, eliminating the arbitrage opportunity. Even though
arbitrageurs are notoriously labeled as “free-riders” of the economy, they tend to play an essential
11
role in eliminating mispricings by providing the required liquidity to capital markets, thus allowing
asset prices to reflect correct relative valuation.
The paragraph above points to an important implication, that is, if LOP is violated, the violation
is to be temporary (and small). This is simply due to the correcting mechanism that underlies the
simultaneous buying/selling of arbitrageurs. The real mystery arises, however, when LOP violation
becomes persistent (and large), since it implies that market participants are not willing (or capable)
to exploit the implied arbitrage strategy. This phenomenon begs a series of important questions:
What type of market constraints, costs or aversions limit an arbitrageur’s active participation in
arbitrage trades? Is this evidence of simple market irrationality, or is it rather linked to specific
risk factors and institutional/geographical features that arise during certain states of the economy
that make an arbitrage trade less and less feasible over time?
Understanding the role of markets in favoring (or limiting) the LOP equilibrium is an important
endeavor in modern finance. The implications should be analyzed in a state-dependent approach:
the LOP equilibrium may hold during the “good” states of the economy, but it may become violated
during the “bad” states of the economy, when access to capital is limited, funding constraints are
tightened, uncertainty suppresses risk appetite, and macroeconomic frictions are adversely binding.
It is important to note that, in real life, arbitrage trades are rarely risk-free. The associated
risks can be either systematic, or idiosyncratic, or both. It could be reasonably conjectured that,
when the perceived risk of arbitrage is higher than the return expected from it, the trade could go
unexploited, causing relative prices to diverge further away from each other for an extended period
of time. With a focus on different economic states, this thesis is dedicated to studying the structural
and financial constraints that are responsible for LOP violations, and the role of monetary policies
and hedge funds in contributing to price convergence.
II. Overview of Recent Financial Crisis
While significant deviations from LOP are certainly not common, the recent 2007-2009 financial
crisis offers a unique laboratory to study this phenomenon across different markets. As stated by
Borio (2008), the 2008 financial turbulence was preceded by a period called “Great Moderation” -
a time when the world economy displayed a rapid growth and unusually strong financial-markets
performance, particularly during 2004-2006 period that coincides with rising residential property
prices and low risk premia. What was rather uncommon to previous decades was the unprecedented
level of financial innovation in the credit risk transfer instruments (e.g. credit default swaps and
structured credit products), coupled with high leverages and excessive risk-taking attitude. The
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credit risk inherent in assets was frequently re-bottled and sold off to capital markets. Credit
regulations and rating methodologies were considerably relaxed, allowing banks and other financial
institutions to over-extend their balance sheets, to pursue aggressive shadow-banking techniques
through the use of complicated, off-balance sheet securitisations and derivatives, and to engage in
various predatory lending activities. With the soothing promise of rising property prices whispered
in the background, borrowers were given strong incentives to get committed to difficult mortgage
loans - this was a time of credit and housing boom.
As of mid-2006, however, housing prices began to drop, and interest rates began to climb, giving
the first signals of difficulty for borrowers to refinance their positions. The situation worsened in
2007, as housing prices continued to decline, consumer wealth continued to deteriorate, and number
of defaults began to rise. On April 2, 2007, the subprime lender, New Century Financial Corp., filed
for bankruptcy; and on June 20, 2007, a total of $4 billion of assets were sold by two Bear Stearns
funds to cover the margin calls triggered by the subprime losses. Almost a month later, on July 10,
2007, Standard & Poor’s declared that $12 billion of subprime debt may be subject to rating cuts. As
of August 2007, the U.S. and Euro interbank markets experienced lending/borrowing dislocations,
soon followed by tightened liquidity levels and downgraded structured products, writedowns and
further subprime losses. As banks became increasingly reluctant to lend to each other, liquidity
and counterparty risk premium soared in proportions that became increasingly difficult to relieve.
This “Liquidity Crisis”, as often called in the finance literature, immediately called forth a
regulatory response by the central banks that would soon provide large liquidity injections and
positive public signaling to financial markets. In order to ease the pressure on short-term funding
markets, for instance, Term Auction Facility (TAF) was launched on December 12, 2007. On the
same day, the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the ECB agreed on the extension of USD swap lines
to meet the dollar funding needs of the Euro Zone. Similarly, the creation of Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF) was announced by the Fed on March 11, 2008. Borio (2008) emphasizes
that, although these monetary policies proved effective in easing the funding pressures on interbank
markets, they fell short of addressing the shifting nature of the turmoil, which was becoming more
related to concerns over credit risk than liquidity risk.1 On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
One week later, on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The
following period, often called the “Credit Crisis” was characterized by the bankruptcy of major
financial institutions, defaulted securities, government bailouts, reduction in consumer wealth, rise
in credit risk and unemployment rates, and collapse of the stock markets around the globe.2
1Longstaff (2010) argues that Lehman’s collapse changed the nature of the crisis, stating that, while the major concern previously
had been the lack of market liquidity, the crisis became more affected by solvency risk.
2Some economists argue that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (under the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999)
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This thesis is focused on a time period that spans different economic states, and includes periods
of market distress described above. To be more specific, our list of cross-sectional and time-series
data cover July 2005 - April 2010 period, which is divided into three main stages (and two further
sub-stages). The “Pre-Crisis” period covers July 1, 2005 - August 8, 2007; the “Crisis” period
covers August 9, 2007 - March 31, 2009; the “Post-Crisis” period covers April 1, 2009 - April 30,
2010. We follow Taylor and Williams (2009) and Longstaff (2010) in our sampling procedure, and
divide “Crisis” period further into two subsamples, such that the “Liquidity Crisis” covers August
9, 2007 - August 29, 2008, and the “Credit Crisis” covers September 1, 2008 - March 31, 2009.3
The terminology introduced here, regarding the time periods, will be used throughout the thesis.
III. Overview of Thesis
This thesis studies the dynamic properties of LOP and near-LOP violations around periods of
market distress. We investigate the extent to which these violations are time-varying, how they are
related to specific market conditions, and how they have changed before, during, and after crisis
periods. The brief summary of the thesis chapters follows:
Chapter 2: Literature Review. This chapter summarizes the related streams of literature.
Chapter 3: Mispricing in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data. This chapter
focuses on the construction and the dynamics of a near-LOP deviation proxy, Basisbond, which we
derive from the foreign-currency sovereign bond markets (in USD and Euro) of three main emerging
economies (i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Turkey), whose domestic currencies are neither USD nor Euro.
Two long-term bonds issued by the same sovereign across two foreign currencies, under the ideal
condition of identical cash-flows, must satisfy a no-arbitrage condition. In real life this would be
extremely rare, if not impossible. So we start out by carefully selecting bond pairs issued by the
same sovereign with similar cash-flow structure and time-to-maturity. We short the USD coupon-
bond, convert the dollar proceeds into Euro in the FX spot market, and long the equivalent Euro
coupon-bond of the same issuer. We simultaneously enter into a series of FX forward contracts to
convert each future cash-flow (coupons and principal) of the Euro bond into dollars, and thus create
a synthetic USD bond that consists only of dollar cash-flows. We define Basisbond as the yield of the
synthetic USD bond minus the yield of the cash USD bond. According to LOP, Basisbond, under
was one of the main reasons why the crisis escalated. Glass-Steagall Act commanded against an institution to act as a combination of a
commercial bank, an investment bank and an insurance company, and thus, disallowing an investment bank, for instance, to “gamble”
on the money of the depositors of the affiliated depository bank.
3Bernanke (2009) argues that during the first stage of the crisis, the Federal Reserve provided liquidity to solvent institutions with
minimal credit risk. However, during the second stage of the crisis, the Federal Reserve accepted credit risk exposure by providing capital
to some impaired borrowers in order to directly address counterparty credit risk.
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this ideal setting, must equal zero, so that the arbitrageur would do no better than only perfectly
meeting the dollar liability cash-flows on the USD bond side, using the dollar-converted asset cash-
flows on the Euro bond side. However, due to structural cash-flow mismatches inherent in bond
pairs, Basisbond could at best be a fair approximation of LOP, and therefore, a plausible proxy for
near-LOP deviation. Several examples are discussed in the literature (see Chen and Knez (1995)
and Gatev, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006)). The rest of this chapter is devoted to testing
whether Basisbond is indeed a good and reliable proxy for near-LOP deviation. The conclusion
is affirmative. While Basisbond moves close to zero (supporting LOP condition) during the good
states of the economy (Pre-Crisis), it becomes markedly large, strongly persistent and highly volatile
during the bad states of the economy, far outstripping the total transaction cost threshold (Credit
Crisis).
Chapter 4: Determinants and Geography of Mispricing in Emerging Markets. This chapter delves
deeper into why Basisbond deviated so markedly from zero during Credit Crisis. We find strong
evidence that deteriorated bond supply, tightened funding costs, macroeconomic shocks and ex-
asperated default risk are jointly responsible in explaining the deviation. In addition, when the
trading strategy is created by shorting the USD bond and longing the Euro bond, the sign of
Basisbond displays cross-sectional idiosyncrasies, such that it is generally positive for Brazil and
Mexico, and negative for Turkey.4 This raises important discussions about the geographical nature
of the financial frictions at hand: Turkey pays smaller credit risk premium in Euro compared to
USD, while the opposite is true for Brazil and Mexico. We find evidence that the reason behind this
could be related to reserve distribution dynamics of the given emerging market central banks, and
the differing features of the interbank funding constraints across USD and Euro. This chapter also
studies the impact of regulatory interventions and announcements in relieving Basisbond violations,
and in contributing to price discovery. In order to understand the nature of the market frictions
being targeted, we first categorize into different groups the monetary policies launched by the Fed
and the U.S. Treasury. We then test whether any of these policies helped to reduce the size of
Basisbond. We find evidence that different sets of policies have different impacts and implications
(positive and negative) on cross-sectional Basisbond, such that at some points, the exclusion of one
country from a certain policy (e.g. Turkey was excluded from the Fed’s dollar swap line extensions,
while Brazil and Mexico were included) can indeed open the cross-sectional gap of the LOP violation
across different countries.
Chapter 5: Supply of Risk Capital: Role of Arbitrageurs and Cross-Market Interactions. This
chapter investigates the impact of arbitrageurs (particularly hedge funds) in supplying liquidity
to capital markets, and thus contributing to correct relative valuation of mispriced securities. In
4This means that the strategy should be reversed to make profit with Turkish bonds.
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order to carry out the investigation, we generate a set of different LOP deviation proxies in credit
and swap markets represented by ~Basis, which is composed of (1) Emerging Market Eurobond
Basis, Basisbond, which we described in the above, (2) Developed Market CDS Basis, Basiscds, (3)
Swap Market CIRP Bases, Basisscirp and Basislcirp. Our findings suggest that the components of
~Basis fluctuate around zero during Pre-Crisis, but become large, volatile and persistent during
Credit Crisis, when there is a level of commonality among them due to a systemic risk factor.
Furthermore, we confirm the hypothesis that the withdrawal (“de-participation”) of hedge funds
from the markets, due to reduction in their capital, contributes significantly and adversely to ~Basis
deviations, implying further LOP divergence. We show that both AuM depletion and deleveraging
tends to exert a significant impact on LOP divergence. Supporting evidence is found that collateral
constraints (captured by tightened requirements on loans and credit lines) have a significantly
adverse impact on both hedge fund deleveraging and LOP disequilibrium.
Chapter 6: Conclusions: This chapter gives the summary results of all chapters.
IV. Remarks on Notation
Sections and Subsections: Chapters are ordered according to Arabic numbers. Sections are
ordered according to Roman numbers (and they re-start from I. for each chapter). Subsections are
alphabetically ordered (and they re-start from A. for each section).
Tables and Figures: Tables and Figures are represented in C(n).T (n) and C(n).F (n) format in
the body of text, respectively, where C(n) denotes the Chapter number, T (n) denotes the Table
number, and F (n) denotes the Figure number. To give an example, Table C(3).T(1) is denoted
as Table 3.1, which refers to Chapter 3, Table 1. Similarly, Figure C(4).F(2) is denoted as Figure
4.2, which refers to Chapter 4, Figure 2. Note that T (n) and F (n) re-start from 1 for each chapter
C(n). All tables and figures are given at the end of each corresponding chapter.
Appendices: Appendices are given at the end of each corresponding chapter.
Bibliography: Bibliography is given at the end of thesis.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis is related to seven main streams of literature, the relevance of which will be clear in the
coming chapters.
Literature Stream 1: The first stream studies the economic reasons for observed deviations from
the law of one price, and argues that arbitrage strategies, in practice, are very rarely risk-free.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) state that arbitrageurs with short horizons
would be concerned about liquidating their mispriced assets, and hence act relatively less aggres-
sive against the unpredictable behavior of unsophisticated investors who generate risks that make
arbitrage trades less attractive. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that a widening in the mispricing
of an asset may lead arbitrageurs to unwind their positions, which may further amplify the initial
mispricing. Such forced unwinding can be due to a suboptimal design of the capital structure of
the arbitrageur. As he loses money on his positions, his investors ask earlier reimbursement. If the
arbitrageur cannot compensate the demand shock of his investors (for instance by increasing his
leverage), then deviations from the LOP can be persistent. Feeding from the potential implications
of financial constraints on the equilibrium asset prices, this stream also focuses on different forms of
frictions that may cause this persistence: (a) liquidity costs; (b) short-selling constraints; (c) lever-
age constraints; (d) other institutional frictions and macro shocks. Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
investigate the impact of illiquidity on asset pricing, arguing that a strong measure of illiquidity
can be captured by the spread between bid and ask prices. They theoretically show that asset
returns are an increasing concave function of the measure of illiquidity (i.e. higher bid/ask spreads
produce higher expected returns). Similarly, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) find a link between risk
management and liquidity and its effect on asset prices. They argue that an institution may choose
to tighten its risk management and to reduce its security holdings, which leads to the reduction
of liquidity in the market. Therefore, when every institution chooses a tight risk management,
the market liquidity is severely impaired, and as a result, the asset prices drop significantly, given
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that liquidity risk is also priced in these assets. The authors highlight the multiplier effect of this
phenomenon: the tighter the risk management, the higher the risk in the expected selling period,
and thus even tighter the risk management. For the role of collateral value, Detemple and Murthy
(1997) examine the frictions on portfolio weights limiting the short sale of assets. They argue that
the existence of a collateral component suggests that all assets can deviate from the intertemporal
MRS pricing in unrestricted trades. Similarly, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) explain how collateral
may prevent the positions of an arbitrageur, such that the problems in asset liquidation (carried
out by the hedge funds) lead to large drops in asset prices. For the role of limited risk capital,
Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) give evidence for the existence of limited arbitrage in
the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets. They argue that a marginal investor in a specific
asset market is a specialized arbitrageur (not a diversified representative investor). Since special-
ized arbitrageurs constitute only a small set of investors, any distressed liquidation that they face
is expected to have large effects on the asset prices. Therefore, the impact of limits to arbitrage are
more pronounced in markets that need more expertise, such as the MBS market. The authors prove
theoretically that liquidations have indeed a large effect in these markets, and limited capital (in
the form of value-at-risk requirements) influences the price of prepayment risks. As a related work,
on margin requirements, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model where the capital of
the speculator drives market liquidity and risk premiums. They define “market liquidity [as] the
ease with which [an asset] is traded”and “funding liquidity [as] the ease with which [traders] can
obtain funding”. They show that under tight funding conditions, traders cannot open positions in
high-margin securities, which in turn reduces market liquidity and increases volatility. Similarly,
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) introduce a cross-asset arbitrage model driven by demand shocks that
in turn generate mispricings across assets. Their theoretical framework gives strong evidence for
the impact of holding costs, leverage and equity constraints on arbitrageur’s ability to bring prices
back to fundamentals. In context of margin constraints, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) generate
a dynamic general-equilibrium model with margin constraints, capturing the features of liquidity
crises. They find that the price gaps between a security and a derivative (with identical cash flows)
is a function of their margin requirements and funding costs. They also show that “negative shocks
to fundamentals make margin constraints bind”, which in turn decreases the risk-free rates and
increases Sharpe ratios of risky securities.
Literature Stream 2: The second stream of the literature investigates market anomalies that
appear to be unrelated to economic fundamentals. Within this literature several empirical stud-
ies focus on violations of the LOP. These include the Siamese-Twin stocks puzzle by Rosenthal
and Young (1990), the closed-end discount puzzle by Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998), the
Palm-3Com spin-off puzzle by Lamont and Thaler (2003b), the put-call parity deviations by Ofek,
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), the U.S. TIPS-Nominal Bonds puzzle by Fleckenstein, Longstaff,
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and Lustig (2010), and the CIRP violation puzzle by Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009), and Griffoli
and Ranaldo (2011).1 The American Depository Receipts (ADR) anomaly is discussed by Chung
(2005) who investigates how changes in the Thai baht exchange rate during the period of the Asian
financial crisis impacted prices, trading activity and the liquidity of ADRs. Gagnon and Karolyi
(2010) use a vast data set to compare intraday prices and quotes of ADRs in the U.S. market with
synchronous prices of their home-market shares, and find that while deviations from price parity
are, on average, small, they can be volatile, and are related to country-level proxies for limits to
arbitrage.
We are distinguished from many of these studies in terms of both the structure of our data and
the type of questions we ask. Our empirical analysis is based on the data from large and liquid
markets, where shorting costs are tiny and symmetrical across currency denominations, and the two
assets converge in value at maturity. Moreover, the nature of our data set allows us to address a
set of different questions than the previous literature: what are the cross-sectional and geographical
differences in LOP deviations, and how are they correlated with the respective funding markets?
Literature Stream 3: The third stream of the literature investigates the role of institutional and
credit frictions in the international provision of liquidity. Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2012)
argue that, during credit crisis, shocks to U.S. money-market funds caused a sharp reduction to the
funding provided to European banks, which created a wedge between the cost of USD and Euro
funding. They suggest that a potential driver behind the persistent violations of covered interest
rate parity, observed during 2008 market turmoil, can be found in a framework in which a European
bank would cut USD lending more than Euro lending in response to a shock to its credit quality.
This stream also focuses on how systemic liquidity shocks that originate from one market are
transmitted to local lending channels of other markets (Tong and Wei (2011); Schnabl (2012)); and
how global banks contribute to the amplification of the international transmission of local liquidity
shocks (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012); Giannetti and Laeven (2012)). To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to show the presence of a cross-sectional sign difference in the LOP deviations,
which are related to different funding frictions across different geographies.
Literature Stream 4: The fourth stream of the literature is related to the literature on credit
risk pricing. This stream has developed in two directions.
The first direction deals with the decomposition of yield spreads in a single-currency setting (El-
ton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001); Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001); Longstaff,
Neis, and Mithal (2005)). These studies show that yield spread levels and dynamics are difficult
to reconcile with traditional structural credit risk models with additive preferences when calibrated
1Refer to Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for an excellent treatment of the main literature on market anomalies.
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to historical default and recovery rates. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) argue the
existence of a systematic factor that is not identifiable from traditional risk factors. Elton, Gruber,
Agrawal, and Mann (2001) decompose corporate bonds into default risk, tax premium and risk
premium, showing that the majority of the dynamics is explained by a systemic factor. Similarly,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) discuss the existence of a systematic factor, which
is not identifiable from traditional priced risk factors. After decomposing the credit yield spreads,
they argue that traditional models of default risk explain relatively a small portion of the change in
credit yield spreads. Although both works focus on a single currency, they provide a useful insight
into how credit risk premiums across different currencies would behave in the market. Their results
support that the credit risk premium of a single issuer may not be explained only by the unit-free
default risk, and may be related to other unit-bearing determinants, which may indeed differ across
currencies. On the other hand, Longstaff, Neis, and Mithal (2005) decompose credit spreads into
default and non-default components, and conclude that the majority of the bond yield spreads is
actually explained by default risk.
The second direction deals with yield spreads of a single issuer in a multi -currency setting.
Examples include studies on currency dependence in credit factor risk models (Kercheval, Goldberg,
and Breger (2003)), the impact of the correlation between default variables and exchange rates
(Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005)), and the impact of sudden devaluations (Ehlers and Schonbucher
(2006)). To be more specific, Kercheval, Goldberg, and Breger (2003) derive a covered interest
arbitrage condition, where the changes in the credit risk premiums of a single issuer, across two
currencies, are expected to be highly correlated, and of the same sign and similar magnitude.
Their findings suggest that the Euro, Sterling, and USD credit spreads of an issuer, (i.e. Toyota,
Dresdner Bank, European Investment Bank), is weakly correlated during 1999 - 2001, and are highly
currency-dependent, implying that the cross-currency risk premiums (of a single issuer) may not
fully represent the perceived creditworthiness of that issuer. Furthermore, Ehlers and Schonbucher
(2006) discuss a theoretical framework where the difference in cross-currency risk premiums is not
only driven by the dependency between the default risk of the obliger and the exchange rate, but
also by sudden devaluations (jumps) in the market. Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005) show that the
risk premiums must be identical for a single issuer as long as the default variables and exchange
rates are uncorrelated. Their findings point to the existence of currency dependence in international
corporate bonds. Landschoot (2008) shows how corporate credit spreads in two different currencies
(i.e USD and Euro) of two different issuers (i.e U.S. and Euro Zone) respond to various yield
factors and market factors. The paper concludes that USD credit spreads, compared to their
Euro counterparts, react more strongly to changes in the level and the slope of the risk-free term
structure, the stock market returns and their volatility. These questions are important, since it is
common market practice among investment banks, data suppliers (i.e. Reuters and Bloomberg) and
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rating agency companies (i.e. Moody’s and Standard Poors) to employ USD as an input to price
the credit risk of products that make reference to the same issuer, even across different currency
denominations. The implicit assumption is that the FX market is liquid and deep enough to make
the USD a perfect substitute for other currencies, and that yield spreads (across two currencies)
are functions only of the underlying risk-free rates and the default credibility of the issuer.
Literature Stream 5: The fifth stream is related to the role of specialized institutions (particu-
larly hedge funds) in ensuring market efficiency by trading assets with similar cash flows. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) argue that the ability of a specialized hedge fund in stabilizing prices can be
substantially hindered by the behavior of performance-based, uninformed investors who could re-
deem capital after negative fund performance. As an empirical validation, Fleckenstein, Longstaff,
and Lustig (2010) find strong evidence of the healing impact of arbitrage-related hedge funds on
the convergence of TIPS-Treasury mispricing. The negativity of their slope coefficient shows that
the corresponding mispricing indeed diminishes with increasing hedge fund returns, and thus with
positive hedge fund performance and higher amounts of capital available. Moreover, Liu and Mello
(2011) focus on how risk of coordination (i.e. uncertainty about behavior of other investors) might
lead to the vicious cycle of capital withdrawals that would result in further LOP discrepancies.
Furthermore, Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) establish the role of hedge fund rehypothecation in the
widening of LOP deviations in the wake of 2008 crisis. They document that hedge fund delever-
aging (due to rescission of prime brokerage debt financing) leads to a severe capital dry-up, which
then forces hedge funds to reduce or liquidate their positions, eventually causing prices to diverge
further away from their relative fundamentals. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to quantify the impact of hedge fund capital (from both equity and debt sides) on the growth of
LOP deviations.
Literature Stream 6: The sixth stream is related to common factor models and their applications
on large data sets of economic series (see Stock and Watson (2002a), Stock and Watson (2002b); Bai
and Ng (2002), Bai and Ng (2006); Ludvigson and Ng (2009)). It is argued by Stock and Watson
(2002b) that a factor model allows to capture the covariance of a large set of different economic series
by a small number of unobserved common components, which can be consistently generated via
principal components analysis. This approach has three main advantages: (1) structural instabilities
and idiosyncratic shocks are ironed out in the process of common factor generation if they differ
substantially among the given economic series (see Stock and Watson (2002a)), (2) predictability
of real economic indicators is substantially improved when the forecasting is based on large data
sets as opposed to low-dimensional regressions (see Stock and Watson (2004)), and (3) it can deal
with a large set of variables without facing the scarce degrees of freedom problems (see Breitung
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and Eickmeier (2005)).2 Although there is a growing stream of literature that finds strong links
between LOP deviations and financial market risks, there is little evidence between the link of the
former and macroeconomic shocks.
Literature Stream 7: The eighth stream is related to the literature that studies the policy im-
plications on market anomalies. Regarding the defining features of the recent liquidity crisis, Borio
(2008) highlights, first, the idiosyncratic attributes (e.g. financial innovation of credit structured
products, and limitations of originate-and-distribute model), which led to excessive risk-taking un-
der the illusion of security; and second, the common fundamental attributes (e.g. thirst for the
expansion of credits and balance sheets during times of economic booms), which tend to build up
in time to cause severe financial imbalances. Borio (2008) argues that both these attributes, though
mostly the common factors, need to be addressed via the improvement of transparency and risk
management systems, as well as the refinement of monetary policies that manage efficient liquid-
ity funding to interbank markets. Furthermore, Gromb and Vayanos (2010) highlight the role of
specialized institutions in the optimal allocation of capital, and their impact on socially optimal
decisions. Krishnamurthy (2010) argues that financial crises, including the subprime and Lehman’s
collapse, provide a compelling example of how government intervention can play a role in the smooth
functioning of financial markets. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that in the presence
of market frictions, market incompleteness creates the possibility of Pareto improvements triggered
by public intervention. The research on LOP anomalies is no doubt linked to the debate on the
optimal design of public policies during financial crises. However, the literature that specifically
deals with this issue is limited, even though it deserves careful attention. This paper aims to deliver
how important (or not) the role of regulation is on the dynamics of LOP deviations, as a possibly
new stream of literature that might lead to further research.
2Other important applications of dynamic factors models show other benefits of the method in the investigation of a wide array of
macroeconomic activities and policy analysis (see Bernanke and Boivin (2003); Stock and Watson (2005); Boivin and Giannoni (2005);
Ludvigson and Ng (2007)).
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Chapter 3
Mispricing in Emerging Markets:
Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data
As a way of meeting long-term funding needs in international markets, it is common practice for
sovereigns and multinational corporations to issue long-term bonds denominated in currencies that
are strictly foreign to the local currency of the issuer. These bonds are called Eurobonds, which tend
to offer fixed coupon flows over their lifetime, and are regarded as fairly attractive debt instruments,
as they give issuers the versatility of financing themselves in any foreign currency they could issue.
For instance, a large number of emerging sovereigns, such as Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, issue
both USD- and Euro-denominated bonds with similar time-to-maturities, even though their local
currency is neither USD nor Euro.
In this chapter we discuss that, in a frictionless market, the yields of emerging market Eurobonds
(denominated in two foreign currencies) should approximately satisfy a simple LOP condition when
their time-to-maturities, coupon structures, and expected recovery rates are very similar. We state
that the price of a USD-denominated Brazilian bond, for instance, should be more or less equal
to that of a synthetic USD bond that is constructed by swapping each future cash-flow of the
Euro-denominated bond of the same issuer into dollars via the USD/EUR FX forward market.
This means that traders, who short the USD-denominated bond and long the Euro-denominated
bond, should do no better than meeting their dollar obligations by converting their Euro receivables
into dollars, and should leave the trade with roughly zero profit/loss. The same logic applies to
traders who long the USD-denominated bond and short the Euro-denominated bond. Otherwise,
they would be in a position to extract a sizable return by exploiting the two nearly-identical debt
securities of a single issuer.
During the 2007-2008 crisis, several institutional investors reported the existence of such an
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opportunity in the Eurobond markets, relating to the foreign bonds of emerging countries. But the
question is whether the LOP was genuinely impaired in these markets after carefully accounting
for transaction costs, exchange rate risks and structural limitations? This chapter investigates the
dynamic properties of this specific case with a focus on emerging countries. We study the extent to
which our constructed LOP proxy, called Basisbond is time-varying and state-dependent, and how
it has changed before, during and after the 2007-2008 crisis. Indeed, while we find no evidence of
a severe violation before 2007, a significant anomaly emerges during the 2008-2009 Credit Crisis,
lasting not merely a few days but over three months. To be more precise, we find that, by mid-
October 2008, Basisbond of the 2010-maturity Brazilian bonds reached 407 bps after hedging out
the exchange rate risk and accounting for transaction costs. Around the same period, this deviation
was 209 bps for 2015-maturity Brazilian bonds, 136 bps for 2020-maturity Mexican bonds, 169 bps
for 2014-maturity Turkish bonds, and 201 bps for 2019-maturity Turkish bonds. These are large
values indeed, given the liquid nature of these securities.
There is a flourishing literature studying such market anomalies, even though, to the best of
our knowledge, a case of Eurobond mispricing has never been discussed in the literature before.
Some of the most significant anomalies include the U.S. TIPS-Treasury Bond puzzle (Fleckenstein,
Longstaff, and Lustig (2010)), the CIRP puzzle (Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011)), and the CDS-bond
basis (Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011)) and the Siamese-Twin stocks
puzzle (Rosenthal and Young (1990)). A differentiating feature of our work is that it provides both
cross-sectional and time-series information across different emerging markets. Moreover, while
the CDS-bond basis refers to a spread between two somewhat different assets, with substantially
different liquidity and counterparty risks (a feature that is notoriously difficult to measure precisely),
sovereign bond pairs are more homogeneous, even though they also suffer from certain structural
limitations (to be discussed later). In addition, sovereign bond markets are substantially more liquid
compared to twin stocks. Furthermore, bonds have a finite terminal resolution of uncertainty, so
that the cash flows of the two legs of the trade must converge in finite time (either at maturity or
at default).
In this chapter we proceed as follows. First, we extend the covered interest rate parity (i.e.
CIRP) condition and derive an LOP relationship that should hold for the bonds denominated in
two different currencies by the same issuer. Second, we select the three most important emerging
sovereign bond markets (by notional amount outstanding) with bond issues denominated in both
USD and Euro (i.e. Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico). These countries have four important features: (a)
they have large and liquid Eurobond markets, in which trading costs were small before the crisis,
(b) they were “remote” to the epicenter of the subprime crisis, as they were upgraded by credit
rating agencies between 2007 and 2011, (c) their bond prices more or less satisfied the LOP prior to
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the crisis, and (d) they provide multiple pairs of tradable assets across different continents. Third,
we identify specific bond pairs from the same issuer with nearly identical maturities in USD and
Euro. Fourth, we construct an LOP proxy called Basisbond based on shorting the USD-denominated
bond and longing the EUR-denominated bond of the same issuer, and converting the future cash
flows of the Euro-denominated bond into USD in the forward FX markets. Fifth, we investigate the
state-dependent dynamics of Basisbond before, during and after 2007-2008 crisis. Sixth, we quantify
the impact of the structural limitations of the trade arising from the cash-flow mismatches.
We find a number of interesting results. There is strong evidence that, while Basisbond (net of
transaction costs) across Brazil, Mexico and Turkey fluctuated close to zero during Pre-Crisis, it
became markedly large, highly volatile, and strongly persistent during Credit Crisis. Multiple hy-
pothesis tests reveal that the character of Basisbond changes substantially from Pre-Crisis to Credit
Crisis across all countries, suggesting the presence of a severe distributional shock across different
subsamples. It is also found that the sign of Basisbond deviations differ from one geography to
another. When the trade is constructed by shorting the USD bond and longing the Euro bond
for each country, it is mostly the case that Turkish Basisbond < 0, whereas Mexican and Brazilian
Basisbond > 0. The negativity of the LOP deviation in Turkey, and positivity of it in Brazil and
Mexico suggest the presence of potential frictions that operate at a geography-specific level. It
also implies that Turkey often pays higher yield (and risk premium) in USD, whereas Brazil and
Mexico often pay higher yield (and risk premium) in Euro. This casts doubt about whether the
creditworthiness of a certain sovereign is truly universal across its debt-securities with different for-
eign currency denominations. Furthermore, our scenario-based assessments of structural limitations
clearly show that the impact of cash-flow mismatches is extremely unlikely to explain the Basisbond
deviations, which opens the door to Chapter 4 where we search for those exogenous state-dependent
factors that are responsible for this pricing anomaly.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section I details the theoretical framework of the potential
mispricing in emerging market sovereign bonds that are denominated in two foreign currencies to
the issuer. Section II gives the data description on the constituents of Basisbond. Section III details
the construction of Basisbond as an LOP proxy, and Section IV discusses the dynamics of Basisbond
and the associated multi-sample hypothesis tests during different subsamples. Section V quantifies
the impact of structural limitations inherent in the Basisbond trade. Section VI prepares for the
next chapter and concludes with a discussion on how to interpret the Basisbond anomaly. Section
VII and Section VIII, respectively, give Appendix A and Appendix B.
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I. LOP Restriction in Sovereign Bond Markets
A. Zero-Coupon Framework
In the absence of frictions, the Law of One Price suggests a simple link between contingent claims
denominated in different currencies. This relationship, known in international finance as the covered
interest rate parity (CIRP), requires that at time t=0 the returns of two riskless investments with
maturity T = 1 year must satisfy:
[1 +Ra(t, T )] =
X(t)
F (t, T )
[1 +Rb(t, T )] (3.1)
where Ri(t, T ) is the underlying annual risk-free rate in the two corresponding currencies i = (a, b)
- with a=USD and b=EUR, respectively - and X(t) and F (t, T ) are the EUR/USD (EUR per unit
of USD) spot and forward exchange rates, respectively.
An investor can borrow one dollar today, owing [1 + Ra(t, T )] at maturity T , convert it to
X(t) Euros at time t, invest in a Euro deposit, and thus receive X(t)[1 + Rb(t, T )] Euros at ma-
turity T . If the forward exchange rate for time T is F (t, T ), the dollar value of this investment
is [X(t)/F (t, T )][1 + Rb(t, T )], which therefore needs to equal [1 + Ra(t, T )] unless an arbitrage
opportunity exists. If, for instance:
[1 +Ra(t, T )] <
X(t)
F (t, T )
[1 +Rb(t, T )] (3.2)
such that [1+Ra(t, T )] = $1.2 and X(t)[1+Rb(t, T )]/F (t, T ) = $1.7, the arbitrageur would lock-in
a profit of $0.5 at time T if he would borrow 1 USD at time t by shorting the given riskless USD
security, and later convert the 1 USD into X(t) Euros, and lend these Euros by longing the riskless
Euro security, while committing simultaneously to a forward exchange contract that would convert
the future Euro receivable into dollars via F (t, T ).
One may consider extending the CIRP from default-free zero-coupon bonds to defaultable zero-
coupon bonds. Imagine, for instance, two pure discount bonds with maturity T , issued by Brazil, in
two foreign currencies (i.e. USD and EUR). The arbitrageur has contemporaneous access to both
spot and forward FX markets. Consider the following conditions:
C1 Liquidity Constraints. The two bonds are identical in terms of liquidity. Both bond markets
are accessible by the arbitrageur at the same time.
C2 Short-selling Constraints. The two bonds are not subject to short-selling constraints, or the
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inventory in the broker-dealer market is such that the two bonds have identical short-selling
costs.
C3 Funding Constraints. Each arbitrageur has free access to raise short-term and long-term
capital in both USD and EUR.
C4 Simultaneous Default. The two bonds have simultaneous default.
C5 Pari Passu. The two bonds are pari-passu and the risk-adjusted recovery values are the same
for both bonds.1
Proposition 1. Let the credit yield spreads (paid over the risk-free rates) of the two bonds in USD
and Euro be denoted by Sa(t, T ) and Sb(t, T ), respectively. When conditions C1 - C5 hold, the
following holds:
[1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y a(t,T )
] =
X(t)
F (t, T )
[1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y b(t,T )
] (3.3)
where yield-to-maturity of the bonds in USD and Euro are denoted by Y a(t, T ) and Y b(t, T ), respec-
tively.
Proof. See Appendix A to Chapter 3.
Indeed, a trader with unlimited access to forward markets can replicate synthetically the USD
bond with a EUR bond after hedging the future cash flows in the FX forward market. Notice that
under the previous conditions, since bond cash-flows are identical state-by-state, the concepts of
no-arbitrage, market integration and covered interest rate parity coincide.
Re-arranging Eq. (3.3), we can obtain the following decomposition:[
X(t)
F (t, T )
[1 +Rb(t, T )]− [1 +Ra(t, T )]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CIRP Component
+
[
X(t)
F (t, T )
Sb(t, T )− Sa(t, T )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spread Component
= 0 (3.4)
It can be stipulated that under LOP condition, both CIRP and Spread components must be equal
to zero in a frictionless market. If LOP is violated, this might be due to (i) the violation of the
CIRP component and not the Spread component; or (ii) the violation of the Spread component and
not the CIRP component; or (iii) the violation of both components at the same time. This concept
will be revisited in Section III, Chapter 4.
1This may not be the case when one of the two bonds is denominated in the domestic currency of the issuer. Since countries that do
not peg their currency have control over their monetary policy, they can formally avoid default on their domestic bonds by printing local
currency.
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B. Coupon Framework
Our framework involves coupon-paying Eurobonds issued by the same emerging market sovereign
in USD and Euro. Assume that both bonds have the same maturity, same coupon timing, and
same coupon frequency. Consider that a trader shorts the USD bond of Brazil, for instance, and
simultaneously longs Brazil’s equivalent Euro bond, after converting the initially borrowed USD
amount into Euro via the spot FX market. The trader must convert the Euro proceeds to dollars
in the forward FX market at each cash-flow date, in order to meet the dollar obligations on the
liability side.
Let us denote Caj as the j
th dollar cash-flow of the annual-coupon USD bond; Cbj as the j
th Euro
cash-flow of the annual-coupon EUR bond; and [1/Fj ] as the USD/EUR Forward FX rate exercised
at jth cash-flow date. Note that Cbj [1/Fj ] = C
a∗
j across the lifetime of the given EUR bond would
create a synthetic USD bond. The difference between the present values of the cash-flows of the
synthetic USD bond and the original USD bond is:
D =
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
(1 + Y a)j
−
m∑
j=1
Caj
(1 + Y a)j
(3.5)
where Y a is the market yield of the USD bond, and m is the total number of cash-flows. As
mentioned before, Y a consists of the underlying risk-free rate plus the credit yield spread.
Let Y a
∗
be the yield of the synthetic USD bond. Y a
∗
is the yield that equates the present value of
the synthetic USD bond’s future cash-flows to the present value of the original USD bond’s future
USD cash-flows. Therefore:
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
(1 + Y a∗)j
=
m∑
j=1
Caj
(1 + Y a)j
(3.6)
Substituting Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.5);
D =
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
(1 + Y a)j
−
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
(1 + Y a∗)j
=
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
[
1
(1 + Y a)j
−
1
(1 + Y a∗)j
]
(3.7)
For no-arbitrage, we must have D=0, which implies Y a
∗
= Y a. For D 6= 0, we must have Y a
∗
6= Y a.
The logic here is that a potential trader, who shorts the USD-denominated bond and longs the
Euro-denominated bond of a single issuer could do no better than meeting his dollar obligations by
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converting his Euro receivables into dollars, and leave the trade with zero profit/loss. If Y a
∗
> Y a,
the expected return of the synthetic bond would be higher than the original cash USD bond.
Structural Limitations - Preview
In reality, however, the maturities of the bonds, as well as the coupon rates, timings and frequencies
do not exactly match, and the forward FX rates are not constant. Under these limitations, there is
no room for a guaranteed arbitrage setting. However, we hypothesize that any sizable deviation of
Y a
∗
− Y a from zero would nonetheless give us a plausible approximation and a useful insight about
a potential anomaly in Eurobond markets. Part of this deviation would be traced to the structural
mismatches in the cash-flows (discussed in Section V of this chapter), but part of it would depend
on the economic risk factors that become increasingly pronounced and relevant during turmoil
periods (discussed in Chapter 4). Therefore, if Y a
∗
− Y a is unusually large relative to past trends
(based on multi-sample hypothesis tests), it becomes reasonable to question as to whether there is
indeed a reason for deviation beyond these structural limitations, and whether any state-dependent
economic risk factors and geographical frictions could also be responsible for it. This is what we aim
to investigate in this and the next chapter. We validate our hypothesis in the following sections,
where we show that Basisbond differs greatly in magnitude and volatility during different economic
periods, and that it is indeed affected by different economic risk factors and geographical frictions.
II. Data Description and Exploratory Analysis
A. Bond Yield Data
Covering the period between July 2005 to April 2010, we collect daily data on U.S. and Euro risk-
free rates and EUR/USD spot and forward exchange rates (1 week to 10 years) using matching
end-of-day Bloomberg data. From the same source, and for the same time period, we also obtain
daily bid-ask prices and yields on Euro- and USD-denominated bonds of maturities up to 30 years
for the three largest emerging market (i.e. EM) sovereign issuers: Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico. These
countries have issued a large cross-section of bonds across both currencies in the ten years prior to
the Crisis. Bid-ask prices and yields are retrieved as the end-of-day (17:00) weighted average of the
quotes submitted by a minimum of five brokers and dealers (Bloomberg BGN).2 This procedure
does not pick the lowest (highest) price offer, but assigns a weight to each contributor based on
2See also Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Landschoot (2008), Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and
Lustig (2010), and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) for examples using BGN prices.
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specific factors, such as the updating frequency. This allows for the minimization on the impact
of measurement error from a specific broker dealer, and makes prices more reflective of market
conditions. For particular currency pairs, BGN prices are adjusted to trading hours.
All bonds have fixed coupon rates and are neither callable, puttable, structured, or convertible.
Brady Bonds are excluded.3 We also exclude domestic bonds and/or bonds governed by domestic
jurisdictions. After these filters, as of July 2005, Turkey has 10 Euro- and 22 USD-denominated
bonds outstanding. Brazil has 6 Euro- and 22 USD-denominated bonds and Mexico has 5 Euro- and
10 USD-denominated bonds outstanding.4 Our sample shows that the emerging market Eurobonds
do not suffer from stale prices.5
From this sample, we pool and match the USD- and Euro-denominated bonds for Brazil, Mexico
and Turkey with respect to their maturity dates. We define the maturity mismatch as the number of
days between the maturities of USD- and Euro-denominated bonds for each country. Accordingly,
we only include bond pairs with a maturity mismatch of less than or equal to 70 days (see also
Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010)). This is the case for the 2010-maturity Brazilian bonds
(maturity mismatch of 70 days), the 2015-maturity Brazilian bonds (maturity mismatch of 32 days),
the 2014-maturity Turkish bonds (maturity mismatch of 26 days), the 2019-maturity Turkish bonds
(maturity mismatch of 22 days), and the 2020-maturity Mexican (maturity mismatch of 49 days).
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics of the given bond pairs used in our analysis.
The preliminary observations are worth discussing. The common pattern in all bonds is that
the yields in both USD and Euro tend to increase from Liquidity Crisis to Credit Crisis, and then
decrease during Post-Crisis period.6 Given that the bond yield is a function of the underlying
risk-free rate and the credit yield spread (i.e. credit risk premium), this very pattern alone suggests
that the market perceives the emerging country bonds increasingly “risky” during Credit Crisis.
In Turkey, for instance, the average yield (volatility) of 2014 EUR-denominated bond, from
Liquidity to Credit Crises, increases by 1.21% (0.92%), that is from 6.10% (0.48%) to 7.31% (1.40%),
while the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent USD-denominated bond increases by 1.57%
3Claessens and Pennacchi (1996) argue that the price of a Brady bond, having a third-party guarantee, does not accurately reflect a
country’s fundamental creditworthiness, and hence require additional adjustments.
4Note that the number of bonds denominated in Euro is usually smaller than in USD. This is because the USD-based Eurobond
market is still more popular among investors, although the Euro-based Eurobond market has been on the rise since the introduction of
Euro in 2000.
5During Credit Crisis, there are at most two instances when prices are stale: (1) for one day, and (2) for two days. The instance
(1) is observed only for 2015-maturity Brazilian EUR- and USD-denominated bond; and instance (2) is observed only for 2019-maturity
Turkish EUR-denominated bond, and 2015-maturity Brazilian USD-denominated bond. Total number of days when prices are stale is
only six across all five bond pairs (ten bonds) with 153 trading days for each bond (a total of 1530 trading days for all bonds) during
Credit Crisis. Therefore, the rate of occurrence of stale prices is less than 0.4%.
6Note, however, that the average Pre-Crisis yield levels of 2010 and 2015 USD-denominated bonds of Brazil are higher than those
of the Credit Crisis. This is the only exception in our entire cross-sectional sample (the same pattern does not hold for Brazil’s EUR-
denominated bonds, for instance.). Excluding Brazil’s USD-denominated bonds, the Credit Crisis yield levels are always higher than the
Pre-Crisis levels across all bonds in the corresponding emerging countries.
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(1.19%), that is from 6.23% (0.40%) to 7.80% (1.59%). While the the average yield (volatility) of
2014 EUR-denominated bond, from Credit Crisis to Post-Crisis, decreases by 2.97% (0.66%), that
is from 7.31% (1.40%) to 4.34% (0.74%), the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent USD bond
decreases by 3.01% (0.71%), that is from 7.80% (1.59%) to 4.79% (0.88%), during the same period.
In Brazil, for instance, the average yield (volatility) of 2015 EUR-denominated bond, from
Liquidity to Credit Crises, increases by 1.40% (0.96%), that is from 5.82% (0.33%) to 7.22% (1.29%),
while the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent USD-denominated bond increases by 0.91%
(0.81%), that is from 5.49% (0.26%) to 6.40% (1.07%). While the the average yield (volatility) of
2015 EUR-denominated bond, from Credit Crisis to Post-Crisis, decreases by 2.96% (0.60%), that
is from 7.22% (1.29%) to 4.26% (0.69%), the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent USD bond
decreases by 1.96% (0.44%), that is from 6.40% (1.07%) to 4.44% (0.63%), during the same period.
In Mexico, for instance, the average yield (volatility) of 2020 EUR-denominated bond, from
Liquidity to Credit Crises, increases by 1.82% (0.36%), that is from 5.59% (0.39%) to 7.41% (0.75%),
while the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent USD-denominated bond increases by 1.22%
(0.69%), that is from 5.47% (0.22%) to 6.69% (0.91%). While the the average yield (volatility)
of 2020 EUR-denominated bond, from Credit Crisis to Post-Crisis, decreases (increases) by 1.81%
(0.13%), that is from 7.41% (0.75%) to 5.60% (0.88%), the average yield (volatility) of the equivalent
USD bond decreases by 1.28% (0.47%), that is from 6.69% (0.91%) to 5.41% (0.44%), during the
same period. This suggests that the funding costs and the credit riskiness of the given bonds tend
to diminish once again as of Post-Crisis period.
Another interesting feature is that, between Liquidity Crisis and Credit Crisis, Turkey generally
pays higher yields in USD than Euro, whereas Brazil and Mexico generally pay higher yields in
Euro than USD. Moreover, during the same period, in Turkey, the increase in the average level
and volatility of the USD yields is considerably steeper than that of the EUR yields. In Brazil and
Mexico, the opposite is often the case (except for the volatility trend in Mexico). This suggests
that the market tends to perceive Turkey comparably more “risky” in USD than Euro, whereas the
exact opposite holds for Brazil and Mexico. This is an important observation, and is the first hint
about the geographical difference of the funding markets across different emerging markets, which
will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.7
7Please also note that the trade could be constructed using CDSs rather than bonds across two currency denominations. Nevertheless,
while USD-denominated CDSs are highly liquid, there is no healthy history on EUR-denominated CDSs in the emerging markets under
study.
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B. The Paris Club
Defaults of sovereign bonds denominated in foreign currencies are often governed by the debt treat-
ment clauses of the Paris Club, an organization of creditors that coordinates the payment process of
the debtor countries, and that enforces pari passu conditions when they apply. The main objective
is to ensure the sustainability of equal conditions for all investors in terms of both bond maturity
and recovery rates. This aim stems also from the “comparability of treatment” clause, under which
“all external creditors must be subject to a balanced treatment for the outstanding debts of the
debtor countries”. The intent of this clause is to avoid instances of selective default and to ensure,
in case of restructuring, equal exposure of all creditors irrespective of the applicable currency. The
existence of this comparability clause confirms the widely held assumption that recovery rates of
bonds of the same country are equal across different (foreign) currency denominations. To address
concerns related to condition C5, bonds included in our analysis are governed by similar jurisdic-
tions, and are regulated by similar collective clause action rules. With two bonds being pari passu,
the recovery rates should be the same.8
III. Construction of LOP Proxy: Basis(bond)
To construct our LOP proxy in sovereign Eurobond markets, we follow a similar procedure used by
Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010) who compute the TIPS-Treasury pricing anomaly. As
discussed in the Data Description section, we use the pairs of bonds from the same issuer with nearly
matching maturities: 2010- and 2015-maturity Brazilian bonds; 2014- and 2019-maturity Turkish
bonds; and 2020-maturity Mexican bonds. For each bond pair for each country, the analysis is
structured around carrying out the following steps.9
1. Short 100 USD of semi-annual coupon USD-denominated bond, convert the dollar proceeds
into Euros in the spot FX market using the spot FX rate, X(t), and long the annual coupon
EUR-denominated bond (by the same issuer) using the Euro proceeds.
8Ukraine’s default provides a useful example of how equal conditions apply across currency denominations. Following its independence,
Ukraine sustained its development by issuing large amounts of foreign denominated debt. In February 2000, however, its Finance Ministry
declared that Ukraine would have failed to meet its coupon repayment for a specific Eurobond issue denominated in DM (i.e. the 16% DM
bonds). In January, Ukraine also defaulted on the coupon payment for the 16.75% USD Eurobonds. After several rounds, a restructuring
plan was coordinated to give bondholders the option of choosing between two 7-year coupon amortization bonds (with average terms of
4.5 years) denominated either in USD or Euro in exchange for the old debt. The terms of the restructuring were symmetric for both
Euro and USD bond holders. A detailed calculation leads to estimates for the USD and Euro haircuts that differ only by a decimal of a
percent (see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) for details), consistent with the “comparability of treatment” clause.
9Note that this analysis more general than that used in subsection IB in the sense that it incorporates the effect of accrued interest
to allow for bonds traded on intermediate dates between two consecutive cash-flows.
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2. Calculate the total face value (FV b) corresponding to the total purchased amount of the
EUR-denominated bond:
FV b =
PV b
A+ B
where A =
m∑
j=1
CLb
(1 + Y b)kj
and B =
1
(1 + Y b)km
(3.8)
where PV b = 100*X(t) is the total present value of the purchased EUR-denominated bond;
Y b is the annual market yield of the EUR-denominated bond; CLb is the Euro coupon rate
given as a percentage of FV b; and kj = [j
th Euro Coupon Date - Date t]/365, measured in
years, for j = [1, ...m] with m being the maturity point. Date t is the first day that the trade
is launched by the arbitrageur. Note that the information of CLb is publicly available for all
bonds (as shown also in table 3.1).10
3. Having found the total face value corresponding to the total purchased amount of the EUR-
denominated bond, generate the fixed coupon payment flows (i.e. Cb) for each coupon date for
EUR-denominated bond, such that Cb = CLbFV b. In other words, find the physical coupon
amounts by multiplying the coupon rate (in %) by the total face value.
4. Enter into a series of USD/Euro (USD per Euro) FX forward contracts to convert the cal-
culated Euro coupon flows Cb at each coupon date, and the face value FV b at the maturity
date, into USD cash flows. If there are ten coupon payment dates, for instance, enter into ten
different FX forward contracts so that each contract has the exact same maturity with each
corresponding future cash-flow date.11 This procedure constructs a synthetic USD bond that
has variable coupons (due to variable forward rates), represented by:
PV a
∗
=
m∑
j=1
Cb/Fj
(1 + Y a∗)kj
+
FV b/Fm
(1 + Y a∗)km
=
m∑
j=1
Ca
∗
j
(1 + Y a∗)kj
+
FV a
∗
(1 + Y a∗)km
(3.9)
where PV a
∗
denotes the initial cash-flow of the synthetic USD bond, which is obviously equal
to PV a = 100 USD; [1/Fj ] is the USD/EUR Forward FX rate to be implemented at j
th
coupon date; Ca
∗
j = C
b/Fj; FV
a∗ = FV b/Fm; and Y
a∗ is the yield of the synthetic USD bond
that satisfies this equation. The only unknown parameter in this equation is Y a
∗
.
10Based on the previous notation, Y b = Rb + Sb. Empirically, we use the market convention for the day-counts of USD-denominated
bonds (30/360) and EUR-denominated bonds (ACT/ACT) and adjust for the accrued interests.
11First, interpolate a linear FX forward exchange rate curve using 1 week to 10 years maturity USD/EUR rates (retrieved from
Bloomberg) for each corresponding date, so that the maturity date of the FX forward contracts will be identical to the corresponding
cash-flow dates at each time t.
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5. To calculate Y a
∗
an iteration routine is developed. First, substitute a seed value into Eq.
(3.9) to calculate the first guess for PV a
∗
.12 If PV a
∗
6= 100, then Y a
∗
is iteratively changed
until convergence (PV a
∗
= 100).
6. Define:
Basisbond = Y
a
∗
− Y a (3.10)
Example. To provide a specific example, let’s take the USD- and Euro-denominated foreign bonds
of Brazil. The USD bond matures on March 7, 2015. As an example, consider a trade executed
on October 31, 2008. The quoted yield-to-maturity of Brazilian USD bond is Y a = 7.54% and
the quoted yield-to-maturity for its Euro counterpart is Y b = 9.46%. With approximately 6.3
years until maturity, the investor shorts 100 dollars-worth of USD-denominated bond, swaps the
proceeds to 78.59 Euros in the spot FX market, and purchases 78.59 Euros-worth of the Euro-
denominated bond, which pays seven coupons (7.375% of the face value) during the remainder of
its lifetime. The calculated total face value corresponding to the total purchased amount of the EUR-
denominated bond is 82.01 Euros, and thus the corresponding coupon payments are 6.05 Euros.
Using the interpolated market USD/EUR FX forward rates [1/Fj] for each coupon date (every 3rd
of February from 2009 to 2015), all Euro cash-flows are converted into USD cash-flows. Since there
are seven cash-flow periods, we execute seven forward contracts. This creates a synthetic USD
bond consisting of only USD coupon flows, equal to $7.69 on February 3, 2009, $7.69 on February
3, 2010, $7.70 on February 3, 2011, $7.75 on February 3, 2011, $7.81 on February 3, 2013, $7.85
on February 3, 2014 and $7.85 on February 3, 2015. Finally, the forward-converted face value
is $106.38. The yield-to-maturity of the synthetic bond Y a
∗
, calculated based on the given USD
flows, is 9.68%, after accounting for the bid-ask spreads in the execution of FX contracts. Hence,
in terms of bps, Basisbond = Y
a∗ - Y a = 968 bps - 754 bps = 214 bps. Clearly, the synthetic USD
bond, constructed from the EUR-denominated bond, generates a substantially higher yield than
its original USD counterpart. At each time t and for every bond pair, the bid-ask spreads in the
execution of FX contracts are integrated. We also need to account for the transaction costs based
on the bond-specific bid-ask spreads involved in the trading of these bonds in the cash market. For
this specific example, the total bond-specific bid-ask spread is 12 bps at this date. The Basisbond is
therefore 214 bps - 12 bps = 202 bps, net of all transaction costs.
12MATLAB provides an in-built function (stepcpnyield) that calculates YTM for variable coupon bonds. This function, however, does
not account for the accrued interest and is therefore not accurate enough for our purposes. In our calculations, therefore, the MATLAB
predictions are taken as the seed (initial value) only.
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IV. Dynamics of Basis(bond)
As mentioned before, all bonds in our study are coupon bonds. However, the coupons on the
USD-denominated bonds have different dates, frequencies and rates than those on their EUR-
denominated counterparts. For example, USD-denominated bonds carry semi-annual coupons while
EUR-denominated bonds carry annual coupons. These structural mismatches could disrupt the
theoretical relationship behind Basisbond. Having said this, we nonetheless hypothesize that it
would be legitimate to use our Basisbond as a near -LOP proxy despite structural mismatches.
13
Our main objective in this section boils down to testing this hypothesis (i.e. net Basisbond is an
acceptable measure for LOP mispricing), which requires that (a) net Basisbond would display a low
mean and variance during the disturbance-free Pre-Crisis period, and furthermore, (b) in the event
of serious price disruptions, it would undergo statistically significant changes across one or more
of the subsamples under study (i.e. Pre-Crisis, Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis, Post-Crisis). This
section discusses the dynamics of Basisbond and tests the validity of this hypothesis. The extent to
which structural mismatches affect the size and dynamics of Basisbond is analyzed in Section V.
A. Size of Basis(bond)
For all bond pairs, Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the gross Basisbond calculated without trans-
action costs. It also shows transaction costs of the trade separately to allow for comparison.14 Note
that any sizable gross Basisbond value in excess of the transaction cost threshold (denoted by the
red line in Figure 3.1) points to a mispricing that cannot be explained by transaction costs.
Two immediate results emerge. First, it can be observed that, while the gross Basisbond exceeds
the transaction cost threshold only by small amounts (if at all) during Pre-Crisis, it far outstrips it
during the Credit Crisis. This shows that after adjusting for the bid-ask spreads, there still remains
significant mispricing in the underlying bonds. Second, the sign of Basisbond tends to be country-
specific. When the trade is constructed by shorting the USD bond and longing the Euro bond, the
gross Turkish Basisbond is generally negative during Credit Crisis, whereas for Mexico and Brazil, it
is generally positive. This suggests that, with the interaction of the bond and FX markets, Turkey
tends to pay a higher yield in USD, whereas Brazil and Mexico tend to pay a higher yield in Euro.
It turns out, therefore, that the appropriate trade in Turkey would be to long the USD bond and
short the Euro bond, whereas the exact opposite trade would be taken in Mexico and Brazil. This
13Similar concepts have been discussed by Chen and Knez (1995) and Gatev, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006).
14All figures start from July 2005 for each Basisbond, except for the Basisbond of Turkish 2019 bond pair, which begins from September
11, 2008, as this was the issuance date of the USD-denominated bond of the corresponding pair, and hence the first possible trading day
of the strategy.
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cross-sectional difference provides a good opportunity to learn about the nature of the geographical
frictions that were responsible for these dynamics. The details of the sign puzzle will be discussed
further in Chapter 4.
For the purpose of using in the analyses that follow (summary statistics and hypothesis tests),
we re-calculate the “net” Basisbond by subtracting the total transaction costs of the trade from the
absolute value of the gross Basisbond. This approach, recommended by Fletcher and Taylor (1996),
is adopted in order to eliminate any confusion arising from the different signs of gross Basisbond.
Hence,
Net Basisbond = |Gross Basisbond| − Transaction Cost (3.11)
The subtraction of transaction cost from the absolute value of the gross Basisbond represents a
“transaction-cost adjustment”. According to Fletcher and Taylor (1996), the following should hold:
Net Basisbond > 0 ⇒ LOP Deviation
Net Basisbond ≤ 0 ⇒ No LOP Deviation
Therefore, while a positive net Basisbond is indicative of LOP deviation, a negative net Basisbond
suggests that the return from the trading strategy is not large enough to compensate the cost,
implying that there is no real LOP deviation. Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, all regressions in
Chapters 4 and 5 use net Basisbond, as defined in Eq. (3.11). In accordance with this representation
(Eq. (3.11)), Table 3.2 shows (in its first three columns) the mean, maximum and standard deviation
of net Basisbond, for each analyzed bond pair, and for each subsample. The mean of the total bid-ask
spreads is also given in the fourth column of this table. The following discussions are made.
During the Pre-Crisis, the mean (standard deviation) of net Basisbond is 4 bps (18 bps), 5 bps
(14 bps), 18 bps (11 bps) and -5 bps (7 bps) for Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020 and Turkey
2014 bonds, respectively. It can be noticed that these values fluctuate close to zero with low mean
and variance. This result supports the first requirement (a) of our hypothesis that Basisbond is a
near-LOP proxy.
During the Liquidity Crisis, the mean (standard deviation) of net Basisbond tends to diverge
further from zero (except for Brazil 2010 bond pair), being 17 bps (19 bps), 20 bps (23 bps) and 8
bps (17 bps) for Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020 and Turkey 2014 bonds, respectively. The mean of net
Basisbond of Brazil 2010 bond pair, on the other hand, is negative (-15 bps), suggesting that LOP
condition was satisfied at the time. Towards the end of the Liquidity Crisis, net Basisbond tends to
grow in size, and reaches its maximum value of 52 bps, 74 bps, 75 bps and 66 bps for Brazil 2010,
Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020 and Turkey 2014 bonds, respectively. It is observed that the size of net
Basisbond, however, is generally not large enough to designate this period as “anomalous”. In fact,
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except for Mexico perhaps, the average size of net Basisbond is still reasonably low.
15 This suggests
that the emerging countries used in our analysis stood relatively remote from the adverse impacts
of the Liquidity Crisis originating from the U.S. and the Euro Zone. It is possible that funding
constraints have not fully seeped into the cross-sectional dynamics of the sovereign Eurobonds.
During Credit Crisis, following the Lehman collapse in September 2008, however, the story
changed distinctively. Displaying unprecedented dynamics, net Basisbond became markedly large,
strongly persistent and highly volatile. The mean (standard deviation) of net Basisbond during this
period is 54 bps (77 bps), 51 bps (48 bps), 32 bps (32 bps), 53 bps (30 bps) and 79 bps (43 bps) for
Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey 2014 and Turkey 2019 bonds, respectively. Similarly,
by the same ordering, the maximum values are 407 bps, 209 bps, 136 bps, 169 bps and 201 bps,
respectively.
Another important observation to be drawn from Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 is that Basisbond,
though indicating increasing returns from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis, also displays increasing volatil-
ity (and therefore uncertainty) during the same period. The increased risk perception could deter
arbitrageurs from exploiting the implied opportunity.
Examples of Dislocation. While one may expect pricing anomalies in small markets, it is
puzzling, to say the least, to see them in such liquid sovereign markets. We note that the Basisbond
refers to claims on cash flows of those emerging markets that are not directly exposed to subprime
crisis. Therefore, any significant disruption gives us an indication of how sensitive emerging markets
are to the economic shocks originating from developed markets.
To provide specific examples of the price disruption during Credit Crisis, on October 8, 2008,
net Basisbond for the 2015 Brazilian pair was 104 bps. Two days later, on October 10, 2008, the
anomaly was even larger for the 2010 Brazilian bonds, with a net deviation of 407 bps. While net
Basisbond fluctuated between 163 bps and 209 bps for the 2015 Brazilian bonds from October 23
to 30, 2008, it varied between 250 bps and 345 bps for the 2010 Brazilian bonds within the same
week. Similarly, on October 23, 2008, net Basisbond was 83 bps for the Mexican 2020 bonds, and
reached 136 bps at the end of October. Once again, on October 23, 2008, net Basisbond equaled 98
bps for the 2014 Turkish pair, and 170 bps for the 2019 Turkish bonds.
The anomaly persisted over three months. A second round of disruption seems to have developed
in mid-November. From 10 to 14 November, 2008, for instance, net Basisbond for the 2015 Brazilian
bond pair fluctuated persistently between 115 bps and 151 bps. On November 20, 2008, netBasisbond
for the 2014 and 2019 Turkish bond pairs widened to 169 bps and 201 bps, respectively. The
15Basisbond for Mexico gets elevated earlier than for Turkey and Brazil.
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deviations continued to fluctuate between November and January, in particular for the 2019 Turkish
bonds, for which the net deviation ranged between 155 bps and 195 bps.
During Post-Crisis, net Basisbond tends to subside for the majority of bonds with the exception
of Mexico. The mean (standard deviation) of net Basisbond is -3 bps (13 bps), 4 bps (20 bps)
and 16 bps (32 bps) for Brazil 2015, Turkey 2014 and Turkey 2019 bond pairs, respectively. The
mean (standard deviation) of Mexico 2020 bonds is 49 bps (34 bps). This suggests that, while
the bond pairs in Brazil and Turkey tend to to converge back to their relative equilibrium prices,
Basisbond anomaly seems to intensify for Mexico 2020 bonds during the third quarter of 2009, when
the net deviation reaches its highest peak of 155 bps on May 28, 2009. Although we observe that
Mexican net Basisbond begins to dwindle from the last quarter of 2009, the finding suggests that
the disruption in Mexico was not really over for an additional period of time.16
These results show that net Basisbond fluctuates close to zero during Pre-Crisis period, and
hence supports the first requirement (a) of our hypothesis. During the Crisis period, net Basisbond
becomes distinctly large and volatile, and hence gives a strong initial evidence in support of the
second requirement (b) of our hypothesis. To see if this structural change is statistically significant,
we move on to the next subsection.
B. Hypothesis Tests
To test the second requirement (b) that net Basisbond (calculated by using Eq. (3.11)) undergoes
statistically significant changes across one or more of the subsamples, we conduct multi-sample
hypothesis tests generated by using ANOVA (based on the strong 99% confidence level requirement).
The null hypothesis states that there is no significant difference of means between the subsamples.
Figure 3.2 displays the results of the hypothesis tests for each subsample (i.e. period), and for
three representative sovereign net Basisbond (i.e. Brazil 2015, Turkey 2014, and Mexico 2020 bond
pairs).17 The outcome of the hypothesis test is displayed in Panel A, and the p-values are given in
Panel B.
To see how expectation (b) fares, we look at the results of the multi-sample hypothesis tests, and
strongly reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean deviations across the
subsamples. This holds for all given countries.18 The important implication is that Basisbond is time-
16Prices of the two legs of the trade on Brazilian 2010-maturity bonds converge to the face value when approaching the maturity.
17Note that the analysis is based on net Basisbond calculated as the absolute values of gross Basisbond minus the transaction costs
of the trade. Also note that for the 2019 USD-denominated Turkish bonds issued during Credit Crisis period, a two-sample hypothesis
test is used instead of ANOVA, because the first two periods (i.e. Pre-Crisis and Liquidity Crisis) do not exist for this bond pair. Here,
the null hypothesis similarly states that there is no difference of means between Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis periods.
18Although not shown in Figure 3.2, we also strongly reject the null hypothesis (with p-values = 0.000) for the 2010 Brazilian bonds
and 2019 Turkish bonds.
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variant and state-dependent. Moreover, as seen in Figure 3.2, Credit Crisis period is undeniably
different from all other periods in all cases. Disruption in terms of mean and volatility seeps into
the markets rapidly from Pre-Crisis to Credit-Crisis, as a clear sign of a severe distributional shock
introduced into the system.19 Basisbond becomes larger, more volatile and more persistent than any
other subsample period, suggesting that our empirical proxy is subject to serious systemic breaks.
This supports the second requirement (b) of our hypothesis.
V. Impact of Structural Limitations
What we have done in the preceding section was to obtain a posteriori confirmation that Basisbond
was indeed a good measure of LOP deviation in the Turkish, Brazilian and Mexican bond pairs.
Our next task is to test its predictive power as a near-LOP proxy. For this purpose, we use the same
dataset but conduct a priori scenario-based assessment of the impact of the cash-flow mismatch
in Basisbond. We use a duration and convexity gap analysis for this purpose. The details of this
analysis and the mathematical derivation are given in Appendix B to Chapter 3.
We denote the present value of the synthetic USD bond as A (asset), and the present value of
the original USD bond as L (liability), both discounted with the annual yield Y a of the original
USD bond since that is the quoted yield in the market. The net present value generated from our
strategy (i.e., profit) denoted by V is equal to A − L. For each bond pair in our study, it can be
shown that (see Appendix B):
∆V
V
= −
A
A− L
[
dA − dL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dgap
∆Y
(1 + Y a)
+
1
2
A
A− L
[
cA − cL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cgap
(∆Y )2
(1 + Y a)2
=
(
∆V
V
)
Duration Component
+
(
∆V
V
)
Convexity Component
(3.12)
where ∆Y is a small increment representing the change in Y a; dA (and dL) and cA (and cL) are
the duration and convexity of A (and L), respectively; and ∆V is defined as ∆V = V∆Y − V , such
that V∆Y denotes the present value of the profit when ∆Y 6= 0 (i.e. with scenario analysis), and
V denotes the present value of the profit when ∆Y = 0 (i.e. without scenario analysis). The first
component of ∆V/V is called the Duration Component, which captures the impact of the first-order
duration gap between two bonds in reducing (or boosting) the profit; and the second component of
∆V/V is called the Convexity Component, which captures the impact of the second-order convexity
gap between two bonds in reducing (or boosting) the profit V .
19Not all subsamples are statistically different from each other at the 0.01 level of significance. Notable exceptions are Pre-Crisis vs.
Liquidity Crisis for Mexico 2020, and Liquidity Crisis vs. Post-Crisis for Turkey 2014.
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Our original Basisbond calculation already prices the built-in coupon mismatches between USD
and Euro bonds in the specific case where ∆Y = 0. The USD shortages (in Brazil and Mexico)
arising from these mismatches are refinanced with a constant dollar interest rate, and the Euro
surpluses (in Turkey) are reinvested with a constant Euro interest rate, between each cash-flow
point. Eq. (3.12) enables us to calculate how much of the profit V (and therefore Basisbond) would
be depleted (or enlarged) when the interest rates are no longer constant (i.e. ∆Y 6= 0). Therefore,
the size of ∆Y , considered in each scenario, captures the interest rate shock to the market, and
represents the cost (or gain) that the trader will endure (or benefit) due to underlying cash-flow
mismatches.
In Brazil and Mexico, where the cash inflows of the synthetic USD bond (asset) is “less frequent”
(by half a year) than the cash outflows of the original USD bond (liability), the trader must borrow
dollars to finance the corresponding dollar gap until due dates for the coupon payments. Therefore,
if dollar interest rates are to increase, the trader will have to borrow dollars “more expensively”,
and hence lose money from the refinancing. Any increase in the USD interest rates therefore implies
that the profit V would be depleted, and hence Basisbond would decrease.
On the other hand, in Turkey, where the cash inflows of the synthetic EUR bond (asset) is “more
frequent” (by half a year) than the cash outflows of the original EUR bond (liability), the trader
must reinvest Euros to benefit from the corresponding Euro gap until due dates for the coupon
payments. Therefore, if interest rates are to increase, the trader will get to lend “at higher rates”,
and hence gain more from the reinvestment. Any increase in the interest rates therefore implies
that the profit V would be boosted, and hence the absolute value of Basisbond would increase.
Calculation Procedure
We consider two interest rate scenarios: (i) “one sigma” shock to dollar bond yield: ∆Y = ±
σY ; and (ii) “2.32 sigma” shock to dollar bond yield: ∆Y = ± 2.32σY . Scenario (i) captures an
environment where there is 16% one-tail probability that the interest rate change will be greater
than one standard deviation; whereas scenario (ii) captures a more extreme environment where
there is 1% one-tail probability that the interest rate change will be greater than 2.32 standard
deviations (in parallel with the parametric VaR approach widely used in banking).
The calculation steps follow below. To make the calculation procedure more clear, we give an
example on the 2015-maturity Brazil bonds during Credit Crisis by considering scenario (i) where
∆Y = σY = 0.96%.
1. STEP 1 - Calculating ∆V :
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(a) Calculate A, L, dA, dL, cA and cL for each day from 1 September 2008 to 31 March 2009.
In our example L=100 USD.
(b) For each day substitute the above data into Eq. (3.12), and calculate ∆V/V . For Brazil
2015 bond pair, the average value of ∆V/V during Credit Crisis is:
∆V
V
= −3.36% + 0.02% = −3.34%
where -3.36% denotes the Duration Component, and 0.02% denotes the Convexity Com-
ponent, as defined in Eq. (3.12). These components show how much of the total percent-
age change in profit V is attributed to the duration gap and convexity gap, respectively.
(c) Calculate ∆V for each day by multiplying both sides of Eq. (3.12) by V = A − L. For
Brazil 2015 bond pair, the average value during Credit Crisis is:
∆V = −$0.04
The negativity of ∆V is due to the fact that Brazil is in a refinance position. Hence, an
increase of ∆Y = 0.96% in the interest rates will decrease the present value of the profit
V by $0.04.
2. STEP 2 - Calculating ∆Basis:
Define ∆Basis as the bps equivalent of ∆V :
∆Basis = Basis∆Y −Basis
= [Y a∗∆Y − Y
a
∆Y ]− [Y
a∗ − Y a] (3.13)
In the above Basisbond (calculated for ∆Y = 0) is abbreviated as Basis for notational conve-
nience. Basis∆Y consists of Y
a∗
∆Y and Y
a
∆Y , which are the re-calculated yields of the synthetic
and the original USD bond, respectively, after adjusting for ∆Y 6= 0. Therefore, ∆Basis
captures how much the trader would lose (or gain).
Note that there is a difference between the USD cash-flows corresponding to ∆Y = 0 and
those corresponding to ∆Y 6= 0. But this difference in cash-flows boils down to ∆V in present
value terms, since ∆V represents the present value of all the cash-flow changes in the disturbed
state (∆Y 6= 0). Hence, Y a∗∆Y and Y
a
∆Y are re-calculated by changing the initial cash-flow of
the trading strategy by a total amount of ∆V , and keeping the remaining cash-flows the same.
(a) Based on the above, calculate Eq. (3.13). For Brazil 2015 bond pair, the average ∆Basis
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during Credit Crisis is:
∆Basis = Basis∆Y − Basis
= [Y a∗∆Y − Y
a
∆Y ]− [Y
a∗ − Y a]
= (6.988%− 6.486%)− (6.992%− 6.482%) = −0.74bps
Results
Table 3.3 displays the average values of both the Duration and Convexity components, the average
percentage change in profit V (i.e. ∆V/V ) and the average change in Basisbond (i.e. ∆Basis)
during the Credit Crisis for each bond pair following the scenarios (i) and (ii).
1. In Brazil, the profit V decreases by 3.34% and 7.69%, corresponding to the scenarios with
σY% and 2.32σY% interest rate hikes, respectively. Similarly, the profit V in Mexico decreases
by 15.38% and 32.84%, corresponding to the scenarios with σY% and 2.32σY% interest rate
hikes, respectively. ∆Basis in Brazil (Mexico) is -0.74 bps (-5.20 bps) and -1.78 bps (-11.13
bps) corresponding to the scenarios with σY% and 2.32σY% interest rate hikes, respectively.
Results for Mexico are notable in terms of the somewhat larger magnitude of the impact of
∆Y . This is because of the longer maturity of the Mexican bond pair under study. It should
be noted that the analysis assumes constant ∆Y throughout the remaining lifetime of the
bonds. In the case of Mexico 2020 bond pair, however, it is highly unlikely for the interest
rates to remain at the elevated level of Y a + (2.32σY%) for 12 years after the onset of the
Credit Crisis in 2008. Even in that extreme scenario, 67% of the profits are still retained.
These results show that the cash-flow mismatch, even under extreme scenarios, falls way short
of eliminating the Basisbond violation in Brazil and Mexico.
2. In Turkey, the profit V increases by 4.45% and 9.13%, corresponding to the scenarios with
σY% and 2.32σY% interest rate hikes, respectively. As opposed to Brazil and Mexico, the
downside risk for Turkey is falling interest rates, which is due to the fact that Turkey is in
reinvestment position. Therefore, the already negative value of the Basisbond will become
more negative (or the absolute value will become larger). Our calculations show that ∆Basis
is -1.78 bps and -3.59 bps corresponding to the scenarios with σY% and 2.32σY% interest
rate hikes, respectively. These results show that the cash-flow mismatch, even under extreme
scenarios, will not alter the size of Basisbond violation in Turkey to any appreciable extent.
3. Due to the nature of the model in Eq. (3.12), the first-order duration component varies
linearly with ∆Y , whereas the second-order convexity component varies non-linearly. Table
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3.3 shows that these two components act in offsetting directions in all cases. It is also clear
that, at low values of ∆Y , it is the duration component that is dominant. However, as ∆Y
increases, the relative weight of the convexity component becomes more pronounced.
The overall conclusion is that the impact of the cash-flow mismatch is way too far from wiping
out the profits generated by our strategy. Once compared to the size of Basisbond, the economic
value of the duration and convexity gaps are a small fraction of the phenomenon that we want to
explain.
VI. Concluding Remarks
It is common market practice among investment banks, data suppliers and rating agency companies
to employ USD as a de-facto input to price the credit risk products that make reference to the same
issuer across different currency denominations. Given that the bond yields are functions of the
underlying risk-free rates and the ubiquitous default credibility of the issuer, the implicit assumption
is that the issuer is subject to identical default probability across different currencies, and that the
FX market is liquid and deep enough to make the USD-denominated product a perfect substitute
for the EUR-denominated product. Based on our analysis, however, this assumption becomes
questionable. Since Turkey generally pays higher yields in USD than Euro during Credit Crisis,
it is possible to conjecture that the market assigns a higher credit risk, and thus, a higher default
probability to Turkey’s USD-denominated bonds compared to its Euro-denominated bonds. The
exact opposite holds for Brazil and Mexico. This is why our results support the importance of
accounting for the heterogeneity of funding markets in credit risk pricing.
It becomes evident that a part of the size of Basisbond deviation is traced back to cash-flow
mismatches. However, after observing the highly volatile nature of Basisbond during different time
periods, it becomes reasonable to ask whether these limitations really account for the entire story
behind the mystery of Basisbond - a mispricing variable which acts more or less in accordance
with the LOP restriction during Pre-Crisis (still in the presence of structural limitations), and
becomes severely violated during Credit Crisis, and later converges back to Pre-Crisis levels during
Post-Crisis. Unlike what most structural limitations suggest, this picture implies the presence of
“state-dependent”risk factors at play. This is why we conjecture that a part of the deviation should
depend also on a set of relevant “state-dependent” financial constraints (e.g. liquidity costs, funding
costs, default risk, macroeconomic deterioration etc.) and geographical frictions that tighten during
turmoil periods, and therefore, keep potential traders from fully exploiting the strategy. The validity
of conditions C1 - C5 needs to be investigated in more depth. These issues will be discussed in further
detail in the next chapter.
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VII. Appendix A to Chapter 3
The derivation below is based on the discrete version of the proof given in Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005).
Assume that in a frictionless market, under conditions C1−C5, a sovereign issues two zero-coupon bonds
denominated in two foreign currencies (a=USD and b=EUR), both having identical time-to-maturity of 1
year. Today’s price at t = 0 of the defaultable bonds are Ca(t, T )=1 USD and Cb(t, T )=1 Euro. Bonds
are subject to simultaneous default at some random time τ∗ ≤ T . Assuming zero recovery rates for both
bonds, the final payoff of the bonds in the corresponding currencies are:
Ca(T, T ) = (1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T ))Iτ∗>T (3.14)
Cb(T, T ) = (1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T ))Iτ∗>T (3.15)
where Iτ∗>T represents an indicator function so that it equals 1 if τ
∗ > T , and 0 otherwise. Ra(t, T ) and
Rb(t, T ) are the underlying risk-free rates in USD and Euro, respectively; and Sa(t, T ) and Sb(t, T ) are the
credit yield spreads paid over the underlying risk-free rates, respectively. No-arbitrage implies the existence
of a risk-adjusted measure Q such that the relative price of any tradable security with respect to the riskless
money market account follows a martingale under the same Q-measure. According to risk-neutral pricing,
the following must hold for USD bond under Q-measure:
1 = Ca(t, T ) =
1
1 +Ra(t, T )
EQ[Ca(T, T ) | Ft]
=
1
1 +Ra(t, T )
EQ [(1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T ))Iτ∗>T | Ft]
=
(
1 +
Sa(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T )
)
EQ [Iτ∗>T | Ft] (3.16)
where EQ [Iτ∗>T | Ft] is the bond’s “survival probability” under measure Q with respect to filtration Ft.
From Eq. (3.16), we can derive:
1 +Ra(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )
= EQ [Iτ∗>T | Ft] (3.17)
According to risk-neutral pricing, the following must hold for EUR bond under Q-measure:
Cb(t, T )
X(t)
=
1
1 +Ra(t, T )
EQ
[
1
F (t, T )
Cb(T, T ) | Ft
]
=
1
1 +Ra(t, T )
EQ
[
1
F (t, T )
(1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T ))Iτ∗>T | Ft
]
=
(
1
F (t, T )
1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T )
)
EQ [Iτ∗>T | Ft] (3.18)
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where X(t) and F (t, T ) are the EUR/USD exchange rates (EUR per USD) in spot and forward markets
at t and T , respectively. The trade is hedged against future FX volatility using F (t, T ). According to the
covered interest rate parity condition, the following must hold:
1
F (t, T )
=
1
X(t)
1 +Ra(t, T )
1 +Rb(t, T )
(3.19)
Substituting Eq. (3.17) and Eq. (3.19) into Eq. (3.18), we can derive:
1
X(t)
=
1
X(t)
(
1 +Ra(t, T )
1 +Rb(t, T )
)(
1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T )
)(
1 +Ra(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )
)
(3.20)
When the common terms are canceled, we have:
1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )
1 +Rb(t, T )
=
1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )
1 +Ra(t, T )
(3.21)
which can be rearranged as:
[1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )] =
1 +Ra(t, T )
1 +Rb(t, T )
[1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )] (3.22)
Using the covered interest rate parity condition in Eq. (3.19), we can derive:
(1 +Ra(t, T ) + Sa(t, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y a(t,T )
) =
X(t)
F (t, T )
(1 +Rb(t, T ) + Sb(t, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y b(t,T )
) (3.23)
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VIII. Appendix B to Chapter 3
The present value of the synthetic USD bond, and the present value of the original USD bond are denoted
as Asset A, and Liability L, respectively, each discounted with the annual yield Y a of the original USD
bond. Hence, we write:
A =
m∑
j=1
[
CAj
(1 + Y a)kj
]
and L =
n∑
j=1
[
CLj
(1 + Y a)hj
]
(3.24)
where CA denotes the dollar-converted cash-flows of asset A, and CL denotes the dollar cash-flows of
liability L. We also define kj = [j
th EUR Coupon Date - Date t]/365, measured in years, where j = [1, ...m],
and m is the total number of Euro coupon payments. Similarly, we define hj = [j
th USD Coupon Date -
Date t]/360, measured in years, where j = [1, ...n], and n is the total number of dollar coupon payments.
Date t is the first day that the trade is launched. By second-order Taylor expansion, evaluated around Y a,
we can write:
A(Y a +∆Y ) = A+A′∆Y +A′′
(∆Y )2
2
and L(Y a +∆Y ) = L+ L′∆i+ L′′
(∆Y )2
2
(3.25)
where ∆Y is a small increment representing the change in Y a. Note that A′ and A′′ are, respectively, the
first and second derivatives of A with respect to Y a. The same notational logic applies to L. Dropping
Y a in parentheses (for notational convenience), and taking out A and L, correspondingly, from both sides,
and dividing both sides, correspondingly, by A and L, we get:
∆A
A
=
1
A
A′∆Y +
1
A
A′′
(∆Y )2
2
(3.26)
∆L
L
=
1
L
L′∆Y +
1
L
L′′
(∆Y )2
2
(3.27)
where ∆A = A(Y a + ∆Y ) − A, and similarly ∆L = L(Y a + ∆Y ) − L. On the asset side, the first and
second derivatives of A can be expressed as:
1
A
A′ = −

 1
A
m∑
j=1
kjPG
A
j


︸ ︷︷ ︸
dA
1
(1 + Y a)
(3.28)
1
A
A′′ =

 1
A
m∑
j=1
(kj)(kj + 1)PG
A
j


︸ ︷︷ ︸
cA
1
(1 + Y a)2
(3.29)
where dA and cA are known as the duration and convexity of A, respectively, and PG
A
j = [C
A
j /(1+ Y
a)kj ]
are the present values of CAj for each j. On the liability side, the first and second derivatives of L can be
46
expressed as:
1
L
L′ = −

 1
L
n∑
j=1
hjPG
L
j


︸ ︷︷ ︸
dL
1
(1 + Y a)
(3.30)
1
L
L′′ =

 1
L
n∑
j=1
(hj)(hj + 1)PG
L
j


︸ ︷︷ ︸
cL
1
(1 + Y a)2
(3.31)
where dL and cL are known as the duration and convexity of L, respectively, and PG
L
j = [C
L
j /(1 + Y
a)hj ]
are the present values of CLj for each j. Denoting the net present value generated from our strategy (i.e.,
profit) by V = A− L, the following holds:
∆V = ∆A−∆L
∆V
A
=
∆A
A
−
∆L
A
=
∆A
A
−
∆L
L
L
A
(3.32)
From previous results, we can substitute:
∆V
A
=
[
−dA
∆Y
(1 + Y a)
+ cA
1
2
(∆Y )2
(1 + Y a)2
]
−
[
−dL
∆Y
(1 + Y a)
+ cL
1
2
(∆Y )2
(1 + Y a)2
]
L
A
= −
[
dA − dL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dgap
∆Y
(1 + Y a)
+
[
cA − cL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cgap
1
2
(∆Y )2
(1 + Y a)2
(3.33)
where dgap is the duration gap, and cgap is the convexity gap. The first and second terms therefore represent
the corresponding contributions of duration and convexity gaps, respectively. To see the percentage change
in V , we can write:
∆V
V
= −
A
A− L
[
dA − dL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dgap
∆Y
(1 + Y a)
+
1
2
A
A− L
[
cA − cL
L
A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cgap
(∆Y )2
(1 + Y a)2
=
(
∆V
V
)
Duration Component
+
(
∆V
V
)
Convexity Component
(3.34)
where ∆V is defined as ∆V = V∆Y −V , such that V∆Y denotes the present value of the profit when ∆Y 6= 0
(i.e. with scenario analysis), and V denotes the present value of the profit when ∆Y = 0 (i.e. without
scenario analysis). The first component of ∆V/V is called the Duration Component, which captures
the impact of the duration gap between two bonds in reducing (or boosting) the profit; and the second
component of ∆V/V is called the Convexity Component, which captures the impact of the convexity gap
between two bonds in reducing (or boosting) the profit.
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Figure 3.1:
Basis(bond) dynamics
The plots show the evolution of the gross Basisbond (in blue lines) for the 2010- and 2015-maturity Brazilian, the
2020-maturity Mexican and the 2014- and 2019-maturity Turkish bond pairs. the gross Basisbond by definition does
not account for the total bid-ask spreads (i.e. transaction costs) of the trade. We plot the gross Basisbond in order
to facilitate an easy comparison between the size of the total mispricing and the total transaction cost, which is
calculated as the summation of the underlying FX bid-ask spreads and the bond-specific yield bid-ask spreads, and
is shown separately in this figure (in red lines). The total bid-ask spreads represents a transaction cost threshold,
such that any Basisbond value in excess of it represents a mispricing that cannot be explained by transaction costs.
All values are denoted in percentages. All figures start from July 2005, except for Turkish 2019 Basisbond, which
begins from 11 September 2008, as this was the first possible trading day of the strategy. The sample is divided into
corresponding subsamples by dashed vertical lines.
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Figure 3.2:
Multi-sample hypothesis tests on Basis(bond)
We provide multi-sample hypothesis test results (using ANOVA) on Basisbond for the following bond pairs: 2015 Brazil, 2020 Mexico, and 2014
Turkey. The null hypothesis states that there is no difference between the mean deviations of Basisbond in one or more of the subsamples (i.e.
Pre-Crisis, Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis). Panel A visualizes the mean of the net absolute Basisbond in the four sub-samples,
and the corresponding red intervals of the statistical test. Panel B reports the p-values of the statistical test. It can be concluded that there
are differences among the means at 0.01 level of significance (i.e. rejection of null hypothesis) if the red intervals in Panel A do not overlap,
and if p-value < 0.01 in Panel B. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected if the red intervals in Panel A overlap, and if p-value > 0.01 in Panel B.
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Table 3.1:
Summary statistics of emerging market bond pairs
This table reports the summary statistics of the bond pairs with nearly-matching maturities (at most 70 days mismatch) issued by Turkey,
Brazil and Mexico. The table displays the ISIN number, the currency of denomination, issue date, maturity date, and annual coupon rate
(in percentages) for each corresponding bond. The averages and the standard deviations (shown immediately below the averages) of the
bond-specific yield-to-maturity are also reported for each subsample (i.e. Pre-Crisis, Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis).
Country ISIN Number Currency Issue Date Maturity Date Coupon Rate (%) Bond Yield Dynamics (%)
Pre-Crisis Liquidity Credit Post-Crisis
Turkey DE000A0AU933 EUR 10.02.2004 10.02.2014 6.5 5.37 6.10 7.31 4.34
0.45 0.48 1.40 0.74
US900123AS92 USD 24.09.2003 15.01.2014 9.5 6.66 6.23 7.80 4.79
0.40 0.40 1.59 0.88
XS0285127329 EUR 02.02.2007 02.04.2019 5.9 - - 8.12 1.15
- - 5.55 0.66
US900123BD15 USD 11.09.2008 11.03.2019 7.0 - - 8.66 1.38
- - 6.14 0.69
Brazil XS0106768608 EUR 04.02.2000 04.02.2010 11.0 4.61 4.95 5.30 -
0.53 0.35 2.17 -
US105756AV22 USD 16.04.2002 15.04.2010 12.0 5.79 4.20 4.01 -
0.58 0.76 1.16 -
XS0211229637 EUR 03.02.2005 03.02.2015 7.4 5.52 5.82 7.22 4.26
0.54 0.33 1.29 0.69
US105756BG46 USD 07.03.2005 07.03.2015 7.9 6.61 5.49 6.40 4.44
0.71 0.26 1.07 0.63
Mexico XS0206170390 EUR 22.11.2004 17.02.2020 5.5 4.95 5.59 7.41 5.60
0.25 0.39 0.75 0.88
US593048BN00 USD 30.03.2001 30.12.2019 8.1 5.91 5.47 6.69 5.41
0.30 0.22 0.91 0.44
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Table 3.2:
Summary statistics of net Basis(bond)
This table provides the summary statistics for the net Basisbond of 2010- and 2015-maturity Brazil, 2020-maturity Mexico, and 2014- and
2019-maturity Turkey (obtained by subtracting from the absolute value of gross Basisbond the total underlying bid-ask spreads). The total
bid-ask spread is defined as the summation of the underlying FX bid-ask spread and the bond-specific yield bid-ask spread. The mean,
maximum and standard deviation values are given in the first three columns of each net Basisbond panel. The mean of the total bid-ask
spreads is also given in the fourth column of each Basisbond panel. All values are denoted in percentages. The sample periods are Pre-Crisis,
Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis.
Summary Statistics of Net Basis(bond)
Brazil 2010 Brazil 2015
Mean Max St. Dev Bid-Ask Mean Max St. Dev Bid-Ask
Pre-Crisis 0.04 0.60 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.53 0.14 0.20
Liquidity Crisis -0.15 0.52 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.74 0.19 0.22
Credit Crisis 0.54 4.07 0.77 0.72 0.51 2.09 0.48 0.23
Post-Crisis - - - - -0.03 0.34 0.13 0.29
Mexico 2020
Mean Max St. Dev Bid-Ask
Pre-Crisis 0.18 0.53 0.11 0.19
Liquidity Crisis 0.20 0.75 0.23 0.27
Credit Crisis 0.32 1.36 0.32 0.23
Post-Crisis 0.49 1.55 0.34 0.23
Turkey 2014 Turkey 2019
Mean Min St. Dev Bid-Ask Mean Min St. Dev Bid-Ask
Pre-Crisis -0.05 0.21 0.07 0.20 - - - -
Liquidity Crisis 0.08 0.66 0.17 0.27 - - - -
Credit Crisis 0.53 1.69 0.30 0.35 0.79 2.01 0.43 0.23
Post-Crisis 0.04 0.57 0.20 0.33 0.16 1.39 0.32 0.22
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Table 3.3:
Duration and convexity analysis
This table reports the duration and convexity of the original USD bond and the synthetic USD bond. The change in interest rate levels
(in terms of percentage) is represented by ∆Y . The dollar-weighted net duration and convexity gaps are calculated based on shorting the
original USD bond, and longing the synthetic USD bond for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey.
Bond Pairs Original USD Bond Synthetic USD Bond Duration Gap
Duration (dL) Convexity (cL) Duration (dA) Convexity (cA) [dA - dL*(L/A)]
(years) (years) (years)
Turkey 2014 4.16 24.00 4.35 25.56 0.07
Brazil 2015 5.08 34.70 4.97 33.35 0.04
Mexico 2020 7.67 81.85 8.14 89.42 0.70
Scenario Duration Component Convexity Component Impact on V Impact on Basis
∆Y (1st-Order) (2nd-Order) ∆ V / V ∆ Basis
(%) (%) (%) (%) (bps)
Turkey 2014 σY = 1.51 4.84 -0.39 4.45 -1.78
2.32σY = 3.51 11.24 -2.11 9.13 -3.59
Brazil 2015 σY = 0.96 -3.36 0.02 -3.34 -0.74
2.32σY = 2.22 -7.81 0.11 -7.69 -1.78
Mexico 2020 σY = 0.84 -16.31 0.93 -15.38 -5.20
2.32σY = 1.94 -37.83 4.99 -32.84 -11.13
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Chapter 4
Determinants and Geography of
Mispricing in Emerging Markets
This chapter investigates the potential market determinants and the cross-sectional geographical
features of Basisbond in emerging sovereign bond markets. The dynamics of Basisbond, covered in
the previous chapter, raises a series of fundamental financial economics questions related to the
type of limitations that may prevent price convergence. We address four main sources of frictions
suggested in the literature: (a) liquidity factors, (b) short-selling constraints, (c) funding costs, and
(d) institutional frictions in the context of a large macro wealth shock affecting the demand for
risky arbitrage. This investigation boils down to questioning the validity of conditions C1 - C5.
An interesting finding of our analysis is indeed the sign of Basisbond, as introduced in the
previous chapter. It is important to answer why our LOP proxy is positive in Brazil and Mexico,
and negative in Turkey, when the trade is constructed by shorting the USD-denominated bond and
longing the equivalent EUR-denominated bond. This suggests that Brazil and Mexico pay higher
yields in Euro than USD, whereas the exact opposite holds for Turkey. Given that the Euro interest
rates in general fluctuated at higher levels than USD interest rates around the globe, the sign is not
surprising in the cases of Brazil and Mexico, but it is rather puzzling in the case of Turkey. This
chapter delves deeper into the roots of this phenomenon, and provides potential explanations.
This chapter also investigates the impact of regulatory interventions and announcements in
relieving the frictions on Basisbond. In order to understand the nature of the market frictions
being targeted, we categorize into different groups those monetary policies launched by the Fed
and the U.S. Treasury. We later test whether any of these policies widened the cross-sectional
gap between the Brazilian/Mexican Basisbond against the Turkish Basisbond, given that Brazil and
Mexico participated in some monetary policies that Turkey did not participate in.
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Another important issue to highlight is the interpretation of the direction of our LOP deviation
proxy. If Basisbond is persistently non-convergent to zero, a higher Basisbond surely means a bigger
potential profit for the trader, while it also means a bigger anomaly in the underlying pricing
mechanism. This double-meaning is essential to understanding the limits-to-arbitrage literature:
bigger potential profit = bigger mispricing = bigger anomaly = tighter constraints in the market.
In a frictionless market, Basisbond is expected to disappear instantly as traders are expected to
exploit the so-called “riskless” arbitrage opportunity. If Basisbond is persistent, and even sometimes
grows further in size, however, traders are unable (or unwilling) to participate in the trade (due to
certain risks and limitations in the market), and therefore, are incapable of providing the sufficient
demand and supply dynamics, eventually causing price convergence to remain unrealized. In other
words, there should exist certain market constraints that are responsible for Basisbond to remain so
large and volatile over an extended period of time. With the use of regression analyses, this chapter
aims to identify these state-dependent financial constraints.
Results reveal that the sizable and persistent pricing anomaly encountered during Credit Crisis
resulted from the strong interaction of a set of macroeconomic and market forces. On one side,
sharply decreasing supply of funds, due to rising funding costs (captured by Secured and Unsecured),
falling bond supply (captured by Inventory), and slowing macroeconomic activity (captured by LN-
Macro); and on the other side, sharply decreasing appetite for risky arbitrage, due to deteriorating
credit risk perception (captured by EM-CDSI) and increasing risk-aversion (captured by Closed
End), jointly acted as binding constraints and/or deterring factors that kept arbitrageurs from
exploiting the underlying opportunity, causing prices to diverge further and further away from
equilibrium. This is consistent with the idea that the marginal arbitrageur is exposed to sources of
risks that go above and beyond the risk factors affecting the local market of the issuing country.1
Supported by the price discovery analysis, calculations reveal that the way default risk is dis-
tributed among currencies depend directly on the geography of bond issuance. Turkey generally
pays a higher default risk premium in USD than Euro (Sa > Sb), while the opposite is true for Brazil
and Mexico (Sa < Sb). With forward FX markets being unable to correct this imbalance, Basisbond
deviation becomes negative for Turkey, and positive for Brazil and Mexico. Under these circum-
stances, when investors face discordant default risks across two equivalent securities, Basisbond trade
could indeed be left unexploited, causing prices to diverge further from each other. Furthermore,
comparing central bank international reserve distributions of Turkey and Brazil, it is observed that
Turkey, being a major trade partner with the Euro Zone, tends to hold more Euro than USD in
its reserves, while Brazil, being closer to the USD-based trade geography, holds significantly less
1See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a model in which global arbitrageurs, who are present across different markets, are affected by
common wealth shocks. When arbitrageurs find it difficult to absorb these shocks by accessing debt markets, this friction becomes a
source of contagion across seemingly unrelated assets.
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Euro than USD. Therefore, it could be argued that markets assign a relatively lower default risk
premium to Euro-based assets in a Euro-strong country like Turkey, while they assign a relatively
lower default risk premium to USD-based assets in a USD-strong country, like Brazil.2
An additional factor that contributes to sign puzzle arises from differences in accessibility of
arbitrageurs to different loan markets. European banks, being major traders of Turkish bonds,
have comparative advantage in funding in Euro (inside capital) than USD (outside capital). Our
regression results indeed show that, in Europe, an increase in the spread between the unsecured
USD funding relative to secured Euro funding, increases the size of net Basisbond of Turkey. This
implies that in Europe, since EUR is comparatively easier to fund than USD, traders would tend
to short the EUR bonds and long the USD bonds of Turkey. The opposite case is true for Brazil
and Mexico. U.S. banks, being major traders of Brazilian and Mexican bonds, have comparative
advantage in funding in USD (inside capital) than EUR (outside capital). Our regression results
indeed show that, in the U.S., an increase in the unsecured EUR funding relative to secured USD
funding, increases the size of net Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico. This indicates that in the U.S.,
since USD is comparatively easier to fund than EUR, traders would tend to short the USD bonds
and long the EUR bonds of Brazil and Mexico.
An additional result is related to the impact of monetary policies in relieving the dislocation in
the Basisbond trade. It is observed that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has extended
global dollar swap lines to Brazil and Mexico, but not to Turkey. This fact allows us to use Turkey
as a control group in our event study analysis, and to identify the cross-sectional impact of the
dollar swap lines on Basisbond. Our findings suggest that the cross-sectional dispersion between
the Turkish Basisbond vs. the Brazilian/Mexican Basisbond tends to widen further when these swap
extensions are authorized. Following the announcement of swap extensions on October 29, 2008,
the mispricing in the Brazilian and Mexican bonds begin to diminish almost immediately, whereas
the mispricing in Turkey continues to rise. We also find that the geographical dispersion tends
to increase following the announcements related to the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF), and the U.S. Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). These results merit
further research regarding the impact of monetary policy on pricing anomalies.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section I details the data description for the potential
determinants of Basisbond. Section II gives the regression analyses that test the significance of these
determinants. Section III discusses the geographical aspects of Basisbond and offers explanations for
the cross-sectional sign differences of the mispricing. Section IV conducts an event study analysis
regarding the monetary policy implications on Basisbond. Section V gives Appendix A.
2In case of Turkey, this would have a positive impact on the credit perception regarding Turkey’s Euro-denominated risky assets,
showing the extent to which Turkey can meet its Euro debt obligations in case of potential default. The opposite is true for Brazil.
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I. Data Description and Exploratory Analysis
The constituents of the determinants of Basisbond are retrieved for July 2005 to April 2010 as the
end-of-day weighted average of the quotes submitted by a minimum of five brokers and dealers from
Bloomberg (BGN), unless otherwise noted. Other data sources include Data Explorers, Global
Insights Basic Economics Database, the Conference Board’s Indicators Database, Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003) liquidity risk data, and Buraschi and Whelan (2012) disagreement in beliefs data, as
detailed below. The determinants are divided into 7 main categories: (1) Liquidity Frictions, (2)
Short-Selling Constraints, (3) Funding Costs, (4) Global Cash-Flow Factors, (5) Credit Risk Factor,
(6) Risk Aversion Factors, and (7) Global Uncertainty. Each category consists of sub-categories.
Details and discussions of the constituents of each category are given below. The summary statistics
of each variable from Pre-Crisis to Post-Crisis are given in Table 4.1.
A. Liquidity Frictions
• FX Latent Liquidity: In an important study that investigates the role of FX liquidity on
covered-interest rate violations, Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) find that the first principal com-
ponent of bid-ask spreads across different currency pairs explains no-arbitrage violations in
FX markets during the crisis period. This result is interesting, since it suggests the existence
of a latent liquidity variable helping to explain the deviations from the CIRP. Recall that the
USD/EUR spot and forward FX markets make up an important part of our trading strategy,
the trader converting the borrowed dollars into Euros via the spot FX market, and later con-
verting each future Euro cash-flow into dollars via the forward FX market. Any illiquidity in
the exchange rate markets is likely to hinder the ability of an arbitrageur to exploit the given
transaction, which is likely to have an adverse impact on Basisbond deviation. Therefore, we
replicate Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) variable by using USD/EUR spot and forward exchange
rates. Instead of using the bid ask spreads of different currency pairs, we focus on USD/EUR
bid ask spreads for different maturities from one week to ten years. We compute the first
principal component of the unit-root tested stationary bid-ask spreads (capturing liquidity
cost) across given maturities, and call this variable Liq-FX.
Table 4.1 shows that Liq-FX increases in size and volatility from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis,
and drops once again during Post-Crisis. To be more precise, the average (standard deviation)
of the principal component is -1.07 (0.61) in Pre-Crisis, 0.55 (0.70) in Liquidity Crisis, 3.48
(1.85) in Credit Crisis, and 0.91 (0.83) in Post-Crisis. These results imply that, during Credit
Crisis, there was a severe systemic shock to FX markets, as the Liq-FX displays a large
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positive jump. FX forward markets suffered from widening bid-ask spreads, and thus became
increasingly illiquid and costly for an arbitrageur to commit to the underlying Basisbond trade.
• Stock Market Liquidity: The U.S. equity market captures the pulse of the overall state of
the economy, and is an indicative variable for the general drop of liquidity and the level of
contagion across different asset classes. Kwan (1996) finds that while lagged stock returns
have explanatory power for the contemporaneous bond yield changes, the vice versa is not
true, suggesting that the dynamics of bonds are led by the dynamics of stocks through firm-
specific information. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Campbell and Tak-
sler (2003) argue that yield spread changes are significantly related to stock market returns.
Moreover, Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that the fluctuations in liquidity
are correlated across stocks and bonds. Similarly, Landschoot (2008) finds a strong negative
dependence among stock market return and credit quality. This is why it is a matter of cu-
riosity whether any liquidity shock to stock markets have adverse impacts on bond markets,
and on the seemingly unrelated emerging market Basisbond. In this spirit, we control for the
systematic properties of liquidity in the U.S. equity markets based on the work of Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) who compute an aggregate measure of liquidity from the cross-sectional
average of individual stock liquidity, captured by the average effect of day t signed volume on
day t+1 return. We call this variable Liq-PS, defined as the traded factor, which is computed
as the value-weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio from a sort on historical liquidity betas that
are generated as the estimated regression slope coefficients on daily stock returns and volume
data of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange.3 Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) state that by construction Liq-PS should be “negative in general and larger in absolute
magnitude when liquidity is lower.”
Table 4.1 shows that, unlike other periods, Liq-PS is largest and most negative (about ten
times more than Pre-Crisis levels in absolute value terms) during Credit Crisis. The levels
tend to approach once again to their Pre-Crisis levels during Post-Crisis period. To be more
precise, the average (standard deviation) of the Liq-PS is -0.01 (0.04) in Pre-Crisis, -0.09
(0.07) in Liquidity Crisis, -0.11 (0.08) in Credit Crisis, and -0.01 (0.05) in Post-Crisis.
B. Short-Selling Constraints
Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) finds that the short-selling constraints (partly imposed by the regulatory
acts, and measured by low lending supply), tend to maintain a negative impact on stock market
efficiency. In other words, high-lending supply allows prices to reflect more information, helping
3The data is retrieved directly from http : //faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research.
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markets to become more efficient. To quote Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011): “[...] arbitrageurs cannot
correct overvaluation as easily when short selling constraints are tighter.”
We aim to investigate the impact of low lending supply on Basisbond, since it is directly related
to the ability of an arbitrageur to launch the trade at time t. If arbitrageur has little or no access to
bonds (due to lending reluctance of bond owners), the trade might go unexploited. This is why we
retrieve a unique dataset that includes detailed bond-specific information on the available inventory
for lending of both the Euro- and USD-denominated bonds across the three EM countries used in
our analysis (i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Turkey). The daily time-series data is obtained from Data
Explorers and provides the most extensive coverage on sovereign bond security lending currently
available on a bond-specific level from Liquidity Crisis to Post-Crisis period.4 It includes the major
prime brokers, custodians, and the lending desks of large firms that actually trade these securities.
It captures bond-specific trading information from over 100 participants and covers approximately
85% of the OTC securities lending market.5
In order to capture the impact of short-selling constraints, we use the the sum of the bond-
specific USD- and EUR-denominated actively lendable inventory values in dollar terms (filtered out
from the inactive loans) for each bond pair at each point of time, and call this variable Inventory,
which captures the dynamics of bond supply.6
Table 4.2 shows that Inventory tends to decrease from Liquidity Crisis to Post-Crisis across all
given countries. For Brazil 2010-maturity pair, for instance, the average (standard deviation) of
Inventory is $27.15 mio ($6.53 mio) in Liquidity Crisis, $21.83 mio ($7.23 mio) in Credit Crisis, and
$9.42 mio ($5.03 mio) in Post-Crisis. This shows that Inventory decreased by 20% from Liquidity
to Credit Crisis, and further decreased by 57% from Credit to Post-Crisis periods. Similarly, for
Brazil 2015-maturity pair, the average (standard deviation) of Inventory is $416.76 mio ($38.69
mio) in Liquidity Crisis, $343.24 mio ($56.23 mio) in Credit Crisis, and $354.60 mio ($43.16 mio)
in Post-Crisis. This shows that Inventory decreased by 18% from Liquidity to Credit Crisis, and
slightly increased by 3% from Credit to Post-Crisis periods.
For Mexico 2020-maturity pair, the average (standard deviation) of Inventory is $276.03 mio
($36.46 mio) in Liquidity Crisis, $156.95 mio ($32.66 mio) in Credit Crisis, and $164.09 mio ($28.25
mio) in Post-Crisis. This shows that Inventory decreased by 43% from Liquidity to Credit Crisis,
and slightly increased by 5% from Credit to Post-Crisis periods.
4Data Explorers, which is acquired by Markit on April 2012, covers $12 trillion of securities over 20,000 institutional funds.
5All double-counted fields are eliminated.
6Total inventory can either be active or inactive. This is due to the fact that there is sometimes a difference between the total amount
that could be lent out and the actual amount that was offered. Data Explorers state that this happens when “securities are held in too
small parcels or have been restricted by the beneficial owner.”
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Furthermore, for Turkey 2014-maturity pair, the average (standard deviation) of Inventory is
$218.39 mio ($59.97 mio) in Liquidity Crisis, $169.56 mio ($70.76 mio) in Credit Crisis, and $78.73
mio ($15.01 mio) in Post-Crisis. This shows that Inventory decreased by 22% from Liquidity to
Credit Crisis, and further dropped by 54% from Credit to Post-Crisis periods. Likewise, for Turkey
2019-maturity pair, the average (standard deviation) of Inventory is $176.05 mio ($49.07 mio) in
Credit Crisis, and $150.99 mio ($17.50 mio) in Post-Crisis. This shows that Inventory decreased by
14% from Credit to Post-Crisis periods.
Also in the aggregate level, using all retrieved outstanding Eurobonds issued by the given
underlying countries (please see Section II of Chapter 1 for details), a similar pattern emerges. We
find that during Liquidity Crisis, there were on average $3,719; $2030; and $3,293 million worth
of total active lendable Eurobonds a day in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, respectively. Between
September 2008 and April 2009, however, there were on average $3,441; $1,251; and $2,671 million
worth of total active lendable Eurobonds a day in Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively (see
Figure 4.1). This suggests that the total available bond supply decreased in value by approximately
7% for Brazil, 38% for Mexico, and 19% for Turkey. After April 2009, the total active lendable
Eurobonds started to grow in value by 8% in Brazil and 3% in Turkey, whereas they continued to
drop by 43% in Mexico.
These observations suggest that the size of the emerging Eurobond markets shrunk notably
during Credit Crisis, implying that the bond-holders became increasingly unwilling to trade. This
may have hampered the flexibility of arbitrageurs to freely short/long the required bonds that
underlie their strategy - a factor that could have an adverse impact on the dynamics of price
efficiency, and on the size of Basisbond.
C. Funding Costs
Funding costs depend on the level of capitalization and the risk of financial intermediaries. As
Fontaine and Garcia (2012) suggest, the risk premia inherent in corporate bond yields increase
with tighter funding conditions. In this context, it is important to capture how difficult it is to
roll-over the arbitrage trades to take advantage of market dislocations, and fund large relative value
positions. In our framework, the arbitrageur may be required to raise additional capital in order
to fund the cash-flow mismatch, and to meet institutional costs that arise during the transactions.
If funding conditions tighten (due to high funding costs), the arbitrageur could very well be driven
away from the Basisbond trade.
Two types of traders are usually involved in such near-arbitrage opportunities: proprietary
trading desks of investment banks and hedge funds. Although they go after similar trades, they
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usually operate under different funding markets. While hedge funds tend to borrow and lend
against collateral on secured terms (“secured funding”), the prop desks of investment banks tend
to participate in unsecured money market operations (“unsecured funding”). We use two main
variables:
• Secured Funding: Similarly to Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009), we proxy “secured funding”
with the spread between the Federal Agency cost of funding yield minus the U.S. Treasury
yield. We use matching seven-years maturities for both variables.7 Since both rates refer
to a collateralized loan, this spread captures the difference in value between high-quality vs.
relatively lower-quality collateral securities.8 The higher this spread, the tighter the funding
constraints in the secured markets, and thus lower the arbitrageur’s ability to raise enough
cash to fund the Basisbond trade.
Table 4.1 shows that Secured variable increases in size and volatility from Pre-Crisis to Credit
Crisis, and drops once again during Post-Crisis. The average (standard deviation) is 0.34%
(0.06%) in Pre-Crisis, 0.57% (0.14%) in Liquidity Crisis, 0.51% (0.28%) in Credit Crisis, and
0.15% (0.12%) in Post-Crisis. The secured funding costs increased by more than 40% from
Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis. This implies that, during Credit Crisis, there was a severe funding
constraint in the secured markets, which would have made it increasingly costly for a trader
to fund the arbitrage trades.
• Unsecured Funding: We proxy “unsecured funding” with the spread between 3-month LIBOR
and U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates. Being one of the most active and liquid interest
rates, LIBOR is the average interest rate of the leading banks in London if they are to borrow
from other banks. OIS is the interest rate swap where the floating leg comprises of the
geometric average of the daily overnight index rate (e.g. federal funds rate) throughout the
payment period, and the fixed leg is based on a central bank rate that is less risky than LIBOR.
The LIBOR-OIS spread captures the health of the interbank lending dynamics, and indicates
the level of stress and funding costs in the money markets. A rise in the differential implies
that financial institutions become less willing to lend to each other. The higher this spread,
the tighter the funding constraints in the unsecured markets, and thus lower the arbitrageur’s
7U.S. Treasury yields are interpolated by the U.S. Treasury, using the closing bid yields on the actively traded Treasury securities
in the OTC market, based on the composite quotations obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The yield curve values
that correspond to the securities’ time-to-maturities, are retrieved only at fixed maturities. This means that even though there is no
outstanding security with exactly seven-years remaining to maturity, seven-year maturity yields are read from the interpolated curve.
Generic United States on-the-run government bond indices are used for Bloomberg rates. Federal Agency securities are instruments
backed by the U.S. government guarantee and issued by the federal credit agencies (i.e. Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and Federal Farm Credit Bureau). These
securities have high credit ratings (though still lower than U.S. Treasuries), and are used to fund public projects such as housing and
urban renewal.
8See Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) for a discussion of the role of MBS as a funding markets.
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ability to raise enough cash to fund the Basisbond trade through this channel (alternative to
secured funding).
Table 4.1 shows that Unsecured variable increases in size and volatility from Pre-Crisis to
Credit Crisis, and drops once again during Post-Crisis. To be more precise, the average
(standard deviation) is 0.08% (0.02%) in Pre-Crisis, 0.68% (0.15%) in Liquidity Crisis, 1.51%
(0.76%) in Credit Crisis, and 0.26% (0.26%) in Post-Crisis. The unsecured funding costs
increased by more than 1787% from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis. This implies that, during
Credit Crisis, there was a severe funding constraint in the unsecured markets as well, which
may have limited an arbitrageur’s chance of funding the Basisbond trade.
D. Global Cash-Flow Factors
• Macro-Activity Risk: A macro wealth shock that corresponds to aggregate-level consumption
and production could have an adverse impact on the demand for risky arbitrage trades. The
deterioration of economic activity would have direct implications on the general economic
behavior of the agents involved. Individual agents would become much more risk-averse
(as their economic utility function decreases due to lower consumption), and institutional
agents (such as banks) would directly suffer from lower revenues and higher expenses (due
to reluctance of lending against rising credit risk and falling industrial production). In an
economic environment of such nature, interest rates would rise, liquidity would dry up, and
financial markets would shrink, so that the implementation of any economic transaction, let
alone a risky arbitrage transaction (e.g. Basisbond trade), could come to a temporary halt,
having adverse impacts on the pricing mechanism.
Our proxy for macroeconomic shocks to cash-flow factors is related to the sixth literature
stream discussed in Chapter 2. We follow Ludvigson and Ng (2009), who estimate a set
of common factors from a panel of 132 real, nominal, and monetary measures of economic
activity. They show that a procedure which synthesizes information from macroeconomic
activity possesses the ability to strongly predict excess bond returns, explaining 26% of the
one-year-ahead variation. The monthly time-series used in our analysis are based on Ludvigson
and Ng (2009) and are collected from the Global Insights Basic Economics Database and the
Conference Board’s Indicators Database. Unlike Ludvigson and Ng, we exclude price-based
information from the panel in order to interpret this variable as a pure macro-activity factor,
and to allow for an easier distinction between macro-activity and other risk factors. After
removing price-based information from the panel, we end up with 99 cross-sectional economic
series summarized under six main categories: (1) Consumption, Orders and Inventories, (2)
Output and Income, (3) Labor Market, (4) Housing Market, (5) Money and Credit, (6) Prices
61
and Inflation. Refer to Appendix A to Chapter 4 for the sources and the entire list of the
data, accompanied by the coding system of how each variable is transformed for stationarity.
Using the covariance matrix of 99 macroeconomic variables and the associated eigenvectors,
we extract the first principal component (via principal component analysis), and label it
LN-Macro.9 The dataset includes industrial production and income, capacity utilization,
manufacturing sale, labor force, employment, non-farm payroll, hourly earnings of production,
housing starts, money stock and monetary base, outstanding commercial and industrial loans,
producer and consumer price indices and others.
Table 4.1 shows that LN-Macro reflects a severe economic activity deterioration during Credit
Crisis when it reaches its largest and most negative levels (about three times more than Pre-
Crisis levels in absolute value terms). The levels tend to increase once again in Post-Crisis
period, though with higher volatility compared to Credit Crisis. To be more precise, the
average (standard deviation) of the LN-Macro in terms of principal component values is 3.04
(1.66) in Pre-Crisis, -0.37 (2.04) in Liquidity Crisis, -10.30 (3.56) in Credit Crisis, and 0.03
(4.73) in Post-Crisis. Since this variable captures the macro wealth shock in the economy,
and the deterioration in general production, consumption and housing markets, it is likely to
have impact on macroeconomic compression, and thus the validity of initiating a Basisbond
trade in such an economy.
• Term Premium: A vast literature shows that the term premium of the U.S. yield curve is a
forward looking proxy of macroeconomic activity. It has also been argued that arbitrageurs
fund their activities rolling short maturity instruments. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) state
that an upward sloping term structure is related to future rise in real economic activity. In
addition, Landschoot (2008) empirically show that a rise in default-free term structure causes
yield spreads to drop, given that, according to expectation hypothesis, an upward sloping term
structure is associated with an increase in future short-term interest rates and a decrease in
yield spreads. See also Vayanos and Vila (2009) for a model in which the slope of the term
structure is informative about the relative cost of arbitrageurs funding risky arbitrage in
bonds. We define the term premium as the difference between 10-year Treasury yield and
3-month Libor yield (see Landschoot (2008)). We label this factor as TP.
Table 4.1 shows that TP increases from Pre-Crisis to Post-Crisis. The average (standard
deviation) is -0.29% (0.40%) in Pre-Crisis, 0.20% (0.91%) in Liquidity Crisis, 0.93% (0.72%)
in Credit Crisis, and 3.06% (0.50%) in Post-Crisis.
9Examples of price variables removed include: the S&P dividend yield, the Federal Funds (FF) rate, the 10-year T-bond, the Baa -
FF default spread, and the Dollar-Yen exchange rate.
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E. Credit Risk Factors
A high number of defaults tend to produce higher default expectations at times of recessions. To
measure the impact of emerging market default risk, we use the Markit CDX Emerging Markets
index price.10 This index is used as a benchmark to study the changes in the credit quality of the
underlying emerging markets, and reflect the default risk perception. The index price is inversely
related to spread, and hence, the index tends to decrease when the credit spread (or default risk)
increases. Since Basisbond trade is subject to the potential default of the underlying bonds, this
variable captures the extent to which credit deterioration hinders arbitrageurs from participating
in the strategy. We label this variable EM-CDSI starting from Liquidity Crisis.
Table 4.1 shows that EM-CDSI reaches its lowest index price (and hence its highest CDS spread
levels) during Credit Crisis, giving a strong indication about the deteriorating default perception
on emerging markets. This highlights the inherent riskiness of the underlying Basisbond trade, given
that it consists of defaultable bonds. A significant fall in the general credit quality of the emerging
market bonds would be a potential reason why an arbitrageur would be unwilling to participate
in the strategy. The average (standard deviation) of the EM-CDSI index prices is 99.64 (1.74) in
Liquidity Crisis, 87.49 (6.19) in Credit Crisis, and 107.94 (4.21) in Post-Crisis.
F. Risk Aversion Factors
• Closed End Fund Discount Risk: Closed-End Funds are investment companies (actively man-
aged by an investment advisor) that initially raise fixed capital through IPO, and then trade
like stocks on the exchange markets. They focus on specific industries or geographies (like
emerging markets), and use leverage to increase returns. The stock price per share may be
different than the net asset value (NAV) per share of the fund’s investments. The stock price
is said to be trading at a premium (discount) if it is above (below) the NAV. In other words,
it is a premium when [Market Price]/[NAV] > 1, and discount when [Market Price]/[NAV] <
1. This is referred in the literature as a “closed-end fund puzzle”, since it is difficult to explain
this phenomenon. Technically, an investor can buy a sufficient amount of the under-priced
shares from the market, gain the majority control of the company, and force investors to sell
the fund at a higher market value, making an arbitrage profit. This is why a large body of the
literature investigates the persistence of the closed-end fund discount as a potential pricing
puzzle. The literature takes two different directions: (1) Rational models and (2) Behav-
ioral models. Rational models tend to explain the anomaly by highlighting the importance of
10The CDX index is a standardised tradable credit security on its own. The credit event associated with the index is defined as
bankruptcy or failure to pay. The determination of the new constituents follows the rule-based approach that takes into account liquidity
(see http://www.markit.com for details).
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frictions such as agency costs, managerial abilities and time variation in the discount factor
(Malkiel (1977); Spiegel (1997); Ross (2002); Berk and Stanton (2007)), whereas behavioral
models argue that it is due to irrational investment decisions and market sentiments (De Long,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990); Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991); Bodurtha, Kim,
and Lee (1995); Baker and Wurgler (2007)).
We compute the arithmetic average of the closed-end funds discounts of three important
emerging market debt funds (EDD, TEI and MSD).11 We generate the closed-end fund pre-
miums (discounts) by dividing the market prices to NAVs, and label it Closed End. We use
this variable as a proxy for risk aversion against emerging market economies.
Note that the smaller the Closed End variable, the bigger the fund discount, and the bigger
the mispricing anomaly. Table 4.1 indeed shows that this ratio reaches its lowest average
and highest volatility during the Credit Crisis, even though closed end funds tend to trade at
a discount throughout the given sample period. To be more precise, the average (standard
deviation) of the given price ratio is 0.94 (0.03) in Pre-Crisis, 0.91 (0.03) in Liquidity Crisis,
0.79 (0.06) in Credit Crisis, and 0.88 (0.04) in Post-Crisis. This gives evidence for a potential
fear against leverage and illiquidity, and a lack of confidence in the underlying emerging market
securities during Credit Crisis.
• Perceived Tail Event Risk: In accordance with the studies of Bollerslev and Zhou (2006),
and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011), we use another measure of risk aversion
with VIX option volatility index, which is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index computed from the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Market
practitioners use VIX as a representative of fear factor in the U.S. markets, as it captures the
market’s expectation of stock market volatility over the next 30 day period. It summarizes
the cost of protection against major market tail event risk (see Pan and Singleton (2008) for
an application in the context of credit markets). As further examples of empirical studies,
Campbell and Taksler (2003) find a significant co-movement between the volatility of stock
returns and credit risk premiums; and similarly, Landschoot (2008) highlights the significance
of VIX (and VIX-squared for non-linearity effect) in corporate credit premiums across USD
and Euro currencies. Finally, Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008) find that the jump risk
premium, denoted by option-implied volatility, is an important component of credit spreads.
Table 4.1 shows that VIX increases considerably from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis, and drops
once again in Post-Crisis. The average (standard deviation) is 12.97% (2.55%) in Pre-Crisis,
23.05% (3.55%) in Liquidity Crisis, 48.20% (14.06%) in Credit Crisis, and 25.05% (5.93%)
11EDD stands for Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets. TEI stands for Templeton Emerging Markets Income Fund. MSD stands for
Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Debt Fund Inc.
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in Post-Crisis. This implies that the forward-looking volatility and the tail event risk of the
market rises by more than 270% from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis.
G. Global Uncertainty Factor
An emerging body of literature uses dispersion in analyst forecasts as a proxy for ambiguity and
uncertainty in financial markets, which could have an adverse impact on the risk aversion of the
arbitrageurs, and hence on the Basisbond trade. They find that disagreement in beliefs helps to
explain yield spreads. We incorporate subjective uncertainty using the Buraschi and Whelan (2012)
dispersion factor, which is intended to capture the U.S.-based macroeconomic uncertainty. The
heterogeneity in beliefs is obtained from market participant surveys regarding the expectations of
future prices and macroeconomic fundamentals. The panel data on the expectations is provided
by Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI). Buraschi and Whelan (2012) focus on two types of
forecasts (short-term and long-term), and three economic variables: (1) Real - Real GDP and
Industrial Production (2) Nominal - Consumer Price Inflation and GDP deflator (3) Monetary -
3-Month and 10-year Treasury rates. The first principal component of the cross-sectional mean-
absolute-deviation (MAD) in forecasts is computed for each category to proxy the macroeconomic
disagreement. We directly use this first principal component as a proxy for the disagreement in
beliefs, and label it as DiB. The variable is not available for the Post-Crisis period.
Table 4.1 shows that the disagreement in belief proxy increases as of Pre-Crisis, and reaches
its maximum level during the Credit Crisis. The average (standard deviation) of the principal
components is -0.22 (0.07) in Pre-Crisis, -0.10 (0.12) in Liquidity Crisis, and 0.25 (0.08) in Credit
Crisis.
II. Determinants of Basis(bond)
In order to investigate the impact of various risk channels and constraints, we run weekly panel
regressions on net Basisbond (based on absolute values, as defined by Eq. 3.11 in Chapter 3) for all
bond pairs, and for all countries.12 Regressions are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimators. The reason for using net Basisbond for all countries is to facilitate the economic inter-
pretation of the analysis. Since net Basisbond is represented in absolute value terms, any rise in
net Basisbond would directly indicate a rise in the pricing anomaly across any given emerging coun-
try. This way, a significantly positive/negative slope coefficient of an explanatory risk factor, when
12Monthly series (i.e. Liq-PS, LN-Macro and DiB) are weekly interpolated at end-of-week points to create matching data. For daily
series (i.e. Inventory and Transaction), end-of-week days are used to create matching data. Inventory series are standardized.
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regressed against net Basisbond, could be unambiguously interpreted as increasing (or decreasing)
the size of the anomaly, regardless of whether the actual Basisbond deviation is positive (Brazil
and Mexico) or negative (Turkey). Therefore, a positive slope coefficient implies that the explana-
tory variable is positively correlated with net Basisbond, such that any increase (decrease) in the
explanatory variable increases (decreases) the pricing anomaly across all countries. On the other
hand, a negative slope coefficient implies that the explanatory variable is inversely correlated with
net Basisbond, such that any increase (decrease) in the explanatory variable decreases (increases)
the pricing anomaly across all countries.
As described in Fletcher and Taylor (1996), the main target is to understand the portion of the
LOP mispricing that is in “excess” of the underlying bid-ask spreads. Once transaction costs are
deducted, leading to net Basisbond, there still remains a large time-variation unexplained. This is the
portion that warrants investigation. This is why, in accordance with limits-to-arbitrage literature,
we use net Basisbond on the LHS of regressions as the dependent variable. The only exception is
Eq. (4.1) in section II.A, where we use gross Basisbond. This is done to investigate the impact of
bond-specific illiquidity (captured by bid-ask spreads). In all regressions, we focus on whether the
following null hypothesis (H0) holds for each independent variable:
H0 : No impact on the growth of Basisbond.
Hence, the rejection of the null hypothesis will give us statistical evidence that the corresponding
risk factor has significant impact on Basisbond. This section will help us pinpoint the risk factors that
were responsible in deterring arbitrageurs from exploiting the Basisbond strategy, and consequently
causing price convergence to remain unrealized in the market.
A. Liquidity Frictions
Liquidity is often argued to be an important priced state variable that captures the features of the
investment environment and macroeconomy. An elevated mispricing could be evidence of liquidity
frictions (Condition C1). Either trading is costly or traders may be reluctant to take positions due to
concerns about the potential future market impact of their trades. Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
as well as a vast literature that followed, argue that bond-specific market liquidity is a significant
factor in the pricing of corporate bonds. Longstaff, Neis, and Mithal (2005) point out the fact
that a large portion of corporate spreads is due to default risk, but the time-varying nature of the
non-default component is strongly related to bond-specific illiquidity. Furthermore, Perraudin and
Taylor (2003) show that liquidity risk premium accounts for an important portion of credit spreads.
Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2005) also find that liquidity risk premium is priced in corporate
yield spreads. Starting in early 2007, a reduction of liquidity increased bid-ask spreads in several
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financial markets, leading commentators to refer to this period as a liquidity crisis. In this section,
we investigate the link between the Basisbond and the reduced liquidity in the cash bond and FX
markets.
First, we compare the dynamics of bid-ask spreads of both the cash bonds and the forward
contracts required to build a long-short position in the Basisbond trade. Indeed, in the Liquidity
Crisis, total bid-ask spreads increased by an average of 1.4x compared to the Pre-Crisis period.
Bond bid-ask spreads, on average, account for 67% of the total transaction costs in the Pre-Crisis
period, and 64% in the Liquidity Crisis period. From the Pre-Crisis to the Credit Crisis period,
total bid-ask spreads increased by more than 1.8x; this is due to a 1.7x increase in the bond bid-ask
spreads and a 2x increase in the FX bid-ask spreads. While transaction costs certainly increased, we
find, however, that the increase in Basisbond far outstrips total transaction costs during the Credit
Crisis (see Figure 3.1). Basisbond reaches levels that in some periods exceed total bid-ask spreads by
5x for Turkey 2014, 11x for Turkey 2019, 6x for Brazil 2010, 9x for Brazil 2015, and 5x for Mexico
2020 bonds.13
To investigate this link further, we regress the changes in the absolute value of gross Basisbond
(without bid-ask adjustment), on changes in the bond-specific total bid-ask costs (denoted as
BidAsk), Liq-FX and Liq-PS:
∆ |Gross Basis(bond)j,t| = αj +B1 [∆BidAskj,t] +B2 [∆Liq FXt] +B3 [∆Liq PSt] + ǫj,t (4.1)
where α denotes the country-specific fixed effect, ∆ denotes the first-difference, and j denotes the
country-specific Basisbond of the bond pairs for Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey
2014, and Turkey 2019. The idiosyncratic errors are captured by ǫt at time t. Table 4.3 details
the regression specifications and summarizes the results in Column (A) by reporting the slope
coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared values.
Calculations reveal that during the Credit Crisis, BidAsk, Liq-FX and Liq-PS are all insignif-
icant. The explanatory power is limited, never exceeding an R-squared of 3%.14 Accordingly, the
bond-specific transaction costs as well as the exchange rate costs arising from the spot and forward
FX markets are not binding, suggesting that liquidity risk played a limited role in explaining the
observed phenomenon.
13Note that the credit ratings of these countries have been upgraded by Fitch from 2007 to 2010: Brazilian treasuries from BB to BBB,
Mexican treasuries from BB+ to BBB, and Turkish treasuries from BB- to BB+. This is consistent with the relatively small observed
variations in bid-ask spreads for these bonds.
14To correct for the possibility that bid-ask spreads may be a function of the liquidity frictions (Liq-FX and Liq-PS), an additional
test is conducted by running the effect of the given liquidity frictions on BidAsk, and using the residuals as a new liquidity measure
against gross Basisbond. These residuals would represent the portion of the bid-ask spreads that cannot be explained by Liq-FX and
Liq-PS. We find that this new liquidity variable is also statistically insignificant.
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B. Short-Selling Constraints and Security Lending Frictions
To implement our trading strategy, a trader needs to borrow a security from a broker dealer (Con-
dition C2). If this security is not available and/or the cost of borrowing is high, the trader can
effectively face a short-selling constraint. Indeed, important literature has emerged that studies
the implications of short-selling constraints (Harrison and Kreps (1978), Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Tuckman and Vila (1992)). To investigate this channel, we
use bond-specific data on total lendable value adjusted to include the active availability for lending
(i.e. Inventory), capturing the tightening of the loan supply and short-selling constraints in the
Eurobond market.
Controlling for country-specific fixed effects, we run panel regressions for the changes in net
Basisbond (after bid-ask adjustment) of the bond pairs included in the analysis on the changes in
Inventory:
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + λ1
[
∆¯Inventoryj,t
]
+ ǫj,t (4.2)
where α denotes the country-specific fixed effect, ∆¯ denotes the percentage difference, and other
notations are as defined before. Table 4.3 details the regression specifications and summarizes the
results in Column (B) by reporting the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared
values.
Calculations reveal that Inventory is statistically significant at 95% confidence level, showing
that during Credit Crisis the constraints in bond supply indeed help to explain net Basisbond
deviations across all given bond pairs. The slope coefficient λ1 is negative (with a t-stat of -
2.99), implying that an increase in Inventory reduces net Basisbond. This is consistent with recent
findings on equity markets about the impact of the short-selling bans on price efficiency (see Saffi
and Sigurdsson (2011)). The implication is that when the bond supply drops in the market (i.e.
owners make bonds less available), the prices are less informative, and the initiation of the trade is
jeopardized, preventing arbitrageurs from freely longing/shorting the required bonds, causing net
Basisbond to diverge further away from zero. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that, when regressed
alone, this channel has limited statistical explanatory power, having 3% R-squared.15 The question
is, if liquidity costs and short-selling constraints do not sufficiently enhance our understanding of
Basisbond variation, then what does? A third source of friction investigated by the limits-to-arbitrage
literature is related to funding constraints, which we explore in the next section.
15In addition, the impact of lending fees on Basisbond is investigated by Buraschi, Menguturk, and Sener (2013). Their findings show
that lending fees are also not the main driver of the underlying pricing anomaly.
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C. Funding Costs in Debt Markets
Consider a wealth shock that weakens the balance sheets of arbitrageurs. If external capital is still
readily accessible then wealth shock could be absorbed by additional borrowing (Condition C3).
If access to external capital is limited, however, arbitrageurs may be forced to close their existing
arbitrage positions, making the LOP equilibrium difficult to attain. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) study a model in which arbitrageurs must collateralize their positions
in each asset to implement an arbitrage. According to them, arbitrageurs cannot enforce the LOP
condition unless their wealth is large relative to the demand shock and the margin requirement.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) extend this analysis to multiple
assets. With multiple assets, they show that leverage constraints can generate contagion of shocks
to seemingly unrelated assets. Shocks to one asset are transmitted to otherwise unrelated assets
through changes in the arbitrageurs’ balance sheets. Relating their argument to our analysis, trading
desks operating simultaneously on multiple sovereign bond markets, cause international contagion
of shocks and frictions across their assets.
Controlling for country-specific fixed effects, we run panel regressions for the changes in net
Basisbond against the changes in Secured and Unsecured funding costs:
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + θ1 [∆Unsecuredt] + θ2 [∆Securedt] + ǫj,t (4.3)
where all notations are as defined before. Table 4.3 details the regression specifications and sum-
marizes the results in Column (C) by reporting the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and
R-squared values.
Calculations reveal that while Secured is statistically insignificant in this analysis, Unsecured
is statistically significant at 90% confidence level, showing that during Credit Crisis the uncollat-
eralized funding constraints indeed help to explain net Basisbond deviations across all given bond
pairs. R-squared is 5%. The slope coefficient θ1 is positive (with a t-stat of 1.67), implying that
an increase in Unsecured funding cost increases net Basisbond. This result is consistent with state-
ments made by central bankers, before and during the crisis, underlying the importance of the
unsecured interbank funding market. For example, Greenspan argued on various occasions that
the LIBOR/OIS differential is a key characteristic of interbank lending and a key measure of the
functioning of capital markets.16
16Greenspan consistently referred to this indicator as a key measure of policy effectiveness of the Fed interventions: “Lehman default
[...] drove LIBOR/OIS up markedly. It reached a riveting 364 basis points on October 10th. The passage by Congress of the 700 billion
dollar Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) on October 3rd eased, but did not erase, the post-Lehman surge in LIBOR/OIS. The
spread apparently stalled in mid-November and remains worryingly high.” This convinced the Fed to intervene in the swap market in
order to address the unusually wide LIBOR/OIS spreads in the initial stage of the crisis.
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D. The Macro Environment
Subsections A, B and C above show that (a) liquidity frictions, (b) short-selling constraints, and (c)
funding costs fail to offer a sufficiently convincing explanation when regressed in their own categories
alone. But this is hardly surprising considering the truly global nature and the gargantuan scale of
the economic disruption behind these price anomalies during the Credit Crisis. It would be overly
simplistic to represent this highly interconnected, complex phenomenon within the categories of our
own design. In the present section, therefore, we form various pools of distinct category variables,
and investigate how they act jointly. In particular, we first control for the Liquidity Frictions and
Short-Selling Constraints together with the Funding Costs, and run the following regression on net
Basisbond:
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + γ1 [∆Liq FXt] + γ2 [∆Liq PSt] + γ3
[
∆¯Inventoryj,t
]
+ γ4 [∆Unsecuredt] + γ5 [∆Securedt] + ǫj,t (4.4)
where all notations are as defined before. Table 4.3 details the regression specifications and sum-
marizes the results in Column (D) by reporting the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and
R-squared values. Results confirm that the unsecured funding channel retains its significance in the
presence of short-selling constraints.
The joint role played by the short-selling constraints and funding costs may also be affected
by the contemporaneous effect of other omitted state variables. For this reason, we extend the
regression specifications in Table 4.3 and control for other potentially significant macro effects. We
organize the control variables, for notational convenience, under: (i) Global Cash-Flow Factors, (ii)
Credit Risk Factor, (iii) Risk Aversion Factors, and (iv) Global Uncertainty. See Section I of this
chapter for the detailed explanation of each category. Controlling for country-specific fixed effects,
we run the following panel regressions for the changes in net Basisbond:
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + β1 [∆Funding Costst−v] + +β2 [∆Short Selling Constraintsj,t]
+ β3 [∆Global Cash F low Factorst] + β4 [∆Credit Risk Factort]
+ β5 [∆Risk Aversion Factorst] + β6 [∆Global Uncertaintyt] + ǫj,t (4.5)
where all notations are as defined before.17 Table 4.4 details the regression specifications and
summarizes the results by reporting the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared
values for Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis periods.
Our findings reveal that, during the Liquidity Crisis, the most significant variable is Secured
17Funding Costs are regressed with the weekly lag parameter v = 0 for Unsecured Funding, and v = 1 for Secured Funding. This
lag specification is chosen after observing that the impact of Secured Funding comes with a lag, possibly due to an inertia effect in the
collateralized market.
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funding with a positive slope coefficient (and a t-stat of 1.87). The tail event risk captured by
VIX is also found statistically significant with a positive slope coefficient (and a t-stat of 1.74).
Nevertheless, no other factor linked to economic activity is significant. R-squared is 7%.
During Credit Crisis, however, a completely different picture emerges. Variables within the
categories of Global Cash-Flow Factors, Risk Aversion Factors and Credit Risk Factor become
highly and statistically significant. This suggests that during the market turmoil, Basisbond was not
simply the outcome of a security-specific phenomenon but was in fact correlated with market-wide
systematic factors. To be more precise, shocks to macroeconomic activity (represented by LN-
Macro) are found statistically and economically significant with a negative slope coefficient (and a
t-stat of -2.03) during Credit Crisis, whereas they are insignificant during Liquidity Crisis. This
result suggests that, the lower the level of macroeconomic activity, the higher the net Basisbond
across the given bond pairs. Therefore, the impact of the macro wealth shock (affecting aggregate
consumption and production) indeed matters, especially in an environment when arbitrageurs are
unable to compensate it by leveraged borrowing. The shrinkage of the economy seeps into the
trading behavior of all economic agents, some of whom are unwilling to lend, and some of whom are
unwilling to borrow. The deadlock of the transaction markets would surely limit the arbitrageurs to
freely short/long the corresponding bonds, and to provide the necessary liquidity into the dislocated
markets.
Second, the risk-aversion proxy based on the average discount of a portfolio of EM closed-end
funds (represented by Closed End) is also found statistically and economically significant with a
negative slope coefficient (and a t-stat of -4.55). This result suggests that, as the closed end discount
decreases by diverging further away from one towards zero (and thus the size of mispricing anomaly
increases in the underlying emerging market funds), net Basisbond increases. The implication is
that, in this period, the arbitragers being relatively more risk-averse to trade emerging market
funds (due to lack of confidence) would be withdrawing (or liquidating) their positions in other
emerging market asset classes (such as Eurobonds) as well. The growing negativity of Closed End
during Credit Crisis implies that there is a severe problem in the asset valuation dynamics in
emerging markets.
Third, the default risk proxy (represented by EM-CDSI) is also found statistically and econom-
ically significant with a negative slope coefficient (and a t-stat of -3.51). The result suggests that
a decrease in the CDS index (i.e. an increase in EM default risk) increases net Basisbond. The
implication is similar to that of Closed End. Arbitrageurs becoming increasingly risk-averse against
default, in this period, would be withdrawing (or liquidating) their positions in emerging market
asset classes that tend to pose a serious credit risk. If the bonds default indeed, the arbitrageurs’
profits would dwindle away proportionally by the recovery rate. Therefore, if the perception of
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default risk is greater than the return, the opportunity indicated by Basisbond would be left unex-
ploited.
Fourth, after controlling for the additional exogenous factors above, both the Unsecured and
one-week lagged Secured funding channels are found highly and statistically significant with positive
slope coefficients (and t-stats of 2.08 and 2.47, respectively, higher than in Table 4.3). This result
highlights the role of both hedge funds and investment banks in ensuring the LOP condition as
long as the funding constraints that they face are not binding (to be discussed in further detail in
Chapter 5). It can thus be argued that Funding Costs help to capture the tightness of leverage
constraints, which might limit the demand for risk capital needed to carry arbitrage trades and
absorb deviations from the LOP.18 Furthermore, Inventory also retains its statistical significance
with a negative slope coefficient (and a t-stat of -3.66, again higher than in Table 4.3). The
conclusion is that when Short-Selling Constraints and Funding Costs are controlled with exogenous
macro shocks related to macroeconomic deterioration, risk aversion and default risk, the majority
of net Basisbond deviation can indeed be explained accurately during Credit Crisis. This suggests
that net Basisbond is strongly and adversely affected by the interaction between deteriorated supply
dynamics, leverage constraints and funding costs in the presence of a massive macroeconomic shock
restraining the supply of risk capital extensively. Jointly, these factors account for 43% of the total
variation.19
To ensure robustness, we finalize our investigation by regressing each category individually
against net Basisbond. Table 4.5 details the regression specifications and summarizes the results by
reporting the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared values for Credit Crisis.
Our findings show that the market constraints that are found significant jointly are also found
significant individually. This strengthens our claim that the conclusions are robust.
These results show that on one side, sharply decreasing supply of funds, due to rising funding
costs (captured by Secured and Unsecured), and falling bond supply (captured by Inventory), and
slowing macroeconomic activity (captured by LN-Macro); and on the other side, sharply decreasing
appetite for risky arbitrage, due to deteriorating credit risk perception (captured by EM-CDSI) and
increasing risk-aversion (captured by Closed End), acted jointly and individually as binding con-
straints and/or deterring factors that kept arbitrageurs from exploiting the underlying opportunity,
causing prices to diverge further and further away from equilibrium.
During Post-Crisis, on the other hand, most of these factors are no longer significant, and R-
squared drops down to 5%. The only significant explanatory variable is Inventory with the expected
18See also Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for earlier related work.
19Other factors, such as TP, VIX and DiB are found statistically insignificant.
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negative slope coefficient (and a t-stat of -3.65). Funding Costs, Risk Aversion Factors, Global Cash-
Flow Factors and Credit Risk Factor are no longer relevant in the dynamics of net Basisbond, which
tends to give strong signs of price convergence for most bond pairs during this period.
III. Geography of Basis(bond)
One of the most intriguing findings is that the sign of the Basisbond is country-specific. Basisbond
of Turkey is generally negative, whereas Basisbond of Mexico and Brazil is generally positive. This
sign puzzle implies that arbitrageurs in Turkey would long the USD bond and short the Euro bond,
whereas those in Brazil and Mexico would make the opposite trade. This result is of interest to us
since it provides additional important clues as to the type of frictions that are at the source of the
pricing dynamics.
A. Price Discovery of Credit Yield Spreads
If institutional frictions create asymmetries in the relative cost of funding for different sovereign
bonds, this asymmetry would be visible in terms of the relative difference in the information con-
tent of each bond. We use a price discovery analysis to learn about the potential effects of the
geographical frictions that relate to the cross-sectional differences in information content.
There are two traditional ways to conduct a price discovery analysis. The first one is based on the
information share (IS) measure, as suggested by Hasbrouck (1995). The second one is based on the
component share (CS) measure, as suggested by Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Both measures rely on
vector error-correction models (VECM). IS assumes that price volatility reflects new information,
and allows for the correlation among multiple markets via the variance and covariance of price
innovations. Following Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), we calculate the IS measures and find
the contribution of USD credit yield spreads (i.e. Sat ) to Euro credit yield spreads (i.e. S
b
t ). Using
the interpolated riskless USD and EUR government yields (Ra and Rb, respectively), and the actual
USD and EUR yields (Y a and Y b, respectively), of the underlying bonds in Turkey 2014-maturity
bond pairs, Brazil 2015-maturity bond pair, and Mexico 2020-maturity bond pair, for each time t,
we first calculate the credit yield spreads, Si(t, T ) = Y i(t, T )− Ri(t, T ) for each currency i=[a, b],
73
where a=USD and b=EUR, as defined before.20 Our calculations reveal that:
In Brazil and Mexico : Sa < Sb (4.6)
In Turkey : Sa > Sb (4.7)
Applying the Johansen cointegration test, we find that Sat and S
b
t are highly cointegrated during the
sample period across the given bond pairs. We define zt,T ≡ [S
a
t,T − k1 × S
b
t,T ]. Dropping subscript
T for notational convenience, we estimate the following VECM for the credit yield spreads of each
country:
∆Sat = A1zt−1 +
N∑
n=1
φ1n∆S
a
t−n +
N∑
n=1
γ1n∆S
b
t−n + u1t (4.8)
∆Sbc,t = A2zt−1 +
N∑
n=1
φ2n∆S
a
t−n +
N∑
n=1
γ2n∆S
b
t−n + u2t (4.9)
where the optimal lag structure N = 2 is determined by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). To
estimate the cointegration parameter k1, we use directly the restrictions implied by the LOP and
set it equal to the average of X(t)/F (t, T ) for each bond pair. We are interested in exploring
two properties of this dynamic system: (a) the existence of an asymmetric structure in the vector
A = [A1, A2], and (b) the Hasbrouck information-share coefficient.
Following the detailed explanation in Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), it is argued that, in
the presence of frictions, Sb contributes more to the price discovery if A1 is statistically significant
and negative. On the other hand, Sa contributes more to the price discovery if A2 is statistically sig-
nificant and positive. If both coefficients are significant, then both currencies are jointly important
in the price discovery process.
Note also that Stock and Watson (1988) decomposition forms the basis for Hasbrouck (1995)
measure of “information share”. The maintained assumption is that new information is reflected by
price volatility. Let σ1 and σ2 be the volatility of the estimated residuals u1 and u2, respectively, and
let σ12 be the covariance. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) states that “market that contributes
the most to the variance of the innovations to the common factor is presumed to be the one
that contributes the most to the price discovery.” When σ12 = 0, Hasbrouck’s measure is defined
20As discussed in the previous chapter, Sat,T and S
b
t,T must satisfy a long-run LOP restriction, namely [S
a
t,T − kt,T × S
b
t,T ] = 0, with
kt,T = X(t)/F (t, T ).
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uniquely; when σ12 6= 0, this measure provides two bounds, Hl and Hu, expressed as follows:
Hl =
A22
(
σ21 −
σ212
σ22
)
A22σ
2
1 − 2A1A2σ12 + A
2
1σ
2
2
, Hu =
(
A2σ1 − A1
σ12
σ1
)2
A22σ
2
1 − 2A1A2σ12 + A
2
1σ
2
2
(4.10)
where A = [A1, A2] are the estimated slope coefficients from Eq. (4.9). In order to find the
decomposition of the price discovery process, Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) suggest
using the average of Hl and Hu, namely Hm. Based on Eq. (4.10), Hm estimates how much S
a
contributes to the price discovery process. Therefore, 1 − Hm shows how much S
b contributes to
the price discovery process. If Hm > 50%, then S
a is the greater contributor; if Hm < 50%, then
Sb is the greater contributor; and if Hm = 50%, both credit yield spreads are equally important in
the price discovery process.
Table 4.6 summarizing our results, indicate a clear pattern. For Brazil and Mexico, A2 is positive
and statistically significant, showing that Sa contributes more to the price discovery process. On
average, Hm is 66% for Brazil, and 84% for Mexico. On the other hand, the exact opposite is true for
Turkey. We find that A1 is negative and statistically significant, showing that S
b contributes more
to the price discovery process. On average, Hm is 29%, so that the contribution of S
b is 1- Hm =
71%. These results show the geographical differences in the information content of sovereign bonds,
and implies that different funding channels may be at work to create a cross-sectional dispersion in
the price discovery process.
B. Currency Composition of Central Bank International Reserves
Is the evidence in the previous section consistent with capital hoarding at the country-specific level?
This phenomenon, perhaps triggered by a precautionary motive in anticipation of future expected
losses from security write-downs, might have played a role in the geography of funding capital. To
investigate this issue in greater detail, we study the evolution of capital at aggregate level, in terms
of central bank foreign currency reserve distributions of Turkey and Brazil.21 Table 4.7 displays the
reserve distribution on the following currencies: the U.S. dollar (USD), Euro (EUR), and others
(e.g. Japanese Yen (JPY), British Pound (BGP), Canadian Dollars (CAD), Australian Dollars
(AUD)).
Interesting geographical patterns emerge. It is observed that 51% (46%) of the total international
reserves of Turkey was attributed to USD (EUR) during 2008.22 Similarly, the same proportion was
21The data for Turkish Central Bank reserve distribution is retrieved from the central bank official website (www.tcmb.gov.tr). The
data for Brazilian Central Bank reserve distribution is retrieved from a Senior Economist of HSBC Bank Brazil. No data is available for
Mexico’s central bank foreign reserve distribution.
22No data is available for years preceding 2008.
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52.6% (44.6%) in 2009, and 51.3% (46.5%) in 2010, respectively. Note that the USD reserves also
include gold and SDR, implying that it is not pure dollar currency. Even under these circumstances,
however, the proportion of EUR assets is highly close to that of USD assets. Since there is not a
great deal of movement in the reserves (the proportion is “sticky” over time), Turkey, being also
major trade partner with the Euro Zone, have the features of being a Euro-strong country, which
would bring about a positive impact on the credit perception of its Euro-denominated liabilities
vis-a-vis USD-denominated ones. In addition, if gold and SDR reserves are deducted from the USD
reserves, it is very likely that Turkey holds more Euro reserves than USD reserves. This would mean
that Turkey is better equipped to meet its Euro-denominated obligations than its USD-denominated
ones, suggesting that a lower default probability (and a lower credit yield spread) would be assigned
to its Euro-denominated assets. This is a plausible reason for Sa > Sb in Turkey.
The situation is different for Brazil. In Table 4.7, it is noted that the weight of the dollar reserves
rose from 55% in 2004 to 89% in 2008, whereas the weight of the Euro reserves during the same
period fell from 35% to 9%. It is evident that Brazil is predominantly a USD-strong country. Share
of Euro in Brazil’s international reserves, being small and falling, would generate a negative impact
on the credit perception of its Euro-denominated liabilities, offering a plausible reason for Sa < Sb
in Brazil (and possibly Mexico for that matter).
C. Decomposing Basis(bond)
While Eq. (3.3) (in Section I, Chapter 3) served as an initial stepping-board to construct Basisbond
under a coupon framework (in Section III, Chapter 3), Eq. (3.4) (in Section I, Chapter 3) similarly
provides us with a strong intuition to decompose Basisbond into its CIRP and Spread components.
Following the procedure described in Section III, Chapter 3, and assuming that the Eurobond
pairs used in our study are issued by risk-free sovereigns (e.g. U.S. and Germany), we construct
a hypothetical risk-free bond pair and calculate the CIRP component that we call Basiscirp. We
do this by replacing the Eurobond market yields (Y a and Y b) with the risk-free government bond
yields (Ra and Rb) in USD and EUR.23 We define Basiscirp = R
a∗ − Ra, where Ra
∗
is the yield
of the synthetic USD riskless bond, and Ra is the yield of the original USD riskless bond. Any
difference between Basisbond and Basiscirp therefore represents the additional Spread component in
the trading strategy, calculated as:
Basisspread = Basisbond −Basiscirp (4.11)
23USD and EUR riskless government yields are retrieved from Bloomberg (BGN). These yields are linearly interpolated using fixed
maturity points (2-years to 10-years) at each time t to come up with such Ra and Rb that exactly correspond to Eurobonds’ actual
time-to-maturities.
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Note that while Basiscirp captures the proportion of Basisbond due to CIRP violation, Basisspread cap-
tures the proportion due to the mispricing in the underlying country-specific credit yield spreads.24
While it is difficult to identify the fundamental source of the anomaly, this analysis will give us a
useful insight about the link between the Basisbond at the level of the individual issuing countries
and the CIRP violation in the global FX markets. A good understanding of the relative magnitudes
of the two components can shed light on geographical dispersion of frictions.
Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of Basisspread and Basiscirp components of total Basisbond of Brazil,
Mexico and Turkey. We select 2014-maturity Turkey, 2015-maturity Brazil and 2020-maturity Mex-
ico bond pairs as representatives. The top left panel of the figure presents the average proportions
of each component in terms of the percentage of total Basisbond. The remaining panels show the
time evolution of each component (in terms of bps) for each country separately during the last four
months of 2008 (representing the peak of Credit Crisis). Our calculations reveal that Basiscirp is
positive. This means that in Mexico and Brazil, Basisbond and Basiscirp have the same signs, but
in Turkey Basisbond and Basiscirp have the opposite signs. In other words, CIRP component tends
to contribute further to the total positive Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico; whereas it works against
the total negative Basisbond of Turkey (pulling it closer to zero). The difference in deviation signs
may require additional explanation for Turkey. Since Basisbond < 0 for Turkey, and Basiscirp > 0,
Eq. (4.11) indicates that Basisspread for Turkey must have a larger negative value than Basisbond.
Therefore, the proportion of Basisspread exceeds 100%, and the proportion of Basiscirp becomes neg-
ative, even though Basiscirp itself is positive. This can be seen clearly in the top left panel of Figure
4.2.
The analysis unearths important results. The country-specific Basisspread component, compared
to the universal Basiscirp component, is indeed the dominant factor in Basisbond, and is a key
component of the large mispricing in the corresponding emerging markets during Credit Crisis.
Frictions that are specific to global CIRP markets cannot entirely explain the large deviation. The
top left panel of the figure shows that, on average, 66% (34%) of Brazilian Basisbond is attributed to
Basisspread (Basiscirp) components. In Brazil, Basisspread reaches a maximum of 178 bps. Similarly,
80% (20%) of Mexican Basisbond is attributed to Basisspread (Basiscirp) components. In Mexico,
Basisspread reaches a maximum of 153 bps. On the other hand, we find that 145% (-45%) of Turkish
Basisbond is attributed to Basisspread (Basiscirp) components. This implies that the negativity of
Basisspread is so large that even the positivity of the CIRP component is insufficient to pull it back
to zero. In Turkey, Basisspread reaches a maximum of -267 bps.
25
24Refer also to Kercheval, Goldberg, and Breger (2003), Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005), and Ehlers and Schonbucher (2006) for the
no-arbitrage condition on the credit yield spreads of a single issuer across two foreign currencies.
25Baba (2009) argues that the CIRP violations can also be captured by using cross-currency basis swap spreads. Indeed, Buraschi,
Menguturk, and Sener (2013) conduct the same analysis above by using cross-currency basis swap spreads to denote the Basiscirp
component. The main results of the thesis are strongly in line with those found in the paper.
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It can thus be argued that a significant component of the frictions are compatible with models
in which the credit quality of an issuer differs across USD and EUR. This is indeed one of the
most important findings of this study, providing a key explanation behind the sign mystery, since
it implies that, unlike commonly assumed, investors during times of market turmoil tend to assign
different default risks to different foreign-currency securities, even though both securities are issued
by the same sovereign. The way default risk is distributed among currencies depend directly on
the geography of the issuing country. Therefore, default risk is not only country-specific, but
is also currency-specific in each country, casting doubts on condition C4 in Chapter 3. Under
these circumstances, when investors face discordant default risks across two equivalent securities,
Basisbond trade could indeed be left unexploited, causing prices to diverge further from each other.
D. Bank Funding Frictions
Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2012) suggest an interesting hypothesis. To illustrate the idea,
suppose that a large part of Turkey’s lending activity is carried out by European banks. These
banks can fund their Euro-lending activity by raising cash from their domestic retail base with
(insured) Euro-denominated deposits. On the other hand, since they are unable to raise dollars
using the insured channel,26 a large portion of the funding of their USD lending activity takes place
either by issuing (unsecured) USD-denominated commercial paper or by synthetically converting a
portion of their Euro deposits into dollars. When credit risk levels are small, costs of direct and
synthetic dollar funding are similar. However, if global credit risk perception deteriorates, the cost
of funding dollar assets through commercial paper would increase, as U.S. money-market funds
would reduce their exposure to most European banks. In the absence of other frictions, European
banks could still raise capital in Euro, taking advantage of the insurance subsidy, and convert it to
dollars, but in the presence of limited capacity in the foreign exchange markets (where there is an
increasing reluctance in dollar supply), the cost of dollar conversion would rise.
In this light, European banks, being major traders of Turkish bonds, have comparative advantage
in funding in Euro (inside capital) than USD (outside capital). Therefore, in Europe, traders would
short the EUR-denominated bonds and long the USD-denominated bonds of Turkey. On the other
hand, U.S. banks, being major traders of Brazilian and Mexican bonds, have comparative advantage
in funding in USD (inside capital) than EUR (outside capital). Therefore, in the U.S., traders would
long the EUR-denominated bonds and short the USD-denominated bonds of Brazil and Mexico.
First of all, to see if there is any tightness in the dollar deposit market in Turkey, we use the
data retrieved from the official website of Turkish Central Bank for 3-month average USD and
26Only the capitalized U.S. subsidiary of a European headquartered bank can issue FDIC-insured deposit in the U.S.
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Euro deposit rates of Turkish banks.27 Indeed, after Lehman’s collapse, we find that the 3-month
USD deposit rates in Turkey increased well above the 3-months Euro deposit rates, such that the
difference of USD rates minus Euro rates increased from -10 bps to 90 bps between May 2008 to
October 2008 (see Figure 4.3). This evidence supports the hypothesis of country-specific capital
imbalances that made the cost of funding via inside capital (insured deposits) substantially cheaper
than unsecured outside funding in the foreign market.
Second, to test the existence and nature of bank funding frictions operating at the geography-
specific level, we execute two sets of regressions analysis: (1) Geography-Specific Cost of Funding,
and (2) Relative Cost of Funding. Details are explained below.
Geography-Specific Cost of Funding
Depending on the geographical location of the issuer, we regress the absolute value of net Basisbond
either on [USD CP - EUR Depo] or on [EUR CP - USD Depo]. We retrieve 3-months USD and Euro
CP rates from Bloomberg, and 3-month USD Deposit rates (as certificate of deposits) from Fed, and
3-month Euro Deposit rates from ECB.28 We also control for the interbank borrowing rates in USD
and Euro by using 3-month USD Libor and 3-month Euribor, (since they are highly correlated, we
lag one of the two rates to avoid multicollinearity), and run the following panel regressions for the
changes in net Basisbond:
∆ [Net Basis(bond)TR,t] = α+ β1,1 [∆(USD CP − EUR Depo)t] + β1,2 ∆Euribort + β1,3 ∆Libort−1
+ β1,4 ∆Lt−1 + ǫTR,t (4.12)
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + β2,1
[
∆¯(EUR CP − USD Depo)t
]
+ β2,2 ∆Euribort + β2,3 ∆Libort−1
+ β2,4 ∆Lt−1 + ǫj,t with j =MX,BR (4.13)
where ∆ denotes first-difference, ∆¯ denotes percentage difference, and j denotes the specificBasisbond
of the bond pairs for j=[BR,MX]. TR, MX and BR represent Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, respec-
tively. The variable Lt−1 denotes the one-week lag of the dependent variable of each given regression.
Table 4.8 reports the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared values of each re-
gression.
We find that the difference of [USD CP - EUR Depo] rates is highly and statistically significant
in explaining net Basisbond of Turkey. The slope coefficient β1,1 has the expected positive coeffi-
cient sign and a t-stat of 2.34, suggesting that an increase in the unsecured USD funding (outside
27To be more precise, the data for the foreign-currency denominated bank deposit rates of Turkish banks is retrieved from
http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr.
28To be more specific, USD deposit rates are retrieved from http://www.federalreserve.gov. Euro deposit rates are retrieved from
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu.
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capital) relative to secured Euro funding (inside capital) increases net Basisbond of Turkey. The
slope coefficient on Euribor is statistically significant and negative with a t-stat of -3.00, while the
slope coefficient on Libor is statistically insignificant and positive. This suggests that, as inter-
bank funding in Euro becomes less expensive, the Euro yield of Turkey’s EUR-denominated bond
decreases as well, increasing in turn the size of net Basisbond of Turkey. The lagged dependent
variable is also found highly and statistically significant with a t-stat of -1.87. R-squared is 21%.
These results confirm the expectation that in Europe, since EUR is comparatively easier to fund
than USD, traders would tend to short the EUR bonds and long the USD bonds of Turkey.
The opposite mechanism is true for Brazil and Mexico. The percentage difference of [EUR CP
- USD Depo] rates is highly and statistically significant in explaining net Basisbond of Brazil and
Mexico. The slope coefficient β2,1 has the expected positive coefficient sign with a t-stat of 10.86,
suggesting that an increase in the unsecured EUR funding (outside capital) relative to secured
USD funding (inside capital) increases net Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico. The slope coefficient on
Euribor is statistically significant and positive with a t-stat of 5.86, while the slope coefficient on
Libor is statistically significant and negative with a t-stat of -1.90. This is the opposite of what
we find for Turkey. This suggests that, as interbank funding in Euro becomes more expensive,
net Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico widens. The lagged dependent variable is also found highly
and statistically significant with a t-stat of -4.05. R-squared is 47%. These results confirm the
expectation that in the U.S., since USD is comparatively easier to fund than EUR, traders would
tend to short the USD bonds and long the EUR bonds of Brazil and Mexico. This evidence is
consistent with the existence of a geographical effect in funding liquidity.
Relative Cost of Funding
With the objective of understanding if and how relative costs of funding by USD banks versus
European banks affected Basisbond, we use one country (Turkey) as a control group, and run a “diff-
in-diff” analysis by computing the ratio between net Mexico (and Brazil) Basisbond over net Turkish
Basisbond. The assumption is that most Turkish sovereign bonds were funded by European-based
banks while Brazilian and Mexican bonds by U.S.-based banks. We run the following regression:
∆
[
[Net Basis(bond)j,t]
[NetBasis(bond)TR,t]
]
= αj+β3,1 ∆
[
(EUR CP−USD Depo)t
(USDCP −EUR Depo)t
]
+β3,2 ∆Lj,t−1+ǫj,t with j =MX,BR (4.14)
where ∆ denotes first-difference, and j denotes the specific bond pairs for j=[BR,MX]. The variable
Lt−1 denotes the one-week lag of the dependent variable of each given regression. Table 4.8 reports
the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared values of the regression. We find that
the β3,1 coefficient is positive and strongly significant, with a t-stat of 6.45. This implies that a
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relative increase in the cost of unsecured Euro funding of US banks contributes to a widening on
the Mexico and Brazil net Basisbond relative to the Turkey net Basisbond. R-squared is 18%. This
supports explanations based on a distinction between inside and outside capital, as in Ivashina,
Scharfstein, and Stein (2012).
IV. Monetary Policy Implications on Basis(bond)
What is the extent to which monetary policies may have eased some of the market frictions? If
arbitrageurs are contemporaneously present on multiple asset markets, Gromb and Vayanos (2010)
argue that balance sheet shocks can give rise to contagion effects even across seemingly unrelated
assets. The idea is that when the burden of market constraints is partly lifted from the shoulders
of arbitrageurs, then arbitrageurs would find it relatively easier to operate in mispriced markets.
This would have a positive impact on price convergence. In this context, it is possible that some
of the monetary policies with the objective of relieving funding conditions on the U.S. markets,
in times of crisis, might relax some of the constraints in EM bonds, thus affecting Basisbond. We
design this last part of the analysis as an event study and quantify the impact of different monetary
interventions on the dynamics of Basisbond.
A. Description of Monetary Policies
We define two main monetary policy phases: “Funding Relief Policies”, which took place both
with conventional funding liquidity measures (mainly during the first phase of the Crisis) and
unconventional asset purchases, and “Uncertainty Relief Policies”, which consists of the publication
of the results of stress test analysis on a number of U.S. banks, aimed to address financial uncertainty
via public signaling.
Policy Phase 1: Funding Relief Policies
This phase of “Funding Relief Policies” unfolded in two parts. In the first part, the Fed became
increasingly concerned about market illiquidity, and executed a series of the so-called Liquidity Risk
Interventions. On December 12, 2007, the Fed introduced a Term Auction Facility (TAF), designed
to lend funds directly to depository institutions for a fixed term (28 or 84 days), and to relieve
the frictions related to interbank borrowing. Two important restrictions applied: (a) funds were in
fixed terms and in limited supply; and (b) foreign banks could bid through their U.S. branches (or
agencies) if they maintained reserves with the Fed; otherwise, they needed to borrow in their own
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jurisdictions. Moreover, to facilitate the provision of USD liquidity to other central banks around
the globe, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) authorized bilateral currency swap lines
with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in the amounts of
$20 billion and $4 billion, respectively, on December 12, 2007. On September 29, 2008, the FOMC
expanded the swap line program with the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, SNB, ECB, Norges
Bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of Japan, and the Reserve Bank of
Australia to $330 billion. One month later, on October 29, 2008, the FOMC established new swap
lines to the central banks of emerging markets that are major U.S. partners, such as Banco Central
do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Bank of Korea in the
amount of $30 billion each. Mexico used it on three occasions with tenors of 88 days and 3.22 billion
each. The Turkish Central Bank, on the other hand, never had access to this facility. Aizenman
and Pasricha (2010) argue that the high concentration of US banks’ lending exposure to Brazil and
Mexico was the key selection criteria used by the Fed to extend the swap lines.
In the second part of “Funding Relief Policies”, the Fed and U.S. Treasury shifted the nature of
their interventions to directly address credit risk concerns. Three unconventional policies followed:
(1) The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) by the U.S. Treasury, aimed at compensating for
the lost capital of U.S. banks and restarting their lending activities,29 (2) The Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) by the Fed, aimed at increasing credit availability and supporting
economic activity by facilitating renewed issuance of consumer and business asset-backed securities
(ABS) at normal interest rate spreads,30 and (3) The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
by the Fed, aimed at relieving short-term funding frictions and thereby contributing to greater
availability of credit for businesses and households.31 A key difference between the U.S. Treasury
and the Fed programs was that while the Treasury’s balance sheet interventions mainly addressed
secured markets via purchasing large amounts of bank preferred stocks and taking on credit risk
exposure (by providing capital), the Fed’s interventions tended to focus on unsecured markets (i.e.
interbank funding markets via new term auction facilities).
29The program was signed into law on October 3, 2008, and involved the mass purchasing of troubled assets, such as mortgage-backed
securities, from U.S. banks and other financial institutions (initially up to $700 billion). The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) was a
part of TARP that involved the purchase of preferred stocks of U.S. banks.
30The program was announced on November 25, 2008, and involved the lending of up to $1 trillion to holders of AAA-rated asset-backed
securities.
31The program was created on October 27, 2008, and allowed the Fed to finance the purchase of highly rated unsecured and asset-backed
commercial paper.
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Policy Phase 2: Uncertainty Relief Policy
This second phase is quite different compared to the first one or to any previous experience. In
2009, the Federal Reserve Board decided to more directly address market uncertainty and tail
risk perception by implementing explicit economic assessments and stress tests on a broad set of
banks and financial institutions. On February 25, 2009, the Federal Reserve Board - together
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency - announced that they will conduct stress tests on eligible U.S.
banks. An initial set of stress test results was released on May 7, 2009. The goal of this exercise
was to reduce uncertainty about the true fundamental value of major financial institutions and to
regain the trust of market participants via public signals on the value-at-risk measures of a series
of banks.32
B. Event Study Analysis
Which, if any, of these policy measures have been significant in reducing Basisbond? We investigate
this question in the context of an event study. For our purposes, we aggregate and classify the
policy events above into four groups: (a) Policy announcements of the Fed (PAF), (b) Policy
announcements of the U.S. Treasury (PAT), (c) USD Swap Lines to developed and emerging markets
(SWAP), and (d) stress tests announcements on U.S. financial institutions (STRESS). As a key
feature of this study, we use the fact that Turkey did not have access to global swap and liquidity
lines by the Fed and ECB. This allows us to use Turkey as a control group to identify the cross-
sectional impact of different relief programs using a “diff-in-diff” approach.33 This approach has the
advantage of controlling for events that affected all bond markets at the same time. The calculation
procedure we use is as follows: (i) we compute forward-looking three-week rolling averages of net
Basisbond, namely 3WBasisbond, for each of the three countries; (ii) we calculate the spread of
the 3WBasisbond between Turkey and the other two countries as an endogenous variable, which
we call Dispt; (iii) we collect an extensive database of 211 economic news and announcements
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis and Bloomberg, and use them as control variables in
multivariate regressions. The dataset includes the policy events described above (PAF, PAT, SWAP
and STRESS), as well as other financial news originating from the U.S., Europe, and the rest of the
32To highlight the positive assessment results, Bernanke pointed out to the Joint Economic Committee: “I’ve looked at many of the
banks and I believe that many of them will be able to meet their capital needs without further government capital.” (Reuters News
Agency on May 5, 2009).
33For a related study, see Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010), who study the differential impact of the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) on the spread between eligible versus non-eligible bonds. They find evidence of a significant drop in the
yield of eligible bonds with respect to non-eligible ones.
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world (e.g. China). Each financial news is grouped according to whether it is positive (e.g. China’s
two-year, $586 billion stimulus plan) or negative (e.g. MBIA and Ambac losing their S&P AAA
rating after disclosing $1 trillion in debt). Among the news variables we include announcements
of significant write-downs and subprime losses of financial institutions (see Table 4.9 for specific
dates and examples of these events). Each news or policy announcement is used as an explanatory
variable and treated as a dummy variable.
The conjecture of this analysis is that Brazil and Mexico, being geographically and economically
closer to U.S. (and to the relief policies that mainly address U.S. banks being exposed to Brazil
and Mexico), would tend to benefit relatively more from these policy measures compared to Turkey.
Before we proceed with the discussion of the results of our multivariate regression analysis, Figure 4.4
shows the dynamics of the dispersion among the Basisbond of Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, following
a set of PAF, PAT and SWAP events. The figure reveals that the cross-sectional dispersion between
Turkey vs. Brazil and Mexico Basisbond tended to widen considerably following these events.
34
The first significant set of interventions occurred on October 7, 2008 when the Fed announced
the introduction of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). This program is potentially
important for us since it was intended to provide “a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial
paper through a special purpose vehicle that purchases three-month unsecured and asset-backed
commercial paper directly from eligible issuers”as quoted by the Fed. The next day, (on October 8,
2008) the ECB changed the tender procedure for Euro area banks in the weekly main refinancing
operations to fixed rate tender with full allotment, which means that the allotment at the refinancing
operations is adjusted to fully match the level of demand. A week later, on October 14, 2008, the
U.S. Treasury announced the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).35 Following
these events, net Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico dropped by 63 bps and 27 bps, respectively, in the
two weeks following, whereas during the same period net Basisbond of Turkey rose by 34 bps.
The largest effect, however, follows the decision on October 29th, 2008, by the Fed to extend
the foreign currency swap facilities to Brazil and Mexico. Importantly, the Turkish Central Bank
did not participate. Moreover, starting October 30th, 2008, the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank (ECB) decided: (a) to extend the offering of U.S. dollar liquidity by expanding
the list of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations to include marketable debt
instruments denominated in currencies other than Euro - namely USD, British pound, and Japanese
yen; (b) to lower the credit threshold for marketable and non-marketable assets from A- to BBB-,
34As mentioned earlier, PAF consists of events such as Term Auction Facility and The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility,
and PAT consists of events such as The Troubled Asset Relief Program and Capital Purchase Programs.
35To quote the Fed, this program was designed to “purchase capital in financial institutions under the authority of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The U.S. Treasury will make available $250 billion of capital to U.S. financial institutions. This
facility will allow banking organizations to apply for a preferred stock investment by the U.S. Treasury. Nine large financial organizations
announce their intention to subscribe to the facility in an aggregate amount of $125 billion.”
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with the exception of asset-backed securities (ABS). Since Turkish bonds were BB, they were not
eligible collateral; on the other hand, Mexican and Brazilian bonds were BBB rated and were eligible
collateral.36 Indeed, after the Fed’s swap line decision, we note that net Basisbond of Brazil and
Mexico compressed by 160 bps and 113 bps, respectively, whereas net Basisbond of Turkey continued
to rise by 99 bps during the same period. The average dispersion in the Basisbond reached its highest
value of 150 bps on November 20, 2008.
We also note that the decision by the U.S. Treasury, after December 5, 2008, to purchase $38
billion in preferred stocks in more than 49 U.S. banks under the Capital Purchase Program had an
impact on the average dispersion. Indeed, in the two weeks following these decisions, net Basisbond
of Brazil and Mexico dropped by 66 bps and 34 bps, respectively, whereas net Basisbond of Turkey
continued to rise by 32 bps during the same period. Finally, on December 30, 2008, the Fed
announced the purchase of mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae; a day later, on 31 December, 2008, the U.S. Treasury purchased $1.91 billion worth of
preferred stocks in 7 U.S. banks under Capital Purchase Program. Following these decisions, net
Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico dropped by 41 bps and 67 bps, respectively, in two weeks, whereas
net Basisbond of Turkey continued to rise by 53 bps during the same period.
While Figure 4.4 is revealing, the standard concern in any event study is the potential contempo-
raneous effect of other economic variables. To address this issue, we run the following multivariate
regressions:
∆Disp(TRBR)t+1 = ρ+ π1PAFt + π2PATt + π3SWAPt + π4STRESSt
+ π5[Positive News]t + π6[Negative News]t + π7∆Disp(TRBR)t + ǫt
∆Disp(TRMX)t+1 = ρ+ π1PAFt + π2PATt + π3SWAPt + π4STRESSt
+ π5[Positive News]t + π6[Negative News]t + π7∆Disp(TRMX)t + ǫt
where the dispersion variables for Turkey vs. Brazil and Mexico are denoted by:
Disp(TRBR) = |3WBasis(bond)TR| − |3WBasis(bond)BR|
Disp(TRMX) = |3WBasis(bond)TR| − |3WBasis(bond)MX |
where 3WBasis(bond) denotes the three-week forward-looking rolling average of net Basisbond of
each country.37 Explanatory variables are the policy and news events, each treated as a dummy
36Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, stated that: “As a result of such decisions, euro area
banks can now borrow from the ECB as much euro and USD liquidity as they wish, also at some key term maturities, of course against
eligible collateral. The new set of temporary measures provide an important contribution to mitigating the funding risks of solvent banks
in the euro area [...].” (Speech at Universidad de Alcala de Henares, Madrid, January 16, 2009).
37By taking three-week averages, we aim to better capture the inertia effect of monetary policies.
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variable that is equal to 1 on the dates of the announcements. Table 4.10 summarizes the results
by reporting the slope coefficients, t-stats and R-squared values.
Our findings reveal that the slope coefficient of SWAP is highly significant and positive with a
t-stat 3.38 and 3.41 for the dynamics of Disp(TRBR) and Disp(TRMX), respectively, validating
the hypothesis that the extension of swap lines indeed helped to relieve the liquidity frictions on
sovereign bonds of the participants (Brazil and Mexico) and not those of the non-participating
country (Turkey). This suggests the existence of cross-sectional differences in the characteristics of
the marginal investors in these markets, and how they were affected differently by these measures.
We also find that the slope coefficient of PAF is highly significant and positive with a t-stat 1.74
and 1.99 for the dynamics of Disp(TRBR) and Disp(TRMX), respectively. Within the PAF
variable, we note that CPFF’s introduction was followed by a particularly significant widening of
the dispersion measure. The evidence for PAT is mixed and is significant mainly for Disp(TRBR)
with a t-stat of 2.14.
Last, we find that the announcement of the stress tests helped to reduce the cross-sectional
dispersion variable. This may be either because it took relatively longer before the effects of
the previous policies were felt by the marginal agents in the Turkey, or because the information
content of the stress tests was more global in nature, and relieved the systemic uncertainty among
intermediaries on a broader scale, thus reducing cross-sectional differences in Basisbond. This is
consistent with Acharya and Merrouche (2010)’s argument that “[...] regulatory attempts to thaw
the money market stress and reduce variability of inter-bank rates [...] should involve addressing
insolvency concerns (for example, early supervision and stress tests, and recapitalization of troubled
banks) and not just provisions of emergency liquidity.”
This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that constraints of arbitrageurs were bind-
ing both because of an initial balance sheet shock and also because of economic uncertainty that
monetary polices helped to reduce. This work might induce future research regarding the impact
of monetary policies and regulatory actions in helping to correct price disequilibrium in dislocated
markets.
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V. Appendix A to Chapter 4
Appendix A
Data description and transformations
This table includes the descriptions of the economic series, their categories and the required stationarity transformations. The
table is based on Ludvigson and Ng (2009). There are six categories: (1) Output and Income, (2) Consumption, Orders and
Inventories, (3) Labor Market, (4) Housing, (5) Money and Credit, and (6) Prices and Inflation. All series are retrieved from the
Global Insights Basic Economics Database, unless otherwise stated, where The Conference Board’s Indicators Database (TCB)
are shown in (parentheses). In the transformation column, the levels and the first-differenced levels of the series are denoted
as lev, and dlev, respectively. The logarithms of the series are denoted as log; the first- and second-differenced logarithms are
denoted as dlog and d2log, respectively.
Description Transformation Category
Personal Income (AR, Bil. Chain 2000 USD) (TCB) dlog Output and Income
Personal Income Less Transfer Payments (AR, Bil. Chain 2000 USD) (TCB) dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index -Total Index dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Products, Total dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Final Products dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Consumer Goods dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Durable Consumer Goods dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index -Nondurable Consumer Goods dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Business Equipment dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index -Materials dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Durable Goods Materials dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Nondurable Goods Materials dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index -Manufacturing dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Residential Utilities dlog Output and Income
Industrial Production Index - Fuels dlog Output and Income
Napm Production Index (Percent) lev Output and Income
Capacity Utilization (Manufacturing) (TCB) dlev Output and Income
Manufacturing and Trade Sales (Mil. Chain 1996 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Sales of Retail Stores (Mil. Chain 2000 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment dlev Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Purchasing Managers’ Index (Sa) lev Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Napm New Orders Index (Percent) lev Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Napm Vendor Deliveries Index (Percent) lev Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Napm Inventories Index (Percent) lev Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Manufacturers’ New Orders, Consumer Goods and Materials (Bil. Chain 1982 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Manufacturers’ New Orders, Durable Goods Industries (Bil. Chain 2000 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Manufacturers’ New Orders, Nondefense Capital Goods (Mil. Chain 1982 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
Manufacturers’ Unfilled Orders, Durable Goods Industries (Bil. Chain 2000 USD) (TCB) dlog Consumption, Orders and Inventories
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Appendix A (cntd.)
Data description and transformations
This table includes the descriptions of the economic series, their categories and the required stationarity transformations. The
table is based on Ludvigson and Ng (2009). There are six categories: (1) Output and Income, (2) Consumption, Orders and
Inventories, (3) Labor Market, (4) Housing, (5) Money and Credit, and (6) Prices and Inflation. All series are retrieved from the
Global Insights Basic Economics Database, unless otherwise stated, where The Conference Board’s Indicators Database (TCB)
are shown in (parentheses). In the transformation column, the levels and the first-differenced levels of the series are denoted
as lev, and dlev, respectively. The logarithms of the series are denoted as log; the first- and second-differenced logarithms are
denoted as dlog and d2log, respectively.
Description Transformation Category
Index of Help-Wanted Advertising in Newspapers (1967=100; Sa) dlev Labor Market
Employment: Ratio; Help-Wanted Ads: No. Unemployed Civilian Labour Force dlev Labor Market
Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Total (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Nonagriculture Industries (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Unemployment Rate: All Workers, 16 Years and Over (%, Sa) dlev Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Average (Mean) Duration in Weeks (Sa) dlev Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Persons Unemployed Less than 5 Weeks (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Persons Unemployed 5 to 14 Weeks (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Persons Unemployed 15 Weeks + (Thous.,Sa) dlog Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Persons Unemployed 15 to 26 Weeks (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Unemploy. By Duration: Persons Unemployed 27 Weeks + (Thous., Sa) dlog Labor Market
Average Weekly Initial Claims, Unemployed Insurance (Thous.) (TCB) dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Total Private dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Goods-Producing dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Mining dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Construction dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Manufacturing dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Durable Goods dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Nondurable Goods dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Service-Providing dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Trade, Transportation and Utilities dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Wholesale Trade dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Retail Trade dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Financial Activities dlog Labor Market
Employees on nonfarm Payrolls: Government dlog Labor Market
Avg Weekly Hrs of Prod or Nonsup Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls: Goods-Producing lev Labor Market
Avg Weekly Hrs of Prod or Nonsup Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls: Mfg Overtime Hours dlev Labor Market
Average Weekly Hours in Manufacturing (Hours) (TCB) lev Labor Market
Napm Employment Index (Percent) lev Labor Market
Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls: Goods-Producing d2 log Labor Market
Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls: Construction d2 log Labor Market
Avg Hourly Earnings of Prod or Nonsup Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls: Manufacturing d2 log Labor Market
88
Appendix A (cntd.)
Data description and transformations
This table includes the descriptions of the economic series, their categories and the required stationarity transformations. The
table is based on Ludvigson and Ng (2009). There are six categories: (1) Output and Income, (2) Consumption, Orders and
Inventories, (3) Labor Market, (4) Housing, (5) Money and Credit, and (6) Prices and Inflation. All series are retrieved from the
Global Insights Basic Economics Database, unless otherwise stated, where The Conference Board’s Indicators Database (TCB)
are shown in (parentheses). In the transformation column, the levels and the first-differenced levels of the series are denoted
as lev, and dlev, respectively. The logarithms of the series are denoted as log; the first- and second-differenced logarithms are
denoted as dlog and d2log, respectively.
Description Transformation Category
Housing Starts: Nonfarm(1947-58); Total Farm and Nonfarm(1959-) (Thous., Saar) dlev Housing
Housing Starts: Northeast (Thous.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Housing Starts: Midwest (Thous.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Housing Starts: South (Thous.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Housing Starts: West (Thous.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Housing Authorized: Total New Private Housing Units (Thous., Saar) dlev Housing
Houses Authorized by Build. Permits: Northeast (Thou.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Houses Authorized by Build. Permits: Midwest (Thou.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Houses Authorized by Build. Permits: South (Thou.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Houses Authorized by Build. Permits: West (Thou.U.) S.A. dlev Housing
Money Stock: M1 (Bil USD,Sa) d2 log Money and Credit
Money Stock: M2 (Bil USD,Sa) d2 log Money and Credit
Monetary Base, Adjusted for Reserve Req Changes (Mil USD, Sa) d2 log Money and Credit
Depository Inst Reserves: Total, Adj. for Reserve Req Changes (Mil USD, Sa) d2 log Money and Credit
Depository Inst Reserves: Nonborrowed, Adj. Res Req Changes (Mil USD, Sa) d2 log Money and Credit
Commercial and Industrial Loans Outstanding in 1996 Dollars d2 log Money and Credit
Net Change Commercial and Industrial Loans (Bil USD, Saar) d2 log Money and Credit
Consumer Credit Outstanding - Nonrevolving (G19) d2 log Money and Credit
Consumer Installment Credit to Personal Income, Ratio (TCB) dlev Money and Credit
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Appendix A (cntd.)
Data description and transformations
This table includes the descriptions of the economic series, their categories and the required stationarity transformations. The
table is based on Ludvigson and Ng (2009). There are six categories: (1) Output and Income, (2) Consumption, Orders and
Inventories, (3) Labor Market, (4) Housing, (5) Money and Credit, and (6) Prices and Inflation. All series are retrieved from the
Global Insights Basic Economics Database, unless otherwise stated, where The Conference Board’s Indicators Database (TCB)
are shown in (parentheses). In the transformation column, the levels and the first-differenced levels of the series are denoted
as lev, and dlev, respectively. The logarithms of the series are denoted as log; the first- and second-differenced logarithms are
denoted as dlog and d2log, respectively.
Description Transformation Category
Producer Price Index: Finished Goods (1982=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods (1982=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Producer Price Index: Intermed Material Supplies and Components (1982=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Producer Price Index: Crude Materials (1982=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Spot market price index: All commodities (1967=100) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Index Of Sensitive Materials Prices (1990=100) lev Prices and Inflation
Napm Commodity Prices Index (Percent) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: All Items (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: Apparel and Upkeep (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: Transportation (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: Medical Care (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: Durables (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: Services (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: All Items Less Food (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: All Items Less Shelter (1982-84=100, Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Cpi-U: All Items Less Medical Care (1982-84=100,Sa) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Personal Consumption Expenditure (1987=100) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Personal Consumption Expenditure: Durables (1987=100) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Personal Consumption Expenditure: Nondurables (1987=100) d2 log Prices and Inflation
Personal Consumption Expenditure: Services (1987=100) d2 log Prices and Inflation
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Figure 4.1:
EM total active lendable values
The three panels show the Total Active Lendable Value (i.e. the aggregate amount available for lending) for all
outstanding Eurobonds of Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, respectively, in millions of USD. The sample includes the
Credit Crisis, where the dashed vertical lines denote the start of Credit Crisis in September 2008 (e.g. Lehman’s
default).
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Figure 4.2:
Basis(bond) decomposition
The four panels show the decomposition Basisbond (blue bars) into its underlying Basisspread component (red bars) and Basiscirp component
(green bars) for 2014-maturity Turkey bond pair, 2015-maturity Brazil bond pair, and 2020-maturity Mexico bond pair. The top left panel
of the figure presents the average proportions of each component in terms of the percentage of total Basisbond. The remaining panels show
the time evolution of each component (in terms of bps) for each country separately during the last four months of 2008 (representing the
peak of Credit Crisis).
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Figure 4.3:
Differential of foreign deposit rates of Turkish banks
The figure shows the difference between the 3-month average USD minus Euro deposit rates (in bps) of Turkish
banks, between March 2008- September 2009.
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Figure 4.4:
Impact of PAF, PAT and SWAP on Basis dispersion
The figure shows the evolution of the Dispersion Variable defined as net Basisbond of Turkey minus the average
of net Basisbond of Brazil and Mexico during the Credit Crisis. The policy announcements of the Fed (PAF) are
indicated by the green vertical lines; the policy announcements of the US Treasury (PAT) are indicated by the black
vertical lines; the dollar swap line extended to Brazil and Mexico (SWAP) is indicated by the red vertical line.
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Table 4.1:
Potential determinants of Basisbond
Summary statistics of the potential determinants of Basisbond of Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, during Pre-Crisis,
Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis periods. The average value of each variable is shown on corresponding
top rows, and the associated standard deviations are shown immediately below. The unit of each variable is also
presented. Liquidity Risks include [Liq-FX, Liq-PS]; Funding Costs include [Unsecured, Secured]; Global Cash-Flow
Factors include [LN-Macro, TP]; Credit Risk Factor includes [EM-CDSI]; Risk Aversion Factors include [Closed End,
VIX]; Global Uncertainty factor includes [DiB]. Summary statistics of the variable Inventory is presented in Table 4.2.
Categories Determinant Unit Period
Pre-Crisis Liquidity Crisis Credit Crisis Post-Crisis
Liquidity Risks Liq-FX Principal -1.07 0.55 3.48 0.91
Component 0.61 0.70 1.85 0.83
Liq-PS Historical Beta -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.01
Coefficient 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05
Funding Costs Secured Percentage 0.34 0.57 0.51 0.15
0.06 0.14 0.28 0.12
Unsecured Percentage 0.08 0.68 1.51 0.26
0.02 0.15 0.76 0.26
Global Cash-Flow LN-Macro Principal 3.04 -0.37 -10.30 0.03
Factors Component 1.66 2.04 3.56 4.73
TP Percentage -0.29 0.20 0.93 3.06
0.40 0.91 0.72 0.50
Credit Risk EM-CDSI Index Price - 99.64 87.49 107.94
Factor - 1.74 6.19 4.21
Risk Aversion Closed End Price Ratio 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.88
Factors 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
VIX Percentage 12.97 23.05 48.20 25.05
2.55 3.55 14.06 5.93
Global Uncertainty DiB Principal -0.22 -0.10 0.25 -
Factor Component 0.07 0.12 0.08 -
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Table 4.2:
Short-selling constraints on Basisbond
Summary statistics of the short-selling constraints on Basisbond of Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, during Pre-Crisis,
Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis periods. The average value of each variable is shown on corresponding
top rows, and the associated standard deviations are shown immediately below. The unit of each variable is also
presented. Inventory represents the the pair-specific value of total actively lendable inventory, capturing bond
supply at a given day, filtered out from the inactive loans.
Categories Determinant Unit Bond Pairs Period
Liquidity Crisis Credit Crisis Post-Crisis
Short-Selling Inventory USD millions Brazil 2010 27.15 21.83 9.42
Constraints 6.53 7.23 5.03
Brazil 2015 416.76 343.24 354.60
38.69 56.23 43.16
Brazil Total 3719.14 3441.33 3707.79
257.76 395.48 277.87
USD millions Turkey 2014 218.39 169.56 78.73
59.97 70.76 15.01
Turkey 2019 - 176.05 150.99
- 49.07 17.50
Turkey Total 3293.57 2670.60 2740.75
426.31 403.54 211.29
USD millions Mexico 2020 276.03 156.95 164.09
36.46 32.66 28.25
Mexico Total 2030.21 1251.12 713.25
183.47 258.79 203.64
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Table 4.3:
Panel regressions on liquidity risks, short-selling constraints, and funding costs
Summary fixed-effects panel regressions on net Basisbond of Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey 2014,
and Turkey 2019 bond pairs. ∆ denotes first-difference, ∆¯ denotes percentage difference, and j denotes the specific
bond pair. We report the slope coefficients, and the associated t-statistics (immediately below), based on White’s
standard errors. Sample is the Credit Crisis period. Results for Liquidity Risks (i.e. BidAsk, Liq-FX, Liq-PS), as in
Eq. (A), are shown in Column A. Results for the Short-Selling Frictions (i.e. Inventory), as in Eq. (B), are shown
in Column B. Results for Funding Costs (i.e. Secured, Unsecured), as in Eq. (C), are shown in Column C. Results
for Liquidity Risks, Short-Selling Frictions and Funding Costs together, as in Eq. (D), are shown in Column D.
In Eq. (A), dependent variable is the absolute value of gross Basisbond (without bid-ask adjustment), and in Eq.
(B), (C) and (D), dependent variable is net Basisbond. Intercepts are not reported. (**) shows a 95% confidence
interval, and (*) shows a 90% confidence interval.
(A) ∆ |Gross Basis(bond)j,t| = αj +B1 [∆BidAskj,t] +B2 [∆Liq FXt] +B3 [∆Liq PSt] + ǫj,t.
(B) ∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + λ1
[
∆¯Inventoryj,t
]
+ ǫj,t.
(C) ∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + θ1 [∆Unsecuredt] + θ2 [∆Securedt] + ǫj,t.
(D) ∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + γ1 [∆Liq FXt] + γ2 [∆Liq PSt] + γ3
[
∆¯Inventoryj,t
]
+ γ4 [∆Unsecuredt] + γ5 [∆Securedt] + ǫj,t.
Credit Crisis
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Category Variable Coeff./t-stat Coeff./t-stat Coeff./t-stat Coeff./t-stat
Liquidity Risks BidAsk 1.4477
1.4598
Liq-FX 0.0169 0.0164
0.9989 0.8407
Liq-PS -0.7671 0.2248
-0.6258 0.1903
Short-Selling Inventory -0.0283 -0.0189
Frictions -2.9924** -2.3919**
Funding Costs Unsecured 0.4174 0.4409
1.6724* 1.7311*
Secured 0.0778 -0.0792
0.5199 -0.5189
R-Squared 3% 3% 5% 7%
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Table 4.4:
Panel regressions on funding costs, short-selling constraints, and other macroeconomic shocks
Summary fixed-effects panel regressions on net Basisbond of Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey 2014,
and Turkey 2019 bond pairs. ∆ denotes first-difference, and j denotes the specific bond pair. We report the slope
coefficients, and the associated t-statistics (immediately below), based on White’s standard errors. The regression
specification is specified below. Samples are the Liquidity, Credit and Post-Crisis periods. Explanatory variables,
shown as vectors, are Funding Costs [Unsecured, Secured]; Global Cash-Flow Factors [LN-Macro, TP]; Credit Risk
Factor [EM-CDSI]; Risk Aversion Factors [Closed End, VIX]; Global Uncertainty [DiB]; Short-Selling Constraints
[Inventory]. Funding Costs are regressed with the weekly lag parameter v = 0 for Unsecured Funding, and v =
1 for Secured Funding. Intercepts are not reported. (**) shows a 95% confidence interval, and (*) shows a 90%
confidence interval.
∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + β1 [∆Funding Costst−v] + +β2 [∆Short Selling Constraintsj,t]
+ β3 [∆Global Cash F low Factorst] + β4 [∆Credit Risk Factort]
+ β5 [∆Risk Aversion Factorst] + β6 [∆Global Uncertaintyt] + ǫj,t.
Categories Variables Liquidity Crisis Period Credit Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period
Slope Coef. / t-stat Slope Coef. / t-stat Slope Coef. / t-stat
Funding Unsecured -0.0403 0.2656 0.4168
Costs -0.4385 2.0802** 0.9020
Secured 0.1600 0.2968 -0.0654
1.8669* 2.4662** -0.5844
Short-Selling Inventory 0.0019 -0.0303 -0.0069
Constraints 0.4596 -3.6616** -3.6543**
Global Cash-Flow LN-Macro -0.0039 -0.0276 0.0107
Factors -0.3364 -2.0285** 1.1546
TP -0.0569 0.1334 -0.0520
-0.8401 1.0520 -0.5134
Credit Risk EM-CDSI -0.0062 -0.0342 -0.0046
Factor -0.5393 -3.5113** -0.8928
Risk Aversion Closed End 0.5100 -2.5454 -0.1152
Factors 0.9591 -4.5498** -0.1307
VIX 0.1023 -0.4153 0.0922
1.7366* -1.1869 0.9258
Global DiB 0.2415 0.4360 -
Uncertainty 1.1770 0.4718 -
R-squared 7% 43% 5%
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Table 4.5:
Panel regressions on individual determinants of Basis(bond)
Summary fixed-effects panel regressions on net Basisbond of Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey 2014, and
Turkey 2019 bond pairs. Explanatory variables are Liquidity Frictions [Liq-FX, Liq-PS]; Short-Selling Constraints
[Inventory]; Funding Costs [Unsecured, Secured]; Global Cash-Flow Factors [LN-Macro, TP]; Risk Aversion Factors
[Closed End, VIX]; Credit Risk Factor [EM-CDSI]; Uncertainty Factor [DiB]. Each category is regressed individually
from Columns (A)-(G). We report the slope coefficients, and the associated White-robust t-statistics (immediately
below the slope coefficients). Sample is Credit Crisis. Intercepts are used but not reported. (**) shows a 95%
confidence interval, and (*) shows a 90% confidence interval.
Determinants of Basis(bond)
Categories (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Liquidity Frictions
Liq-FX 0.0191
1.1303
Liq-PS -0.7061
-0.5622
Short-Selling Constraints
Inventory -0.0283
-2.9924**
Funding Costs
Unsecured 0.4174
1.6724*
Secured 0.0778
0.5199
Global Cash-Flow Factors
LN-Macro -0.0627
-5.7212**
TP -0.0738
-0.8540
Risk-Aversion Factors
Closed End -2.1654
-3.9424**
VIX 0.5137
1.5655
Credit Risk Factor
EM-CDSI -0.0304
-2.9451**
Uncertainty Factor
DiB 0.7316
0.7813
R-squared 1% 3% 5% 11% 23% 7% 1%
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Table 4.6:
Price discovery analysis
Summary results of the price discovery regressions between the USD and Euro credit yield spreads of the bond
pairs used in our analysis. The tests are based on weekly-frequency VECM specification shown below. We let
St = [S
a
t , S
b
t ] be the vector of bond credit yield spreads in a=USD, b=EUR, and zt ≡ [S
a
t − k1 × S
b
t ], where k1 is
the average of X(t)/F (t, T ). We denote the corresponding error terms as ut = [u1t, u2t], so that σ1, σ2, σ12 are the
standard deviations and covariance of u1t and u2t, respectively. The optimal number of lags N=2 are determined by
Akaike Information Criteia (AIC). We report the average of A1 and A2 coefficients for each region, and the average
t-statistics immediately below. Hl and Hu are the Hasbrouck bounds, and Hm is the average of the two. We report
the average Hm for each bond pair (i.e. Turkey 2014, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020), capturing the contribution of S
a
to the price discovery process. 1-Hm captures the contribution of S
b to the price discovery process. VECM and
Hasbrouck bounds are specified in order as follows:
∆Sat = A1zt−1 +
N∑
n=1
φ1n∆S
a
t−n +
N∑
n=1
γ1n∆S
b
t−n + u1t
∆Sbc,t = A2zt−1 +
N∑
n=1
φ2n∆S
a
t−n +
N∑
n=1
γ2n∆S
b
t−n + u2t
Hl =
A22
(
σ21 −
σ212
σ22
)
A22σ
2
1 − 2A1A2σ12 + A
2
1σ
2
2
, Hu =
(
A2σ1 − A1
σ12
σ1
)2
A22σ
2
1 − 2A1A2σ12 + A
2
1σ
2
2
Region Coeff. Hasbrouck Measure
A1 A2 Hm
Brazil 2015 0.02 0.16 66%
0.27 2.30
Mexico 2020 0.01 0.04 84%
0.56 2.07
Turkey 2014 -0.14 -0.09 29%
-1.73 -1.18
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Table 4.7:
Central bank international reserve distribution
Time evolution of the distribution of foreign asset values to total foreign assets of the Central Bank of Brazil
(Banco Central do Brazil) from 2004 to 2010, and that of the Central Bank of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez
Bankasi) from 2008 to 2010. The reserve distribution data preceding 2008 is not available for Turkey. The foreign
assets include the following currencies: the U.S. dollar (USD), Euro (EUR), and others (e.g. Japanese Yen (JPY),
British Pound (BGP), Canadian Dollars (CAD), Australian Dollars (AUD)).
Year Brazil Turkey
EUR USD Other EUR USD Other
2004 35.1% 54.6% 10.3% - - -
2005 21.3% 73.2% 5.5% - - -
2006 10.3% 88.3% 1.4% - - -
2007 9.5% 90.0% 0.5% - - -
2008 9.4% 89.1% 1.5% 46.0% 51.0% 3.0%
2009 7.0% 81.9% 11.1% 44.6% 52.6% 2.8%
2010 4.5% 81.8% 13.7% 46.5% 51.3% 2.2%
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Table 4.8:
Regressions on commercial paper rates and deposit rates
Summary regressions on net Basisbond of Brazil 2010, Brazil 2015, Mexico 2020, Turkey 2014, and Turkey 2019
bond pairs. ∆ denotes first-difference, ∆¯ denotes percentage difference. Bond pairs of Turkey are denoted by TR,
and those of Brazil and Mexico by j= [BR, MX], respectively. We report the slope coefficients, and the t-statistics
(below), based on White’s standard errors. Sample is the Credit Crisis. The variable Euribor and Libor stand
for 3-month Euribor and Libor rates, respectively; and the variables CP stand for 3-months commercial paper
rate, and Depo stand for 3-months deposit rate in their corresponding currencies, USD and EUR. The variable
Lt−1 denotes the one-week lag of the dependent variable of each given regression. Panel regression results of each
specification (A)-(C) are displayed in their respective columns. Intercepts are used but not reported. (**) shows a
95% confidence interval, and (*) shows a 90% confidence interval.
(A) ∆
[
Net Basis(bond)TR,t
]
= α+ β1,1 [∆(USD CP − EUR Depo)t] + β1,2 ∆Euribort + β1,3 ∆Libort−1 + β1,4 ∆Lt−1 + ǫTR,t
(B) ∆ [Net Basis(bond)j,t] = αj + β2,1
[
∆¯(EUR CP − USD Depo)t
]
+ β2,2 ∆Euribort + β2,3 ∆Libort−1 + β2,4 ∆Lt−1 + ǫj,t
(C) ∆
[
[Net Basis(bond)j,t]
[NetBasis(bond)TR,t]
]
= αj + β3,1 ∆
[
(EUR CP−USD Depo)t
(USDCP −EUR Depo)t
]
+ β3,2 ∆Lt−1 + ǫj,t j =MX,BR
Variables Credit-Crisis Period
Column A Column B Column C
Coef. / t-stat Coef. / t-stat Coef. / t-stat
USD CP - EUR Depo 0.5706
2.3434**
EUR CP - USD Depo 0.0470
10.8556**
Ratio CP Depo 0.0288
6.4546**
Euribor -1.3149 2.3640
-3.0005** 5.8598**
Libor 0.0390 -0.3821
0.2145 -1.9014*
L(-1) -0.2761 -0.4933 0.2500
-1.8715* -4.0571** 2.7415**
R-squared 21% 47% 18%
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Table 4.9:
Policy events and announcements summary
This table summarizes the classification and sample characteristics of the policy events and news that occurred during the sample period. The event
categories are: (1) “Funding Relief Policy” variables, divided into three subsets (a) Policy announcements of the Fed (PAF), (b) Policy announcements
of the US Treasury (PAT), (c) USD Swap Lines to developed and emerging markets (SWAP); (2) “Uncertainty Relief Policy” variable, which consists of
the announcements of stress tests on U.S. financial institutions (STRESS); (3) “News Controls” variables: (a) Positive News and (b) Negative News. The
control group includes financial news originating from the U.S., Europe and the rest of the world (e.g. China), as well as announcements on write-downs and
subprime losses for U.S. financial institutions, and the announcements on the U.S. housing market. An example event is reported for each category. Sample
is the Liquidity, Credit and Post-Crisis periods. The entries are left undefined (-) for the events that had no occurrence in the given subsample periods.
Category Event Definition Example Date Number of Events
Liquidity Credit Post
Funding PAF Policy announcements on The Fed announced the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 07.10.2008 9 8 4
Relief Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to provide liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper
Policies
PAT Policy announcements on U.S. Treasury announces Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase 14.10.2008 - 27 18
the US Treasury’s balance sheet capital in fin. institutions under Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008.
SWAP The Fed Swap Lines $330 billion of swap lines to nine central banks of developed markets 29.09.2008 4 9 3
to developed and emerging markets $120 billion of swap lines to four central banks of emerging markets 29.10.2008
Uncertainty STRESS Stress Tests on For U.S. bank holding companies with assets over $100 billion, the Fed 25.02.2009 - 1 2
Relief US financial institutions announces that it will make stress tests or economic assessments
Policy
News Positive News News on U.S. finance 3 Billion dollars of stock is sold by Citigroup to boost capital 29.04.2008 13 5 -
Controls News on European finance 205 Billion dollar loans are guaranteed by Sweden 20.10.2008 16 7 -
News on UK finance 4.5 Billion pounds Quatari investment plan is launched by Barclays 25.06.2008 3 7 -
News on Rest of the World finance 586 Billion dollars stimulus plan over 2 years is announced by China 10.11.2008 - 3 -
News on US Housing market Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 signed into law by President Bush 30.07.2008 3 3 1
Negative News News on U.S. finance MBIA and Ambac, 1 Trillion dollars of Debt, lose S&P AAA Rating 05.06.2008 8 - -
News on European finance Soc Gen announces 84% slump in profits of 3Q 03.11.2008 5 5 -
News on UK finance Biggest fall in UK house prices since 1991 31.07.2008 13 5 -
News on Rest of the World finance Market disruption in Canada 14.08.2007 1 - -
News on US Housing market Fannie MaeAˆ announces 25.2 Billion dollars loss in fourth quarter 2008 26.02.2009 2 4 6
News on Writedowns 18 Billion dollars write-down of Citi 24.10.2007 16 - -
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Table 4.10:
Event analysis regressions
Event analysis regressions on Brazil, Turkey and Mexico. The dependent variable consists of 3WBasisbond of Turkey 2014, Brazil
2015 and Mexico 2020 bond pairs, where 3W denotes the three-week forward-looking rolling average of net Basisbond of each bond
pair. The dispersion variable for Turkey vs. Brazil is denoted by Disp(TRBR)=[|3WBasis(bond)TR| − |3WBasis(bond)BR|],
whereas the dispersion variable for Turkey vs. Mexico is denoted by Disp(TRMX)=[|3WBasis(bond)TR| − |3WBasis(bond)MX |].
Explanatory variables are the policy and news events, each treated as a dummy variable on the dates of the announcements.
The event categories are: (1) the “Funding Relief Policy” variables: (a) Policy announcements by the Fed (PAF), (b) Policy
announcements of the US Treasury (PAT), (c) USD Swap Lines to developed and emerging markets (SWAP); (2) the “Uncertainty
Relief Policy” variable, which consists of the announcements of stress tests on U.S. financial institutions (STRESS); (3) “News
Controls” variables: (a) Positive News and (b) Negative News. The control group includes financial news originating from the
U.S., Europe and the rest of the world (e.g. China), as well as announcements on write-downs and subprime losses for U.S.
financial institutions, and the announcements on the U.S. housing market. Sample is from July 1, 2005 to April 30, 2010.
Results for Eq. (A) are shown under Column A; Results for Eq. (B) are shown under Column B. Columns (C)-(F) give the
corresponding results after dropping PAT and PAF interchangeably. We report the parameter estimates, and the associated
t-statistics are displayed immediately below. Intercepts are not reported. (*) shows a 90% confidence interval, and (**) shows a
95% confidence intervals.
(A) ∆Disp(TRBR)t+1 = ρ+ π1PAFt + π2PATt + π3SWAPt + π4STRESSt + π5[Positive News]t + π6[Negative News]t + π7∆Disp(TRBR)t + ǫt
(B) ∆Disp(TRMX)t+1 = ρ+ π1PAFt + π2PATt + π3SWAPt + π4STRESSt + π5[Positive News]t + π6[Negative News]t + π7∆Disp(TRMX)t + ǫt
Categories News Turkey-Brazil Turkey-Mexico Turkey-Brazil Turkey-Mexico
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F
Funding Relief PAF 0.0050 0.0055 0.0055 0.0056
Policy Variables 1.735* 1.9897** 1.8974* 2.0194**
PAT 0.0043 0.0006 0.0045 0.0009
2.1429** 0.3226 2.283** 0.4718
SWAP 0.0111 0.0108 0.0118 0.0109 0.0113 0.0110
3.3802** 3.4117** 3.5843** 3.4584** 3.4428** 3.4865**
Uncertainty Relief STRESS -0.0269 -0.0263 -0.0257 -0.0261 -0.0271 -0.0264
Policy Variable -3.5686** -3.6301** -3.4043** -3.6173** -3.5856** -3.6543**
News Control Positive News -0.0049 -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0040
Variables -2.7478** -2.5054** -2.8097** -2.5183** -2.5979** -2.3385**
Negative News 0.0043 0.0025 0.0044 0.0026 0.0044 0.0026
2.5213** 1.5528 2.5642** 1.5597 2.5525** 1.5820
Disp(t) 0.8145 0.8124 0.8150 0.8122 0.8141 0.8111
50.3203** 50.3782** 50.2854** 50.4079** 50.2958** 50.3126**
R-squared 68% 68% 67% 68% 67% 68%
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Chapter 5
Supply of Risk Capital: Role of
Arbitrageurs and Cross-Market
Interactions
This chapter empirically studies the impact of hedge funds’ supply of risk capital and banks’ col-
lateral restrictions on the anomalous growth of a set of LOP deviations across credit and swap
markets, during 2007-2008 crisis. We investigate the extent to which LOP condition and hedge
fund capital structure are related. An important component of our study is the combination of
three unique datasets that provide detailed information on hedge fund assets under management,
hedge fund leverage ratios, and survey results of Euro area collateral requirements for credit line
extensions.
As a continuation of Chapter 3 and 4, which investigate the financial constraints that impede
the exploitation of sovereign bond basis strategies in emerging markets, this chapter focuses on the
role of arbitrageurs as specialized institutions in ensuring the LOP equilibrium. Modern finance
theory suggests that arbitrageurs (e.g. hedge funds) target positive returns from any mispricing of
assets with similar cash flows, and take long/short positions, thus providing the required liquidity
to inefficient markets, helping to move the dislocated prices back to equilibrium. As discussed in
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010), and Mitchell and Pulvino
(2012), the main hypothesis states that any hedge fund capital dry-up would eventually lead the
associated hedge fund to reduce or liquidate its positions and shy away from markets with mispriced
assets. This would eventually leave the so-called arbitrage opportunities unexploited, adversely
affecting relative prices from converging to equilibrium. In this context, therefore, the role of hedge
funds and other arbitrageurs becomes a crucial one for market efficiency and the attainment of the
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LOP condition. This chapter mainly tests this hypothesis. We proceed as follows.
1. We identify two main categories of LOP deviation, namely Credit Market LOP, and Swap
Market LOP, which displayed changing characteristics from Pre-Crisis to Post-Crisis periods,
and experienced substantial violations during the Lehman collapse in particular.
(a) In Credit Market LOP, we work with two major proxies, (i) Emerging Market Eurobond
yield mispricing, as derived and discussed in Chapter 3 and 4; and (ii) Developed Market
CDS-Bond Basis, as discussed in Giglio (2011). While the former proxy, Basisbond, is
concerned with the relative yield mispricing of two bonds issued by the same sovereign
across two foreign currencies; the latter proxy, Basiscds, refers to the differential between
the CDS rates and the credit yield spreads of the corporate bonds of the same issuer
taken from a set of U.S. and European financial institutions.
(b) In Swap Market LOP, we work with the covered interest rate parity (CIRP) violations
across two different currencies. While the proxy called Basisscirp is generated using
two-year risk-free rates in USD and Euro, the proxy called Basislcirp is generated using
five-year risk-free rates in USD and Euro.
We define a vector ~Basis as:
~Basis = [Basisbond(br), Basisbond(mx), Basisbond(tr), Basiscds, Basisscirp, Basislcirp]
where br, mx and tr represent Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively. If LOP holds, each
component of ~Basis must be zero.
2. We conduct commonality tests among each component of ~Basis via principal component
analysis (PCA) and vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This allows us to see whether there
was an underlying systemic risk factor driving them simultaneously.
3. We test whether the AuM reduction of hedge funds and the debt deleveraging component
contribute to the anomalous growth of ~Basis during Credit Crisis. We also quantify the
impact of the tightening of loan collateral requirements on both ~Basis and hedge fund leverage
ratios.
In these analyses, we utilize four different data sources (described in Section I): (i) Bloomberg
data for generating each component of the vector ~Basis, (ii) Barclay Hedge database for study-
ing hedge fund assets under management, (iii) Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011) fund-of-funds
database for studying the hedge fund leverage ratios, (iv) Euro Area Bank Lending Survey for
studying collateral restrictions. We find a number of novel results:
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1. There is evidence for a strong level of cross-market linkage among the components of ~Basis.
These components are shown to be driven by an underlying systemic risk factor during Crisis
period.
2. There is significant real-life impact of the hedge fund capital structure (through both AuM
reduction and debt deleveraging) on the anomalous growth of ~Basis during Credit Crisis.
The sign of regression coefficients are found to be in line with the theoretical arguments. A
decrease of AuM in hedge funds, coupled with a decrease in leverage ratios, can be associated
with an increase in the ~Basis deviations. This shows that, as arbitrageurs shy away from
markets with seemingly attractive (but increasingly risky and costly) arbitrage opportunities,
prices tend to keep diverging further away from equilibrium.
3. There is strong evidence that an increase in loan collateral requirements can be associated
with a decrease in the hedge fund leverage ratios, and an increase in the ~Basis in the market.
This supports the hypothesis that the deterioration in hedge fund debt-financing, through
tighter collateral restrictions, could subsequently lead to increasing LOP deviations.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section I details the data description. Section II gives
the generation of the components of ~Basis across credit and risk-free markets, and discusses the
commonality and cross-market linkages in ~Basis. Section III discusses the empirical results of the
impact of hedge fund capital and collateral restrictions on ~Basis. Section IV concludes.
I. Data Description and Exploratory Analysis
A. Market Data
The time series of the underlying USD and Euro risk-free rates, Emerging Market USD and Euro
sovereign bond yields,1, EUR/USD spot and forward exchange rates are retrieved from Bloomberg
as the end-of-day bid, ask and mid prices on an annualized basis at daily frequency. These are
used to generate the LOP proxies across credit and swap markets, to be discussed below under the
subsection “Types of LOP Anomalies”. The Bloomberg Generic (BGN) prices, which are updated
intra-day by accounting for market trading hours, are based on the weighted average of the quotes
submitted by a minimum of five brokers and dealers, and the weighting is based on the updating
frequency of each contributor. This allows to minimize the impact of measurement error from a
specific broker dealer, and to make prices more reflective of market conditions. Refer to Blanco,
1To be more specific, we use the USD and Euro yields of the Turkish bond pair with maturity 2014, Brazilian bond pair with maturity
2015, and Mexican bond pair with maturity 2020, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Landschoot (2008), Fleckenstein,
Longstaff, and Lustig (2010), and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) for the use of BGN prices for similar
works.
B. Hedge Fund Data
Assets Under Management (valued in terms of current market prices, and hereafter denoted by
AuM) of hedge funds represent equity capital that corresponds to the net asset value (NAV) of the
assets being managed.2 One can write:
Total Capital = Equity + Debt = AuM+Debt (5.1)
where Debt is mostly comprised of short positions and short-term borrowing. Eq. (5.1) describes
the relationship between the two components of the hedge fund capital.3
We have access to two unique datasets that capture (1) AuM of hedge funds, and (2) leverage
ratios of hedge funds, each to be detailed below. While the former represents the dynamics of equity
funding, the latter captures the dynamics of debt funding.
1. Assets Under Management
A monthly cross-sectional time series of hedge fund AuMs are retrieved from Barclay Hedge
database for July 2005 - April 2010. The Barclay Hedge database has the largest number
of funds available (compared to TASS, HFR, Eurekahedge and Morningstar), the highest
percentage of dead/defunct funds (as to minimize survivorship bias), and the highest AuM
coverage with the least number of missing observations (see Joenvaara, Kosowski, and Tolonen
(2012); Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul (2012)). We study 2,406 hedge funds that operate
under six different investment strategies: Arbitrage, Equity, Options, Distressed Securities,
Global Macro and Commodity. The number of hedge funds included is 444 for Arbitrage, 979
for Equity, 33 for Options, 76 for Distressed Securities, 120 for Global Macro, and 754 for
Commodity. The main focus of this work is given to hedge funds that operate under Arbitrage
strategies.
Summary Statistics
Figure 5.1 presents the time-evolution of total AuM decomposed into six investment strategies,
and reveals important patterns about the dynamics of AuM for each investment strategy across
2On March 31, 2012, SEC announced the creation of a new metric called Regulatory Assets Under Management (RAUM), which
represents gross assets under management involving long/short positions (on gross basis) and leverage.
3An important distinction is that while bank equity is non-redeemable, hedge fund equity is redeemable (following lock-up periods),
rendering hedge funds relatively more vulnerable to direct investor behavior.
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the four time periods being studied. It should be noted that AuMs of all six investment
strategies tend to increase from Pre-Crisis to Liquidity Crisis, and experience a serious fall
thereafter, experiencing the most serious drop during Credit Crisis. The monotonic increase in
AuM between Pre-Crisis and Liquidity Crisis is indicative of the fact that hedge funds generate
high returns, and have easy access to equity capital. The sharp fall between Liquidity Crisis
and Credit Crisis, on the other hand, suggests that hedge funds lose significant portfolio value,
and have restricted access to equity capital.
Studying Figure 5.1 more closely, and referring to Table 5.1 that presents the corresponding
summary statistics, we find that the average value of AuM during Pre-Crisis is 69.9 billion USD
for Arbitrage hedge funds, 151.2 billion USD for Commodity, 26.1 billion USD for Distressed
Securities, 158.4 billion USD for Equity, 24.5 billion USD for Global Macro, and 1.7 billion
USD for Options. In this period, it is noted that hedge funds focused on Equity-based
strategies enjoy the greatest AuM, followed by Commodity and Arbitrage, while Options
have the smallest AuM. In the periods that follow, the same order holds, with the notable
exception of Commodity-based hedge funds, which become the number one in terms of AuM.
From Pre-Crisis to Liquidity Crisis, AuM on average rises by 14% (up to 79.5 billion USD) for
Arbitrage, 48% (up to 223.8 billion USD) for Commodity, 70% (up to 44.2 billion USD) for
Distressed Securities, 25% (up to 198.6 billion USD) for Equity, 18% (up to 29.0 billion USD)
for Global Macro, and 65% (up to 2.8 billion USD) for Options. This indicates that hedge
funds on average still acted as fairly profitable investment vehicles during the Liquidity phase,
even though this phase is generally characterized by increasing liquidity risks and deteriorating
funding constraints. As of the last months of Liquidity Crisis, however, it is noted that AuM
shows the first signs of disruption, and begins to fall.
From Liquidity Crisis to Credit Crisis the situation takes a turn for the worst. AuM on
average drops by 35% (down to 52.0 billion USD) for Arbitrage, 2% (down to 219.6 billion
USD) for Commodity, 29% (down to 31.4 billion USD) for Distressed Securities, 37% (down
to 125.4 billion USD) for Equity, 29% (down to 20.5 billion USD) for Global Macro, and 19%
(down to 2.3 billion USD) for Options. Compared to others, Equity- and Arbitrage-based
strategies experience the largest fall in their AuMs, which are both substantially lower than
their Pre-Crisis levels. As a noteworthy fact, the AuM of Commodity-based funds is almost
unaffected, in line with the relatively less downbeat investment outlook that prevailed for
commodities all along this and the following periods.
Except for Commodity-based funds, the situation keeps deteriorating (though at a slower
rate) during Post-Crisis. From Credit Crisis to Post-Crisis, AuM on average drops further by
19% (down to 42.0 billion USD) for Arbitrage, 33% (down to 21.1 billion USD) for Distressed
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Securities, 4% (down to 120.0 billion USD) for Equity, 6% (down to 19.3 billion USD) for
Global Macro, and 26% (down to 1.7 billion USD) for Options. Compared to others, Distressed
Securities- and Options-based strategies experience the largest fall in their asset values. On
the other hand, it is noteworthy that Commodity-based funds maintain their contrary stand,
and their AuM on average increases by 2% (up to 224.1 billion USD).
To give an idea of the overall picture in the hedge fund industry, Figure 5.2 presents the time-
evolution of aggregate AuM across all six investment strategies. The average of the aggregate
AuM during the Pre-Crisis is 432 billion USD, and increases by 35% (up to 578 billion USD)
during Liquidity Crisis. However, it falls by 22% (down to 451 billion USD) during Credit
Crisis, and falls further down by 5% (down to 428 billion USD) during Post-Crisis. Note
that the speed at which the net asset value increases and later decreases is important. For
instance, as of the first month of Pre-Crisis until the last month of Liquidity Crisis, the total
AuM increases by more than 242 billion USD (from 325 billion USD to 567 billion USD).
This takes over three years. However, during Credit Crisis, 68% of this total gain in value
(242 billion USD) is rapidly lost in only half a year, the aggregate AuM dropping from 567
billion USD to 403 billion USD. This frightening velocity at which the size of this industry
falls points to a serious disruption in the total profitability of hedge funds, and to a severe
reduction of capital made available to them.
Correlation of AuMs
The second interesting fact is concerned with the cross-correlation of hedge fund AuMs across
different investment strategies during different periods. Hedge funds operating under different
investment strategies are normally known to be weakly correlated with the market, and with
each other, granted that they aim to outperform the market, and each other, by specializing
in unique, undiscovered opportunities. As shown in Table 5.2, AuM correlations between
investment strategies change from one period to the next, and do not always confirm the weak-
correlation conjecture. During Pre-Crisis, for instance, the correlation is highly positive, and
ranges between 84% and 98%. The uncharacteristically close correlation experienced during
Pre-Crisis could be explained by arguing that the extended period of easy money in those
times systemically drove all AuMs to move up regardless of the strategy followed. During
Liquidity Crisis, we have evidence for a notable “de-coupling” effect, the correlation ranging
between -96% and 97%. As for Credit Crisis, however, we observe a strong “re-coupling”
shift towards a very high degree of co-movement, the correlation ranging between 87% and
100%. During this period, Arbitrage-focused hedge funds are most correlated with Equity-
focused (100%) funds, and least with Distressed Securities-focused funds (88%). The very
high degree of co-movement determined during Credit Crisis can be regarded as an evidence
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for the sweeping propagation of a systemic financial shock across the normally self-contained
categories of hedge funds, creating a contagious, self-exacerbating mechanism. Finally, during
Post-Crisis period, we have yet another evidence for a “de-coupling” effect, and the correlation
ranges between -81% to 93%.
2. Leverage Ratios
A monthly cross-sectional time series of hedge fund gross leverage ratios are obtained from
Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011) for July 2005 - September 2009.4 This is a unique, high-
quality dataset that uses actual time-variant leverage ratios (reported directly by hedge funds),
as opposed to those used in prior works that rely either on static ratios or estimates (see Lo
(2008)). Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011) retrieve the leverage ratios from a large fund-
of-hedge-funds, which they refer to as the Fund. The Fund standardizes the leverage ratios
reported at different frequencies, and if necessary, obtains values by directly calling hedge
fund managers and making analyst site visits. The Fund database includes the hedge funds
in TASS, Barclay Hedge and other databases, but it excludes the implicit leverages in client-
based funding options, and focuses only on those that are reported in active strategies. As
described by Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011), the Fund database uses both top down and
bottom up selection approaches in order to reduce the selection bias.5 The dataset is of high
quality because the Fund investigates the individual hedge funds through due diligence, and
frequently monitors their investments. The fact that the risk and performance reports of the
included hedge funds’ are audited adds to the reliability of the data.
For our sample of 2005-2009, the dataset has a total of 208 hedge funds, such that 114 follow
long-short equity (EQ), 36 follow relative-value arbitrage (RV), 21 follow credit (CR) and 37
follow event-driven (ED) strategies.6
Summary Statistics
Table 5.3 shows interesting patterns for the sector-based leverage ratios for each subsample
period. The time evolution of leverage ratios for each investment strategy is shown in Figure
5.3. During Pre-Crisis, the average leverage ratio is 5.8 for RV, 3.1 for CR, 1.7 for EQ, and
1.4 for ED. This shows that relative-value arbitrage strategies had the largest leverage ratios
(3x as large as Equity and 4x as large as Event-Driven strategies). In fact, this is the case
for all periods. Nevertheless, starting from the Liquidity Crisis, we observe a continuous
trend of deleveraging, though in different magnitudes and severity, in all four categories, until
4We thank Andrew Ang for his kind support.
5Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011) also state that “survival biases are mitigated by the fact that often hedge funds enter the database
not when they receive funds from the Fund, but several months prior to the Fund’s investment and they often exit the database several
months after disinvestment. [The] database also includes hedge funds which terminate due to poor performance.”
6Investment strategies are categorized under different names for Barclay Hedge (as above) and the Fund.
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the end of Post-Crisis period. The leverage ratios from Pre-Crisis to Liquidity Crisis, for
instance, drop by 19% (down to 4.7) for RV, 24% (down to 2.3) for CR, 2% (down to 1.7) for
EQ, and 1% (down to 1.4) for ED. As deleveraging continues from Liquidity Crisis to Credit
Crisis, the leverage ratios drop by 29% (down to 3.3) for RV, 32% (down to 1.6) for CR,
28% (down to 1.2) for EQ, and 34% (down to 0.9) for ED. Compared with the levels of Pre-
Crisis, the largest deleveraging is observed for CR, the leverage ratio of which is almost halved
(with -48%). Considering the deteriorating credit-related nature of the market turmoil, this
is hardly surprising. RV also suffers one of the biggest deleveraging in terms of percentages
(-42%) compared to Pre-Crisis levels. The leverage ratios in Post-Crisis continue to decrease
for CR and RV, though they tend to increase very slightly for ED and EQ, when compared
to Credit Crisis. From Credit Crisis to Post-Crisis, while the leverage ratios drop by 27%
(down to 2.5) for RV, and 18% (down to 1.3) for CR, they increase by 3.3% (up to 1.3) for
EQ, and 22% (up to 1.1) for ED. On average, the leverage ratio drops by 41% from Pre-Crisis
to Post-Crisis periods, given that the ratios of CR and RV are more than halved compared
to Pre-Crisis. When all hedge funds are included (denoted as All HF), the average leverage
ratio is 2.36 during Pre-Crisis, 2.07 during Liquidity, 1.47 during Credit, and 1.46 during
Post-Crisis periods.
As an interesting note, we observe that leverage ratios during the entire time spanned con-
sidered reach a maximum of 6.8 for RV, and 3.9 for CR, whereas for EQ and ED, they never
exceed 2.2 and 2.6 for EQ and ED, respectively. First, this highlights the heterogeneity in the
magnitudes of hedge fund leveraging, which directly depends on the type of the investment
strategy undertaken. Second, it shows that hedge fund leverage ratios have been “fairly mod-
est” compared to those of investment banks during 2005-2010 period (see Ang, Gorovyy, and
Inwegen (2011)). This is worth noting, as one would suspect that hedge funds, operating with
little regulatory oversight, would tend to take on leverages higher than those set by Reserve
Board’s Regulation T.
Correlation of Leverage Ratios
As discussed for the case of AuM correlations, hedge funds operating under different invest-
ment strategies are known to be weakly correlated with the market, and with each other. As
shown in Table 5.4, leverage ratio correlations between investment strategies change from one
period to the next, and do not always confirm the weak-correlation conjecture. The sign of
correlations is interesting. RV is negatively and weakly correlated with all remaining strate-
gies during Pre-Crisis, while the others are positively and strongly correlated among each
other. The same pattern is observed during Liquidity Crisis. During Credit Crisis, however,
all strategies, including RV, are strongly and positively correlated with each other. As in
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the case of AuMs, it could be argued that the contagion of a systemic financial shock causes
massive deleveraging across all strategies. During Post-Crisis, RV becomes negatively and
strongly correlated with other strategies, except CR.7
C. Collateral Requirement Data
Our work retrieves from Datastream the results of The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey on collateral
requirements for loans and credit lines extended to enterprises, covering a period of May 2006 to
May 2010, provided quarterly by the European Central Bank. By directly targeting the senior loan
officers at a representative group of 112 banks in the Euro area (including all Euro area countries),
the survey determines the number of banks tightening their collateral requirements vs. the number
of banks easing their collateral requirements. Using the survey results, we define the following
(based on The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey):
Col(req) = % of Banks with Tightened Credit−% of Banks with Eased Credit (5.2)
such that a positive Col(req) shows that a larger proportion of banks have tightened credit standards
(net tightening), and a negative Col(req) shows that a larger proportion of banks have eased credit
standards (net easing).8 We use this variable as a proxy for collateral restrictions in the financial
markets during Credit Crisis.
Figure 5.4 indicates that Col(req) is -1% in Quarter 3, 2006, 0% in Quarter 4, 2006, -1% in
Quarter 1, 2007 and -4% in Quarter 2, 2007. The negative values all indicate a period of net easing
in the collateral standards of loans during Pre-Crisis, confirming the arguments made about the
availability of easy money during this period. Starting from Quarter 3, 2007, however, we observe
the beginning of tighter collateral requirements. The average Col(req) between Quarter 3, 2007
to Quarter 2, 2008, jumps up to 25.3%. The largest restriction on collateral is observed following
the Lehman collapse, during the 3rd Quarter of 2008, when Col(req) increases to its maximum of
46%. According to Euro Bank Lending Survey October 2008 report: “The results [...] indicate a
significant increase in the net tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises in the third
quarter of 2008. The most important factors in net tightening remained the expectations regarding
future economic activity and the industry or firm-specific outlook.” The same pattern continues
during the last quarter of 2008, and the first quarter of 2009, when Col(req) is 41%, and 36%,
respectively. As of Quarter 2, 2009, Col(req) gives signals of converging back to its Pre-Crisis
levels, even though net tightening affects persists.
7For the first time, CR becomes negatively correlated with ED and EQ.
8Refer to http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html for the related reports and descriptions.
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II. LOP Anomalies In Different Markets
Exploratory analysis of AuM and leverage ratio data in Section I has uncovered instances of close
correlation across normally impermeable hedge fund strategies during Credit Crisis, where AuMs
and leverage ratios of all hedge fund strategies experienced a sharp decline, and Pre-Crisis, which
coincided with a long stretch of rising AuMs and leverage ratios. Such occurrences of co-movement
are indications of contagious interactions between different markets during times of financial distress
(Credit Crisis) or undeserved optimism (Pre-Crisis). In the present section, we start from these
findings and expand our coverage of cross-market interactions to credit and swap markets.
A. Construction of LOP Proxies
We empirically generate a set of LOP proxies that displayed a substantial anomaly during the recent
Credit Crisis. The main point is to keep the nature of the strategies diverse, so that they would
represent different segments of financial markets, and potentially different types of arbitrageurs.
Using the Market Data unless otherwise noted, we analyze credit and swap markets, and use the
empirical proxies as outlined below. For each proxy, there is a specific LOP condition that must
hold in equilibrium. While this condition was satisfied to a large extent during the Pre-Crisis period,
it was considerably violated following the Lehman collapse. An interesting aspect of this violation
was its persistence, since most trades were left unexploited for a time that seems inconsistent with
the existing theoretical models. We divide LOP proxies into two main categories: (i) Credit Market
LOP, and (ii) Swap Market LOP. The details are given below.
Credit Market LOP
1. Emerging Market Eurobond Basis: This is the proxy defined, constructed and used in Chapters
3 and 4:
Basisbond,t = Y
a∗
t − Y
a
t (5.3)
where Y at and Y
a∗
t are the yields, respectively, of the original and the synthetic USD-denominated
bonds committed at time t, referencing to the same issuer. For this analysis, we consider 2014-
maturity Turkish bond pair (Basisbond(tr)), 2015-maturity Brazilian bond pair (Basisbond(br)),
and 2020-maturity Mexican bond pair (Basisbond(mx)), discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Recall
from Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 that net Basisbond deviations exceed 209 bps in Brazil, 136 bps
in Mexico and -169 bps in Turkey in Credit Crisis.
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2. Developed Market CDS Basis: The credit yield spread of a corporate bond and the Credit
Default Swap (CDS) spread of the same reference entity, having the same maturity, are bound
by an LOP condition. In theory, the credit yield spread of a bond must be equal to the
CDS spread of the same underlying bond. Any divergence from this equality (called CDS-
Bond Basis in literature) would approximate an LOP violation, and would allow an investor
to transact a corporate bond by insuring it against default with positive return. As Hull,
Predescu, and White (2004) state, if CDS spread is greater than the reference bond’s credit
yield spread, “[...] arbitrageur will find it profitable to buy a riskless bond, short a corporate
bond and sell the credit default swap”; and if CDS spread is smaller than the reference bond’s
credit yield spread, “[...] arbitrageur will find it profitable to buy a corporate bond, buy the
credit default swap and short a riskless bond”. This LOP condition has been documented
and studied extensively in the literature (see Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005); De Wit
(2006); Garleanu and Pedersen (2011); Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011); Bai
and Collin-Dufresne (2011); Mitchell and Pulvino (2012); Giglio (2011)). The empirical proxy
follows as:
Basiscds,t = CDS
corp
t,m+t − S
corp
t,m+t (5.4)
where the CDS spread, and the underlying bond’s credit yield spread issued by the reference
entity corp (composed mainly of investment banks), are represented by CDScorp and Scorp,
respectively, and m is the number of years to maturity. Any deviation from the zero bound
approximates an LOP violation.
In this chapter, we use the results of Eq. (5.4) for m=5 years, calculated by Giglio (2011).
Their calculations are based on a reference bond constructed by averaging the data for 15
largest American and European investment banks, commercial banks and dealers and brokers
that also have the highest gross exposures to the CDS market, covering about 90% of the total
CDS transaction volume.9 Figure 5.5 shows the time evolution of Basiscds, which is often large
and negative during Credit Crisis (exceeding -311 bps), suggesting that investors could make
positive returns by longing both the bond and the CDS protection, and shorting the riskless
bond. The results suggest the extent to which Basiscds, being close to zero during Pre-Crisis,
could be so severely violated even for the so-called “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions,
during Credit Crisis.10
9The institutions involved are Bank of America, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers,
Wachovia, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Abn Amro, Credit Suisse, UBS, Bnp Paribas and Barclays.
10Ironically, all of these “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions involved in the sample faced severe problems during Credit Crisis. In
September 15, 2008, for instance, Lehman Brothers files Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and Bank of America announces the purchase of Merrill
Lynch.
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Swap Market LOP
Covered Interest Rate Parity: The covered interest rate parity states that the money market in-
vestments in two different risk-free rates must generate equal returns across two corresponding
currencies, as long as the investments are hedged in the FX forward market. Otherwise, an arbi-
trageur would be able to lock in a riskless profit by borrowing at the cheaper side, and lending at the
more expensive one for the same maturity. Let us construct an idealized example of this arbitrage
strategy in FX swap markets. Suppose an arbitrageur borrows USD at a risk-free rate for two years
(e.g. by shorting a two-year zero coupon USD government bond), converts the proceeds into EUR
at the spot exchange rate, and then invest in EUR again at a risk-free rate rate for two years (e.g.
by longing a two-year zero coupon EUR government bond). Simultaneously, the arbitrageur enters
into a two-year forward contract to sell the future value of the two-year EUR investment to receive
USD in return for EUR. CIRP violation occurs if the future dollar value of the EUR investment
exceeds the future dollar cost of USD debt.
CIRP violations have been documented and studied extensively in the literature (see Peel and
Taylor (2002); Akram, Rime, and Sarno (2008), Akram, Rime, and Sarno (2009); Coffey, Hrung,
and Sarkar (2009); Fong, Valente, and Fung (2010); Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011)). We test the CIRP
condition by borrowing USD and investing in EUR (the same direction of Basisbond) at risk-free
rates. The empirical proxy follows:
Basiscirp,t =
m
√
Xt
Ft,m+t
(1 +Rbt,m+t)− (1 +R
a
t,m+t) (5.5)
where m is the number of years to maturity. Any deviation from zero implies LOP violation.
Following the same notation in the previous chapters, Ra and Rb are the U.S. and Euro Government
risk-free rates, respectively, such that a=USD and b=Euro. The spot and forward exchange rates
(Euro per USD) are denoted as X and F , respectively. We calculate Eq. (5.5) for two maturity
buckets. The calculation based on m=2 years is called Basisscirp,t, and the calculation based on
m=5 years is called Basislcirp,t.
11 The Basisscirp exceeds 145 bps, and Basislcirp exceeds 106 bps
during Credit Crisis. See Figure 5.5 for their time evolution.
B. Commonality in LOP Proxies
One motivation of this study is to evaluate whether there exists any commonality in the variation of
the LOP proxies described above. The recent Credit Crisis offers a unique opportunity to test this
11All rates with the given two fixed maturity points (i.e. m=2 years and m=5 years) are retrieved from Bloomberg as BGN.
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across credit and swap markets, and see whether there exists any cross market linkages in a period
of financial distress. This draws links with the literature of contagion transmission as discussed in
Longstaff (2010).
In order to carry out this analysis, it is required to have two main conditions: (1) one must have
a period of severe market distress that differs substantially from the preceding periods, and (2) one
must have a vector of LOP deviations directly associated with that period. Our analysis satisfies
both conditions. The LOP proxies described above display substantial differences from one period
to the next. The fact that they are diverse in nature not only reduces the possibility of finding a
common systemic component that may simultaneously drive them, but it also makes the issue of
potential cross-market linkage more relevant for our purposes.12 We define a vector ~Basis as:
~Basis = [Basisbond(br), Basisbond(mx), Basisbond(tr), Basiscds, Basisscirp, Basislcirp] (5.6)
where each component represents the net deviation from zero (based on absolute values), and br, mx
and tr represent Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, respectively. The usage of absolute values is to allow
for a consistent economic interpretation (see Section II, Chapter 4). Since each component of ~Basis
is represented in absolute value terms, any rise in this component would directly indicate a rise in
the pricing anomaly. This way, a significantly positive/negative slope coefficient of an explanatory
variable, when regressed against the component of ~Basis, could be unambiguously interpreted as
increasing (or decreasing) the size of the anomaly, regardless of whether the actual LOP deviation
is positive or negative. IF LOP holds, each component of ~Basis should be equal to zero.
We apply two procedures to study the nature and extent of commonality among the components
of ~Basis. (i) The first procedure aims to identify whether there are any common factors that jointly
explain the variations in ~Basis. We use principal component analysis (PCA) for this purpose. (ii)
The second procedure aims to study the nature and the extent of any cross-market linkages between
the components of ~Basis. We run vector autoregressions (VAR) on each component of ~Basis (see
Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010) for a similar analysis). The details of the analyses follow.
Common Factors Among Basis Components
Supposing that N is the total number of variables in the dataset, PCA is a method to find a
small number of orthogonal principal components (generated from the eigenvectors of the NxN
covariance matrix) that would best represent the total variability of the dataset. In literature, the
12Initially, we observe that during Pre-Crisis, Credit and Swap Market LOPs are jointly violated only 11% of the time. During
Liquidity Crisis, however, they are jointly violated 38% of the time, which still indicates to a higher level of commonality compared to
Pre-Crisis period. Nevertheless, this statistic increases substantially during the Credit Crisis (more than two times), when they are jointly
violated 81% of the time. This suggests that if LOP is violated in one market, it is very likely to be violated simultaneously in the other
five markets as well. During Post-Crisis, the co-movement tends to diminish, such that they are jointly violated only 16% of the time.
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first principal component (corresponding to the largest eigenvalue) often refers to a systemic shock,
whereas the second and third principal components (corresponding to the second and the third
largest eigenvalues) are often associated with more regional factors.
Using the covariance matrix of the six components of ~Basis, we calculate the associated six
eigenvalues and six principal components, where λn for n (from 1 to 6) denotes the n
th eigenvalue
corresponding to the nth principal component (from largest to smallest). The contribution of each
principal component to the total variance of ~Basis is captured by calculating the “coupling co-
efficient” (see Scherer and Avellaneda (2002)), which is obtained by dividing the nth eigenvalue
to the sum of all eigenvalues. Scherer and Avellaneda (2002) state that “[...] coupling coefficient
represents the frequency with which the market moves as a single block under a typical shock”.
The calculation follows:
Coupling Coefficient =
λn∑N
n=1 λn
(5.7)
Table 5.5 reports the cumulative coupling coefficients generated for Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis
periods.
Our calculations reveal that, while the coupling coefficient of the first principal component
(associated with systemic risk) explains 28% of the total ~Basis variability during Pre-Crisis, it
explains 50% during Crisis period. This gives strong evidence for the presence of an underlying
common risk factor that tends to have an increasing influence over LOP deviations from Pre-Crisis
to Crisis, explaining half of the total variance of ~Basis components during the latter period. The
influence of this factor tends to persist, though to a slightly smaller degree, during Post-Crisis,
having 44% marginal contribution. Our findings suggest that the cumulative coupling coefficients
of the first three principal components rise up to 88% during Credit Crisis, indicating that almost
the entire dataset can be explained by three underlying common factors, and that regional shocks
are also strong drivers of ~Basis components during the market turmoil.
Cross-Market Linkages Among Basis Components
The topic of cross-market spillover is gaining significant attention from both academics and prac-
titioners following the recent subprime crisis. Longstaff (2010) defines contagion as “an episode in
which there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock occurs in one market”.13
Three main channels of contagion have been identified by Longstaff: (i) correlated-information
channel (see King and Wadhwani (1990); Kiyotaki and Moore (2002)), (ii) liquidity channel (see
13Refer also to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000); Kaminsky, Reinhardt, and Vegh (2003); and Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003).
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Allen and Gale (2000); Kodres and Pritsker (2002); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), (iii) risk
premium channel (see Vayanos (2004); Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). Each channel is argued to
have different implications for the asset prices across different markets. Longstaff (2010) finds strong
evidence of contagion during the subprime crisis, triggered primarily by liquidity and risk-premium
channels. In the framework of LOP deviations, Baba (2009) finds strong evidence of dynamic
spillover between the short- and long-term covered interest rate parity violations. Similarly, Fleck-
enstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010) find significant correlation and commonality among different
fixed-income arbitrage opportunities (CDS/corporate bond market vs. TIPS-Treasury market), and
conclude that different LOP deviations can be interrelated in a contagious environment where they
are driven by a small number of common factors.
In the spirit of Longstaff (2010), and Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010), we investigate
the extent of the cross-market linkages among the components of ~Basis by estimating the following
VAR system:
∆ ~Basisj,t = aj +
2∑
k=1
6∑
l=1
Vj,k,l∆ ~Basisj,l,t−k + ej,t (5.8)
where notations are as defined above. Idiosyncratic errors are captured by et at time t, and the
optimal lag structure two weeks is determined by the the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table
5.6 displays the V coefficients, t-statistics, and R-squared values for the Crisis period (9 August
2007 - 31 March 2009).
Our results reveal a significant level of cross-market spillover in Crisis period. To be more
specific, we observe a significant information transmission from the weekly-lagged Basisbond(mx) and
Basiscds to Basisbond(br); and from the weekly-lagged Basisbond(tr) and Basisbond(br) to Basisbond(mx).
The same effect takes place from the two-week lagged Basisbond(br), Basisbond(mx) and Basiscds
to Basisscirp; and from two-week lagged Basisbond(br), Basisbond(mx), and Basiscds to Basislcirp.
Furthermore, both Basisbond(tr) and Basiscds experience a significant information transmission from
the two-week lagged Basisbond(br) and Basisscirp. R-squared ranges between 24% to 49%.
It is interesting to see a strong spillover effect among trades that belong to different market
segments. Our findings support the hypothesis that the financial contagion was primarily diffused
through both FX swap and credit markets mutually, giving evidence for a bi-directional transmission
rather than a single-directional transmission. Our results are also in line with the interpretations
of Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010) that arbitrageurs who participate in these different
markets were limited by similar constraints.
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III. Supply of Risk Capital
A. Impact of Hedge Fund Capital on Basis
In this section, we study the impact of the changes in AuM, and the changes in leverage ratio on
~Basis. We run the following panel regressions:
∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α1 + β1∆¯HFAuMt + γ1,j∆ ~Basisj,t + ǫ1,t (5.9)
∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α2 + β2∆¯HFLevt + γ2,j∆ ~Basisj,t + ǫ2,t (5.10)
where HFAuM denotes the AuM of hedge funds that specialize on arbitrage-focused strategies,
and HFLev denotes the leverage ratio of all hedge funds including arbitrage-focused strategies.14
First-difference is represented by ∆, and percentage difference is represented by ∆¯. Idiosyncratic
errors are captured by ǫt at time t. Table 5.7 reports the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics
and R-squared values on each regression.
1. Impact of AuM: Our results suggest that HFAuM has no significant impact on ~Basis during
Pre-Crisis, Liquidity and Post-Crisis periods. Nevertheless, it becomes highly and statistically
significant during Credit Crisis with a negative slope coefficient β1 and a t-stat of -3.22. R-
squared increases to 17% (almost twice as much as that in Pre-Crisis or Liquidity Crisis). The
negativity of β1 suggests that, in distressed periods, an increase in ~Basis deviations can be
linked to depletions in AuM. This result suggests that a sizable capital dry-up could indeed
lead hedge funds to “de-participate” from dislocated markets, keeping them from providing
the required liquidity to arbitrage trades, which in turn would be associated with further
relative price divergence in the underlying assets. This conclusion is in direct harmony with
the arguments of the related literature (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Fleckenstein, Longstaff,
and Lustig (2010), Liu and Mello (2011), Mitchell and Pulvino (2012)).15
2. Impact of Leverage Ratio: Our results suggest that HFLev has no significant impact on
~Basis during Pre-Crisis, Liquidity and Post-Crisis periods. Nevertheless, it becomes highly
and statistically significant during Credit Crisis with a negative slope coefficient β1 and a t-
stat of -2.94. R-squared increases to 20% (almost three times higher than that in Pre-Crisis or
Liquidity Crisis). Once again, negative slope coefficients indicate that, in distressed periods,
14The variables HFAuM and HFLev are interpolated to match the weekly frequency of the components of ~Basis. AuM series are
standardized.
15When we make the same regressions by using the AuMs of Equity, Commodity, Distressed Securities and Global Macro strategies,
during Credit Crisis, we find significant impact of Equity (with a t-stat of -2.66) and Global Macro (with a t-stat of -3.30). This shows
that capital reduction in hedge funds that specialize on equity markets and broad macroeconomic trends tend to contribute adversely to
the pricing anomaly in credit and swap markets, possibly due to an underlying contagion effect.
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an increase in ~Basis deviations can be linked to hedge fund deleveraging. Similar to our
results discussed above, this finding suggests that hedge funds, exposed to a severe dry-up of
debt financing, would be unable to raise sufficient capital that would help move prices back
to equilibrium. These conclusions are also in strong agreement with the related literature.16
B. Association of Hedge Fund Capital with Systemic Factor
PCA conducted in Section II reveals that components of ~Basis are driven simultaneously by an
underlying systemic risk factor. Following this analysis, we test whether this underlying systemic
risk factor (captured by the first principal component of ~Basis) can be associated with the hedge
fund capital structure. In order to do this, we run the following regressions:
∆PC1Basist+1 = α1 + β1∆¯HFAuMt + ǫ1,t (5.11)
∆PC1Basist+1 = α2 + β2∆¯HFLevt + ǫ2,t (5.12)
where PC1Basis denotes the first principal component of ~Basis, and other notations are as defined
above. Table 5.8 reports the slope coefficients, White robust t-statistics and R-squared values on
each regression. Our results suggest that HFLev is highly and statistically significant on PC1Basis
with a t-stat of -2.48, and an R-squared of 12%. The negative slope coefficient suggests that lower
hedge fund debt leveraging can be associated with a larger systemic risk that simultaneously drives
LOP proxies. This suggests that the variations in the underlying systemic factor may be linked to
hedge fund debt constraints that become increasingly binding during Credit Crisis period.
C. Impact of Collateral Restrictions on Basis
Our second interest lies in the impact of loan collateral restrictions on ~Basis and hedge fund
capital structure. This analysis draws its logic from the literature on the impact of collateral
constraints on LOP deviations. Tuckman and Vila (1992) state that the optimal investment of
a risk-averse arbitrageur, constrained by holding costs, would lead to limited arbitrage positions.
Similarly, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) introduce a multi-period model where collateral directly limits
the positions of arbitrageurs. Liu and Longstaff (2004) show that the introduction of collateral
constraints would force investors to optimally underinvest in risky arbitrage positions, which may
16When we make the same regressions by using the leverage ratios of Arbitrage (RV), Credit (CV), Equity (EQ) and Event-Driven
(ED) strategies, individually, during Credit Crisis, we find significant impact of RV (with a t-stat of -2.87), and EQ (with a t-stat of
-1.94), and ED (with a t-stat of -2.00). Not only does this analysis show that the deleveraging affect of the arbitrage-focused hedge funds
have the highest marginal contribution on LOP growth, it also reveals that deleveraging of hedge funds that specialize on equity markets
and corporate events (such as mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcies) also contribute adversely to the pricing anomaly in credit and swap
markets, possibly due to an underlying contagion effect.
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lead to persistent and widening LOP deviation. The idea is related additionally to the hedge fund
literature, as discussed in Mitchell and Pulvino (2012).
Here, we study the impact of the changes in collateral requirements on ~Basis and HFLev. We
run the following panel regressions:
∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α3 + β3∆Coll(req)t + γ3∆
~Basisj,t + ǫ3,t (5.13)
∆¯HFLevt+1 = α5 + β5∆Coll(req)t + γ5∆¯HFLevt + ǫ5,t (5.14)
where Coll(req) is defined in Section I.17 Table 5.9 reports the slope coefficients, White robust
t-statistics and R-squared values on each regression.
Results suggest that Coll(req) has no significant impact on ~Basis during Pre-Crisis, Liquidity
and Post-Crisis periods. Nevertheless, it becomes highly and statistically significant during Credit
Crisis with a positive slope coefficient and a t-stat of 2.09. R-squared is 9%. The positivity of
the slope coefficient indicates that, in distressed periods, an increase in ~Basis deviations can be
linked to an increase in loan collateral requirements in the market. When funding costs through
tightened collateral exceed the expected arbitrage returns, traders would withdraw from the implied
opportunity. This result directly confirms the arguments of the related literature. Results also
suggest that Coll(req) has a statistically significant impact on HFLev during both Liquidity Crisis
and Credit Crisis with negative slope coefficients and t-stats of -1.91 and -2.04, respectively. While
R-squared is 50% during Liquidity Crisis, it is 70% during Credit Crisis. The increasing R-squared,
coupled with negative slope coefficients, suggest that, in distressed periods, a decrease in leverage
ratios (and thus debt funding) can indeed be linked to an increase in loan collateral requirements
in disrupted markets.
IV. Concluding Remarks
As a continuation to Chapter 3 and 4, and based on the literature stream 5 (in Chapter 2), this
chapter investigates the role of arbitrageurs as specialized institutions in ensuring price convergence
in mispriced securities. Modern finance theory suggests that, by targeting mispriced securities,
hedge funds channel the required liquidity (and the demand/supply dynamics) into arbitrage trades
until prices meet at relative equilibrium. Therefore, hedge funds, if allowed to participate in markets
during periods of non-binding constraints, tend to contribute positively to the LOP condition. The
main hypothesis states that hedge funds, if exposed to severe capital dry-up, would no longer provide
liquidity to markets, and consequently force similar assets to trade at similar prices, which in turn
17The variable Coll(req) is interpolated to match the weekly frequency of the components of ~Basis.
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would lead LOP deviations to diverge further away from the zero equilibrium. To the best of our
knowledge, the work presented in this chapter is the first in literature to quantify the impact of
hedge fund capital withdrawal on LOP deviations from both the equity and the debt sides.
Equity capital and debt capital are the two main funding sources that hedge funds rely on.
Debt financing in particular is obtained with substantial leverage to maximize expected returns.
The main idea is that, if only AuM falls, the hedge fund can compensate this fall by raising
additional leveraged-debt; and similarly, if only debt capital falls, the hedge fund can compensate
this fall by raising additional equity. On the whole, the total capital may still remain unaltered,
such that the hedge fund would continue to operate with the same capital that it has initially
required. Therefore, if only one of the two capital components drops, this does not necessarily
mean that the hedge fund would be forced away from the mispriced markets. The real problem,
however, arises when hedge fund shrinks simultaneously from both the equity and the debt sides.
In this circumstance, the hedge fund would find it increasingly difficult to fund itself through all
possible means. An intriguing example is observed during 2008 Credit Crisis, for instance, when
hedge funds were indeed unable to replace large AuM reductions with leveraged debt, and vice
versa. The significant fall in leverage ratios directly coincided with large AuM reductions.
In this study, we empirically test the proposition of the related literature, and investigate the im-
pact of the massive hedge fund capital dry-up on LOP deviations during 2008-2009 market turmoil.
The results validate the main hypothesis of the related literature, and indicate the occurrence of a
troubling chain reaction from credit suppliers to hedge funds, and from hedge funds to dislocated
markets with the inducement of persistent LOP deviations. Following the severe net tightening of
funding facilities through higher funding costs and restricted collateral requirements, hedge funds
find it increasingly difficult to raise leveraged debt – a phenomenon that erupts during bad states
of the economy when market constraints become strictly binding on traders. When the depletion
in the hedge fund debt capital is further coupled with sudden AuM reduction, hedge funds “de-
participate” from dislocated markets that offer risky arbitrages. This would further exacerbate the
relative pricing anomaly, and can be associated with larger and persistent LOP deviations. Our
analysis shows that an increase in LOP deviations can indeed be linked to depletions in AuM and
debt capital, and to hikes in loan collateral requirements. Therefore, hedge fund participation in fi-
nancial markets tends to contribute significantly to the restoration of correct valuation for mispriced
assets. This might potentially induce future research.
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Figure 5.1:
Hedge fund AuM across individual investment strategies
The figure displays the time evolution (in million USD) of Assets Under Management (AuM) of the hedge funds that specialize on six
different investment strategies (i.e. Arbitrage, Options, Commodity, Equity, Distressed Securities and Global Macro). The sample is July
2005 - April 2010, divided into the corresponding subsample periods by dashed vertical lines.
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Figure 5.2:
Hedge fund aggregate AuM across six investment strategies
The figure displays the time evolution (in millions USD) of Assets Under Management (AuM) of all hedge funds
together under six different investment strategies (i.e. Arbitrage, Options, Commodity, Equity, Distressed Securities
and Global Macro). The sample is July 2005 - April 2010, divided into the corresponding subsample periods by
dashed vertical lines.
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Figure 5.3:
Hedge fund leverage ratios
The figure displays the time evolution of the leverage ratios of hedge funds that specialize on Relative Value, Credit,
Equity and Event-Driven strategies. The figure also includes the average leverage ratio generated from all hedge
funds, shown as All HF. The sample is from July 2005 - September 2009, divided into the corresponding subsample
periods by dashed vertical lines.
126
Figure 5.4:
Euro area loan collateral requirements survey results
The figure displays the quarterly results of The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey regarding the collateral requirements
for loans and credit lines (extended to enterprises), covering the period May 2006 to May 2010. The survey seeks
an answer to the following question: over the last quarter, how have your bank’s loan and credit lines to enterprises
changed? The graph shows the collateral-specific results in terms of the net percentage, which is defined as the
difference between the proportion of banks that report tightened credit standards and the proportion of banks that
report eased credit standards. The variable is called Coll(req) which captures the net effect of collateral demands
on credit to firms. The sample includes Liquidity, Credit and Post-Crisis periods.
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Figure 5.5:
Basis(cds), Basis(scirp) and Basis(lcirp) dynamics
The plots show the evolution of Basiscds (shown in blue, in percentages); Basisscirp (shown in orange, in percentages)
and Basislcirp (shown in green, in percentages). Basisscirp and Basislcirp are constructed by shorting the USD
riskless bond and longing the EUR riskless bond, and are positive when the USD riskless bond is trading rich, and
negative when EUR riskless bond is trading rich. All figures cover between July 2005 - April 2010, divided into the
corresponding subsample periods by dashed vertical lines.
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Table 5.1:
Statistics for hedge fund AuMs
This table summarizes the sample-specific average AuMs (in million USD) of hedge funds that operate under six different investment
strategies: Arbitrage, Commodity, Distressed Securities, Equity, Global Macro and Options. The percentage change of AuM from the
previous period is presented. The entire sample is from July 2005 to April 2010. The data set is divided into Pre-Crisis (1 July 2005 - 8
August 2007), Liquidity Crisis (9 August 2007 - 29 August 2008), Credit Crisis (1 September 2008 - 31 March 2009) and Post-Crisis (1 April
2009 - 30 April 2010) periods.
Periods Hedge Fund Investment Strategies
Arbitrage Commodity Distressed Securities Equity Global Macro Options
Pre-Crisis AuM (millions) 69,854.14 151,163.90 26,054.93 158,386.71 24,524.38 1,720.07
Liquidity Crisis AuM (millions) 79,455.59 223,795.05 44,198.11 198,594.48 29,042.22 2,831.19
% Change from previous period 13.74 48.05 69.63 25.39 18.42 64.60
Credit Crisis AuM (millions) 51,982.15 219,601.71 31,382.98 125,436.85 20,515.72 2,303.35
% Change from previous period -34.58 -1.87 -28.99 -36.84 -29.36 -18.64
Post-Crisis AuM (millions) 42,040.72 224,128.70 21,065.35 120,006.48 19,250.83 1,700.58
% Change from previous period -19.12 2.06 -32.88 -4.33 -6.17 -26.17
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Table 5.2:
Correlations of hedge fund AuMs
This table summarizes the period-specific correlations of the AuMs of hedge funds that operate under six different investment strategies:
Arbitrage, Commodity, Distressed Securities, Equity, Global Macro and Options. The entire sample is from July 2005 to April 2010, divided
into Pre-Crisis (1 July 2005 - 8 August 2007), Liquidity Crisis (9 August 2007 - 29 August 2008), Credit Crisis (1 September 2008 - 31 March
2009) and Post-Crisis (1 April 2009 - 30 April 2010) periods.
Correlations
Pre-Crisis Arbitrage Commodity Distressed Securities Equity Global Macro
Commodity 95%
Distressed Securities 91% 84%
Equity 98% 95% 92%
Global Macro 90% 94% 86% 95%
Options 98% 91% 94% 95% 90%
Liquidity Crisis Arbitrage Commodity Distressed Securities Equity Global Macro
Commodity -96%
Distressed Securities -87% 92%
Equity 97% -90% -84%
Global Macro 23% -4% 14% 35%
Options -88% 91% 82% -84% -19%
Credit Crisis Arbitrage Commodity Distressed Securities Equity Global Macro
Commodity 98%
Distressed Securities 88% 89%
Equity 100% 99% 90%
Global Macro 97% 97% 95% 98%
Options 98% 93% 87% 96% 95%
Post-Crisis Arbitrage Commodity Distressed Securities Equity Global Macro
Commodity -81%
Distressed Securities 43% -42%
Equity -71% 93% -41%
Global Macro -81% 73% -61% 75%
Options 64% -79% 68% -78% -73%
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Table 5.3:
Statistics for hedge fund leverage ratios
This table summarizes the leverage ratios per month of hedge funds that operate under Credit (CR), Event-Driven (ED), Long-Short Equity
(EQ) and Relative Value Arbitrage (RV). It also includes the leverage using all hedge funds together (All HF). The percentage change of
AuMs from the previous period is presented. The entire sample is from July 2005 to September 2009. The data set is divided into Pre-Crisis
(1 July 2005 - 8 August 2007), Liquidity Crisis (9 August 2007 - 29 August 2008), Credit Crisis (1 September 2008 - 31 March 2009) and
Post-Crisis (1 April 2009 - 30 September 2009) periods.
Periods Hedge Fund Investment Strategies
All HF Credit Event-Driven Equity Relative Value
Pre-Crisis Leverage Ratio 2.36 3.08 1.41 1.73 5.81
Liquidity Crisis Leverage Ratio 2.07 2.34 1.40 1.70 4.68
% Change from previous period -12.45 -23.84 -0.50 -1.60 -19.40
Credit Crisis Leverage Ratio 1.47 1.59 0.92 1.22 3.34
% Change from previous period -29.01 -31.93 -34.41 -28.29 -28.74
Post-Crisis Leverage Ratio 1.46 1.31 1.12 1.26 2.45
% Change from previous period -0.64 -17.81 22.10 3.39 -26.61
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Table 5.4:
Correlations of leverage ratios
This table summarizes the period-specific correlations of the leverage ratios of hedge funds that operate under four different investment
strategies: Credit (CR), Event-Driven (ED), Equity (EQ) and Relative-Value Arbitrage (RV). The entire sample is from July 2005 to
September 2009, divided into Pre-Crisis (1 July 2005 - 8 August 2007), Liquidity Crisis (9 August 2007 - 29 August 2008), Credit Crisis (1
September 2008 - 31 March 2009) and Post-Crisis (1 April 2009 - 30 September 2009) periods.
Correlations
Pre-Crisis Credit Event-Driven Equity
Event-Driven 0.90
Equity 0.89 0.93
Relative-Value Arbitrage -0.17 -0.47 -0.34
Liquidity Crisis Credit Event-Driven Equity
Event-Driven 0.81
Equity 0.88 0.86
Relative-Value Arbitrage -0.09 -0.01 -0.28
Credit Crisis Credit Event-Driven Equity
Event-Driven 0.56
Equity 0.41 0.78
Relative-Value Arbitrage 0.92 0.78 0.59
Post-Crisis Credit Event-Driven Equity
Event-Driven 0.50
Equity 0.72 0.91
Relative-Value Arbitrage 0.94 0.59 0.75
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Table 5.5:
Common factor among Basis components
Table displays the cumulative principal component contributions of the first three eigenvalues generated from the covariance matrix of the
six components of ~Basisj for j=[Basisbond(br) ; Basisbond(mx) ; Basisbond(tr) ; Basiscds ; Basisscirp ; Basislcirp], each made stationary by
taking first-differences (i.e. ∆). λn for n (from 1 to 6) denotes the n
th eigenvalue corresponding to the nth principal component (from largest
to smallest), generated for Pre-Crisis, Crisis (Liquidity and Credit) and Post-Crisis periods. The contribution of each principal component
to the total variance of ~Basis is represented by calculating the coupling coefficient, which is obtained by dividing the nth eigenvalue to the
sum of all eigenvalues:
Coupling Coefficient =
λn∑6
n=1 λn
Contribution Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
(1 July 2005 - 8 August 2007) (9 August 2007 - 31 March 2009) (1 April 2009 - 30 April 2010)
λ1∑6
n=1 λn
28% 50% 44%
λ1+λ2∑6
n=1 λn
50% 71% 63%
λ1+λ2+λ3∑6
n=1 λn
68% 88% 77%
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Table 5.6:
Cross-market linkage among Basis components
Summary vector autoregressions are shown for vector ~Basisj for j=[Basisbond(br) ; Basisbond(mx) ; Basisbond(tr) ; Basiscds ; Basisscirp ;
Basislcirp], each made stationary by taking first-differences (i.e. ∆). A lag structure of two weeks is chosen according to AIC. We report the
V coefficients, t-statistics (immediately below) and R-squared values for the Crisis period (9 August 2007 - 31 March 2009). Intercepts are
not reported. (**) shows 95% and (*) shows 90% confidence interval. The following VAR is estimated:
∆ ~Basisj,t = aj +
2∑
k=1
6∑
l=1
Vj,k,l∆ ~Basisj,l,t−k + ej,t
Basis(bond-TR) Basis(bond-BR) Basis(bond-MX) Basis(cds) Basis(scirp) Basis(lcirp)
Basis(bond-TR) (-1) -0.3823 0.0220 -0.2082 0.1019 0.0049 -0.0704
-3.1189** 0.1913 -1.8068* 0.5957 0.0573 -0.8452
Basis(bond-TR) (-2) -0.1281 0.1140 0.1707 -0.1424 0.0445 0.0899
-1.0292 0.9739 1.4585 -0.8201 0.5095 1.0620
Basis(bond-BR) (-1) -0.0682 0.5165 0.4846 -0.0583 -0.0616 0.0251
-0.4521 3.6425** 3.4169** -0.2769 -0.5817 0.2445
Basis(bond-BR) (-2) 0.3278 -0.1307 -0.0068 -0.4039 0.2106 0.2412
2.1119** -0.8957 -0.0467 -1.8645* 1.9325* 2.2862**
Basis(bond-MX) (-1) -0.1565 -0.5548 -0.5786 0.1202 -0.2168 -0.1738
-1.0828 -4.0827** -4.2572** 0.5960 -2.1361** -1.7687*
Basis(bond-MX) (-2) -0.1696 -0.1275 -0.0313 0.3494 -0.2906 -0.2378
-1.1066 -0.8849 -0.2168 1.6333 -2.6998** -2.282**
Basis(cds) (-1) -0.0611 0.1501 -0.0991 -0.4753 -0.0241 -0.0048
-0.7135 1.8652* -1.2319 -3.98** -0.4006 -0.0831
Basis(cds) (-2) -0.1257 0.1495 0.0260 0.0059 0.2950 0.1172
-1.4072 1.7805* 0.3099 0.0470 4.7042** 1.9312*
Basis(scirp) (-1) 0.4131 -0.3043 0.2622 0.7041 -0.0125 0.2375
1.9408* -1.5203 1.3097 2.3702** -0.0836 1.6409
Basis(scirp) (-2) 0.0940 -0.0948 -0.0247 -0.2542 0.0184 0.2105
0.4194 -0.4502 -0.1173 -0.8131 0.1172 1.3821
Basis(lcirp) (-1) -0.1419 -0.1217 -0.3254 -0.5447 -0.0720 -0.4317
-0.5748 -0.5245 -1.4018 -1.5813 -0.4152 -2.5724**
Basis(lcirp) (-2) -0.0239 0.3392 -0.0349 0.3858 -0.1736 -0.2756
-0.0939 1.4173 -0.1457 1.0862 -0.9716 -1.5928
R-squared 29% 45% 49% 34% 44% 24%
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Table 5.7:
Regressions on LOP deviations and hedge fund AuMs and leverage ratios
Displays two types of regressions as outlined below for vector ~Basisj for j=[Basisbond(br) ; Basisbond(mx) ; Basisbond(tr) ; Basiscds ;
Basisscirp ; Basislcirp]. Variable column shows the explanatory variables, such that HFAuM denotes the AuM of hedge funds that operate
under Arbitrage strategies; and HFLev denotes the leverage ratio of the hedge funds that operate under Arbitrage strategies. First-difference
is represented by ∆, and percentage difference is represented by ∆¯. Sample is divided into Pre-Crisis, Liquidity, Credit and Post-Crisis
periods. We report the average parameter estimates. The associated White-robust t-statistics are displayed immediately beneath. Intercepts
are not reported. (**) shows 95% and (*) shows 90% confidence interval. The two specifications from (A) to (B) are shown in table, and are
estimated as follows:
(A) ∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α1 + β1∆¯HFAuMt + γ1,j∆ ~Basisj,t + ǫ1,t
(B) ∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α2 + β2∆¯HFLevt + γ2,j∆ ~Basisj,t + ǫ2,t
Variables Pre-Crisis Liquidity Crisis Credit Crisis Post-Crisis
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1) Basis(+1)
HFAuM 0.00 - 0.22 - -0.04 - -0.01 -
0.10 - 1.76* - -3.22** - -0.65 -
HFLev - 0.00 - 0.01 - -0.06 - 0.01
- -0.17 - 1.31 - -2.94** - 0.28
Basis(bond-BR) -0.24 -0.24 -0.15 -0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.52 -0.52
-2.03** -2.04** -1.46 -1.69* 0.10 0.04 -5.33** -4.94**
Basis(bond-MX) -0.26 -0.26 -0.30 -0.30 -0.41 -0.41 -0.37 -0.46
-3.09** -3.1** -2.05** -2.1** -3.62** -3.26** -2.94** -2.76**
Basis(bond-TR) -0.34 -0.34 -0.18 -0.17 -0.40 -0.43 -0.29 -0.43
-2.99** -3.** -1.27 -1.19 -2.1** -2.5** -1.81* -2.16**
Basis(cds) -0.21 -0.21 -0.09 -0.10 -0.43 -0.50 -0.38 -0.43
-1.85* -1.86* -0.52 -0.57 -1.57 -1.87* -2.72** -2.76**
Basis(scirp) -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.30 -0.28 -0.32 -0.34 -0.44
-2.55** -2.54** -1.87* -1.77* -1.37 -1.81* -2.69** -2.41**
Basis(lcirp) -0.41 -0.41 -0.50 -0.51 -0.01 -0.08 -0.24 -0.28
-4.42** -4.44** -3.22** -3.47** -0.06 -0.50 -1.99** -1.68*
R-squared 8% 8% 8% 8% 17% 20% 16% 22%
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Table 5.8:
Regressions on first principal component of LOP deviations and hedge fund capital structure
Displays two types of regressions as outlined below for PCBasis denoting the first principal component of ~Basisj for j=[Basisbond(br) ;
Basisbond(mx) ; Basisbond(tr) ; Basiscds ; Basisscirp ; Basislcirp]. Variable column shows the explanatory variables, such that HFAuM
denotes the AuM of hedge funds that operate under Arbitrage strategies; and HFLev denotes the leverage ratio of the hedge funds
that operate under Arbitrage strategies. Percentage difference is represented by ∆¯. Sample is Credit Crisis period. We report the
average parameter estimates. The associated White-robust t-statistics are displayed immediately beneath. Intercepts are not reported.
(**) shows 95% and (*) shows 90% confidence interval. The two specifications from (A) to (B) are shown in table, and are estimated as follows:
(A) ∆PC1Basist+1 = α1 + β1∆¯HFAuMt + ǫ1,t
(B) ∆PC1Basist+1 = α2 + β2∆¯HFLevt + ǫ2,t
Variables Credit Crisis
(A) (B)
PC1Basis (+1) PC1Basis (+1)
HFAuM 0.12 -
1.43 -
HFLev - -0.48
- -2.48**
R-squared 0% 12%
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Table 5.9:
Regressions on LOP deviations, hedge fund AuMs, leverage ratios and loan collateral tightening
Displays three types of regressions as outlined below for vector ~Basisj for j=[Basisbond(br) ; Basisbond(mx) ; Basisbond(tr) ; Basiscds ;
Basisscirp ; Basislcirp]. Variable column shows the explanatory variables, such that HFLev denotes the leverage ratio of the hedge funds
that operate under Arbitrage strategies; and Coll(req) denotes the net tightening of collateral requirements for loans and credit lines
(extended to enterprises), based on The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey. First-difference is represented by ∆, and percentage difference is
represented by ∆¯. Sample is divided into Pre-Crisis, Liquidity, Credit and Post-Crisis periods. We report the average parameter estimates.
The associated White-robust t-statistics are displayed immediately beneath. Intercepts are not reported. (**) shows 95% and (*) shows 90%
confidence interval. The three specifications from (A) to (B) are shown in table, and are estimated as follows:
(A) ∆ ~Basisj,t+1 = α3 + β3∆Coll(req)t + γ3∆
~Basisj,t + ǫ3,t
(B) ∆¯HFLevt+1 = α5 + β5∆Coll(req)t + γ5∆¯HFLevt + ǫ5,t
Variables Liquidity Crisis Credit Crisis Post-Crisis
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
Basis(+1) HFLev (+1) Basis(+1) HFLev (+1) Basis(+1) HFLev (+1)
Coll (req) -0.01 -0.34 0.08 -0.78 0.03 0.73
-0.40 -1.91* 2.09** -2.04** 1.30 0.96
Basis -0.27 - -0.27 - -0.32 -
-4.29** - -3.87** - -5.78** -
HFAuM - - - - - -
- - - - - -
HFLev - 0.65 - 0.60 - 0.79
- 3.49** - 3.19** - 6.59**
R-squared 8% 50% 9% 70% 11% 56%
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis is dedicated to understanding the state-dependent dynamics of LOP violations in fi-
nancial markets during different stages (Pre-Crisis, Liquidity Crisis, Credit Crisis and Post-Crisis)
related to the recent subprime crisis. To the academic literature, we introduce a new LOP devia-
tion proxy, called Basisbond, which is structured around a sample of emerging market coupon-paying
bond pairs issued by the same sovereign (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) in two different foreign cur-
rency denominations (USD and Euro). Our construction is based on shorting the USD-denominated
bond and longing the Euro-denominated bond of the same issuer, and converting each future Euro
cash-flow of the Euro-denominated bond into dollars using a series of forward FX contracts (see
Chapter 3). This way a trader should normally be expected to do no better than meeting the dollar
liability cash-flows on the USD bond side using the dollar-converted asset cash-flows on the Euro
bond side. Despite some minor structural cash-flow mismatches inherent in the given bond pairs,
we show that any sizable deviation of Basisbond from zero gives a plausible approximation of LOP
deviation (i.e. a proxy for near-LOP deviation), and provides a useful insight about a potential
pricing anomaly in Eurobond markets.
The conclusions of the thesis can be summarized under the following main points:
1. While Basisbond moves close to zero (supporting LOP condition) during the good states of the
economy (Pre-Crisis), it becomes markedly large, strongly persistent and highly volatile during
the bad states of the economy, far outstripping the total transaction cost threshold (Credit
Crisis). Basisbond variation from Pre-Crisis to Credit Crisis not only indicates increasing
returns, but also displays increasing volatility (and therefore uncertainty), which could be a
factor deterring arbitrageurs from exploiting the implied opportunity (see Chapter 3).
2. Supported by multi-sample hypothesis tests, results give strong evidence that Basisbond is
state-dependent and time-variant, and is a good proxy for testing LOP deviations. Our
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findings suggest that the underlying structural limitation of the trade (interest rate risk due
to cash-flow mismatches) is far from explaining the high levels of the mispricing encountered
(see Chapter 3). This leads us to investigate whether any state-dependent financial constraints
are relevant.
3. When trading strategy is constructed by shorting the USD-denominated bond and longing
the Euro-denominated bond, Basisbond deviation in Turkey is generally negative, whereas
Basisbond deviations in Mexico and Brazil are generally positive during Credit Crisis. This
indicates that the sign of Basisbond deviation depends on the geography of the issuing country
(see Chapter 3).
4. This interesting sign difference requires investigation. As a result of Turkey paying a higher
credit yield spread in USD than Euro (Sa > Sb), and forward FX markets being unable to
correct this imbalance, Basisbond deviation in Turkey is negative. On the other hand, as a
result of Brazil and Mexico paying a higher credit yield spread in EUR than USD (Sa < Sb),
and forward FX markets being unable to correct this imbalance, Basisbond deviations in Brazil
and Mexico are negative. The price discovery analysis reveals that Sa contributes more than
Sb to the price discovery process in Brazil and Mexico, whereas the opposite is true in Turkey
(see Chapter 4).
5. In support of conclusion 4 above, when Basisbond is decomposed into CIRP and Spread Com-
ponents, the latter (related to the credit yield spreads) is found to be the dominant factor in
explaining the pricing anomaly. Unlike commonly assumed, this implies that investors during
times of market turmoil tend to assign different default risks to different foreign-currency se-
curities, even though both securities are issued by the same sovereign. Default risk is not only
country-specific, but is also currency-specific in each country. Under these circumstances,
when investors face discordant default risks across two equivalent securities, Basisbond trade
could indeed be left unexploited, causing prices to diverge further away from each other (see
Chapter 4).
6. One clue to the geographic spread difference is obtained by comparing central bank interna-
tional reserve distributions of Turkey and Brazil. It is observed that Turkey, being a major
trade partner with the Euro Zone, tends to hold more Euro than USD in its reserves, while
Brazil, being closer to the USD-based trade geography, holds significantly less Euro than USD.
Therefore, it could be argued that, during Credit Crisis, markets assigned a relatively lower
default risk premium to Euro-based assets in a Euro-strong country like Turkey, while they
assigned a relatively lower default risk premium to USD-based assets in a USD-strong country,
like Brazil (see Chapter 4).
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7. An additional factor that contributes to the sign puzzle arises from differences in arbitrageurs’
accessibility to different loan markets. European banks, being major traders of Turkish bonds,
have comparative advantage in funding in Euro than USD. Therefore, European traders would
tend to short the EUR bonds and long the USD bonds of Turkey. The opposite mechanism is
true for Brazil and Mexico. U.S. banks, being major traders of Brazilian and Mexican bonds,
have comparative advantage in funding in USD than EUR. Therefore, U.S. traders would tend
to short the USD bonds and long the EUR bonds of Brazil and Mexico (see Chapter 4).
8. Our analyses show that the sizable and persistent pricing anomaly encountered during Credit
Crisis was the result of a set of macroeconomic and market forces strongly interacting with
each other. More specifically, we find that on one side, sharply decreasing supply of funds, due
to rising funding costs (captured by Secured and Unsecured), falling bond supply (captured
by Inventory), and slowing macroeconomic activity (captured by LN-Macro); and on the other
side, sharply decreasing appetite for risky arbitrage, due to deteriorating credit risk perception
(captured by EM-CDSI) and increasing risk-aversion (captured by Closed End), jointly acted
as binding constraints and/or deterring factors that kept arbitrageurs from exploiting the
underlying opportunity, causing prices to diverge further and further away from equilibrium
(see Chapter 4).
9. Novel conclusions are obtained regarding the cross-sectional affects of the monetary policy
transmission during Credit Crisis. Results show that the U.S. monetary policies, implemented
during Liquidity Crisis and Credit Crisis, had significant impact in reducing Basisbond devi-
ations in the countries that participated in (or indirectly benefited from) them. Following
Federal Open Market Committee’s policy decision of October 29, 2008 to extend global dollar
swap lines to Brazil and Mexico (but not to Turkey), the cross-sectional gap between Turkish
Basisbond and Brazilian/Mexican Basisbond started to widen. A similar development occurred
following the Fed’s introduction of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (October 7, 2008),
and the U.S. Treasury’s announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (October 14,
2008), both aimed at relieving the funding constraints in the U.S. financial markets. Conse-
quently, Brazil and Mexico, being major trade partners with the U.S., benefited to a greater
extent from these policies than Turkey (see Chapter 4).
10. A significant level of linkage exists among the pricing anomalies in credit markets (represented
by Basisbond of Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, and Basiscds) and swap markets (represented by
Basisscirp and Basislcirp) during market turmoil. This implies that arbitrageurs who participate
in these different markets were limited by similar constraints. Based on PCA results, there
is strong evidence for the presence of an underlying systemic shock driving different pricing
anomalies simultaneously during Crisis period (see Chapter 5).
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11. There exists a strong level of correlation across the normally impermeable hedge fund strate-
gies during Credit Crisis, where AuMs and leverage ratios of all hedge fund strategies experi-
enced a sharp decline. Such occurrences of co-movement indicate the presence of a contagious
interaction between different markets during Credit Crisis (see Chapter 5).
12. The role of hedge funds as arbitrageurs in ensuring LOP condition is quantified. Analyses
confirm the hypothesis that the withdrawal (“de-participation”) of hedge funds from the mar-
kets, due to reductions of debt financing (captured by changes in leverage ratios) and equity
capital (captured by changes in AuM) contributed significantly to relative price divergence
across credit and swap markets (see Chapter 5).
13. Collateral constraints (captured by tightened requirements on loans and credit lines) had
additional adverse impact on both hedge fund deleveraging and LOP condition, creating a
chain reaction from credit suppliers to hedge funds, and from hedge funds to markets with the
end result of LOP disequilibrium. The results suggest that the supply of insufficient amount
of liquidity to capital markets contributed significantly to the incorrect relative valuation of
securities (see Chapter 5).
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